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1.1. GEnEral InTrOduCTIOn
In this thesis, we will discuss private expenditure on health and voluntary private health 
insurance (PHI). The two themes are linked since private expenditure represents the 
market for PHI. Knowing and understanding private expenditure on health is a prerequi-
site for PHI to respond to consumer needs and to improve welfare.
The following issues will be addressed in this thesis: (i) the reliability of OECD Health 
Statistics; (ii) supplementary physicians’ fees; (iii) access to new health technologies; (iv) 
the regulation of PHI markets and (v) the optimal design of PHI products.
We will focus on Belgium and neighbouring countries. As regards the regulation of 
PHI, we will also discuss Slovenia. All these countries are characterised by Bismarckian 
health care systems and complementary PHI markets. Key figures for these countries are 
represented in Table 1. The figures for Belgium are quite close to the EU average.
Table 1. Key figures for selected EU countries (2014)
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Public expenditure on healtha 78.74% 77.6% 78.6% 84.6%b 80.6% 71.0%
Out-of-pocket expenditure on healtha 15.34% 17.8% 7.0% 13.0% 12.3% 13.0%
Voluntary private health insurancea 4.85% 4.4% 13.7% 1.5% 5.9% 14.8%
Other financing schemesa 1.07% 0.2% 0.7% 0.9% 1.2% 1.2%
Percentage of total population covered by complementary PHI n.a. 82.2% 95.5% 22.9%c 84.5% 72.8%
a: as a share of total expenditure on health
b: including primary (substitutive) private health insurance
c: In Germany, another 10.9% of the population holds primary (substitutive) private health insurance.
Figures adapted from OECD, Health at a Glance: Europe 2016
Within the context of this thesis, we will focus on complementary health insurance. 
Complementary insurance covers services that are excluded from the statutory benefits 
package or it may reimburse the costs of statutory user charges and supplementary fees 
charged by health care providers (Thomson and Mossialos, 2009).1
1	 Supplementary	insurance	is	not	within	the	scope	of	this	thesis.	Supplementary	insurance	offers	access	
to	health	services	that	are	already	covered	by	mandatory	basic	health	insurance	but	gives	subscribers	
a	greater	choice	of	provider	and	enables	them	to	bypass	waiting	lists	for	publicly-financed	treatments	
(Thomson	 and	 Mossialos,	 2009).	 Substitutive	 insurance	 is	 also	 out	 of	 scope.	 Substitutive	 insurance	
provides	cover	for	people	not	eligible	for	statutory	health	coverage	or	for	those	who	are	not	required	to	
be	statutorily	covered	and	can	opt	into	or	out	of	the	statutory	scheme	(Thomson	and	Mossialos,	2009).	
Substitutive	insurance	plays	a	significant	role	in	Germany,	where	about	9	million	people	have	subscribed	
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In the European Union (EU), private expenditure represents -on average- 21 per cent of 
total expenditure on health (see Table 1).2 Three-quarters of private expenditure or 15 per 
cent of total expenditure is financed out-of-pocket.3 Voluntary private health insurance 
(PHI) finances only 5 per cent of total health spending in the EU (OECD, 2016).4
Out-of-pocket expenditure on health can negatively affect access to health care. People 
on low incomes and in poor health are particularly at risk. Households that face difficul-
ties paying medical bills may postpone or even forgo the health care they need.
In the most recent Belgian Health Interview Survey (2013), 26 per cent of households 
stated that out-of-pocket expenditure on health is (very) hard to bear (in the lowest 
and highest income quintile the figures are 50 per cent and 5 per cent respectively). In 
2013, 8 per cent of Belgian households had to postpone health care for financial reasons 
(Demarest, 2015). Chronic diseases have a particularly negative impact on the acces-
sibility of health goods and services. 54 per cent of Belgian households with chronically 
ill members face financial hardship and 46 per cent need to postpone health care for 
financial reasons (66 per cent postpone dental care, 46 per cent medical specialist care, 
44 per cent glasses and 31 per cent medication) (Samana, 2016). Research by a Belgian 
cancer foundation shows that private health expenses for cancer patients amount to 
1,838 EUR (median) during the first year after the initial treatment. 25 per cent pays 2,844 
EUR per year or more (Rommel, 2015). Recently, the term ‘cancer poverty’ has come into 
vogue (Lewis, 2017).
Out-of-pocket expenditure on health comprises both user charges on the statutory 
benefits package and expenditure on health goods and services that are not covered by 
mandatory basic health insurance.
to	substitutive	health	insurance.	The	OECD	differentiates	between	complementary,	supplementary	and	
duplicate	PHI.	According	to	the	OECD	definitions,	complementary	insurance	covers	any	cost	sharing	left	
after	basic	 coverage.	 Supplementary	 insurance	adds	additional	 services	 and	duplicate	 insurance	pro-
vides	faster	access	or	wider	choice	to	providers.	Thomson’s	and	Mossialos’	definition	of	complementary	
insurance	 is	 broader	 than	 the	definition	of	 complementary	 insurance	used	by	 the	OECD.	 In	 fact,	 the	
definition	of	complementary	insurance	by	Thomson	and	Mossialos	encompasses	both	complementary	
and	supplementary	insurance	as	defined	by	the	OECD.	In	this	thesis,	we	use	the	definitions	of	Thomson	
and	Mossialos.
2	 Total	 expenditure	 on	 health	 is	 composed	 of	 public	 and	 private	 expenditure.	 Private	 expenditure	 on	
health	 includes	both	out-of-pocket	expenditure	and	expenditure	covered	by	voluntary	private	health	
insurance	(PHI).	
3	 Surprisingly,	out-of-pocket	expenditure	in	the	EU	is	higher	than	in	the	United	States,	where	out-of-pocket	
expenditure	represents	12	per	cent	of	total	expenditure	on	health	(OECD,	2017;	figure	for	2014).	
4	 Figures	for	2014.
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User charges (deductibles, co-insurance [a percentage] and co-payments [a fixed sum]) 
play a role in preventing the overuse of health care provision.  However, these mecha-
nisms can also allow the public sector to shift costs onto households. For instance, 
Thomas, Thomson and Mossialos (2015) find that this has been the case in Slovenia.
In contrast to publicly-funded care, out-of-pocket payments depend on the patient’s 
ability to pay. Therefore, many countries have policies in place to protect categories of 
the population from excessive out-of-pocket payments. These comprise partial or total 
exemptions for social aid beneficiaries, senior citizens, or people with chronic diseases 
or disabilities by capping user charges, either in absolute terms or as a share of income 
(Paris et al., 2016). However, these policies generally provide protection against the 
costs of statutory user charges only. Health services and goods that are excluded from 
the statutory benefits package need to be paid for out-of-pocket by everybody. This 
is particularly true for certain pharmaceutical drugs, dental treatment and therapeutic 
appliances such as eyeglasses and hearing aids. Across the EU, pharmaceutical drugs 
account for 40 per cent of total out-of-pocket expenditure, dental care for 18 per cent 
and therapeutic appliances for 12 per cent. The remaining 30 per cent is constituted by 
curative care (OECD, Health at a Glance, 2016).
OECD Health Statistics are a widely used source for detailed information on health ex-
penditure. OECD Health Statistics are used to analyse health policy issues over time and 
in comparison with other countries (Oderkirk, 2013). When analysing private expenditure 
on health, it is important that these statistics be reliable. Therefore, we will examine 
the reliability of OECd Health Statistics as far as private expenditure on health is 
concerned.
All European countries endorse equity of access to health care for all people as an im-
portant policy objective. Private expenditure on health has an important bearing on the 
following policy issues: (i) free choice of health care provider; (ii) access to better quality 
of care and (iii) waiting time. The last issue, bypassing waiting lists for publicly-financed 
treatment, is out of scope. This thesis focuses on Bismarckian health care systems where 
waiting lists tend to be less of a problem than in Beveridgean national health systems.
We will focus on the two first issues: (i) supplementary physicians’ fees buying free 
choice of physician and (ii) out-of-pocket payments buying access to new health 
technologies. New health technologies -health goods and services- which are not (yet) 
reimbursed by basic health insurance are accessible only for patients able and willing to 
pay out-of-pocket. In Belgium and France, access to certain physicians is similarly only 
possible for patients able and willing to pay supplementary fees.
12
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When out-of-pocket expenditure represents a significant share of total expenditure 
on health, welfare can be increased by PHI. However, PHI covers only a relatively small 
proportion of private spending on health, less than 25 per cent in most EU Member 
States, except for France (65 per cent), Ireland (41 per cent), Luxembourg (33 per cent), 
the Netherlands (30 per cent) and Slovenia (51 per cent) (OECD Health Statistics 2017, 
figures for 2015). It appears that private insurers in Europe are not very successful in 
converting out-of-pocket expenditure into PHI.
National governments concerned about the accessibility and affordability of PHI tend to 
impose restrictive regulation on the operation of private health insurance markets. The 
question is: in how far is restrictive regulation of PHI markets in accordance with Eu 
free market principles?
PHI can lead to welfare gains if the advantages of health insurance outweigh the disad-
vantages. Advantages of health insurance are: (i) the reduction of financial risk for the in-
sured and (ii) access to health care that would otherwise be unaffordable. Disadvantages 
are: (i) loading costs and (ii) moral hazard. Unfortunately, many PHI products currently 
are suboptimal. The question is: how can the design of PHI products be optimised?
In the following sections, we will expand on each of the five above-mentioned issues 
that will be addressed in this thesis.
1.2. rElIabIlITy Of OECd HEalTH STaTISTICS
Since 2005, OECD, Eurostat and WHO have been jointly collecting expenditure and 
financing information from OECD and EU countries.
OECD Health Statistics on private and out-of-pocket expenditure on health provide 
important information for the different stakeholders in the health care system. For 
policymakers, it is important to know how much and what kind of care is being financed 
privately, and for determining whether there might be a problem with the accessibility of 
health care. Data on private and out-of-pocket expenditure are indispensable for health 
insurers. Basic health insurers need to be able to measure the effect of their reimburse-
ment policy, while insurers offering PHI need as detailed information as possible about 
their potential market, which is made up of privately financed care. Finally, practitioners 
and patients need comprehensive clarification of the costs to be borne by the patient, 
since treatment decisions may well be influenced by cost issues.
13
Introduction
Ch
ap
te
r 1
The OECD states that it provides ‘accurate, reliable and timely data on health spending 
that is comparable across OECD countries and over time’ (OECD, 2015). Doubts about the 
reliability of the OECD data for private expenditure on general hospitals in Belgium have 
led us to critically examine Belgian official data on private health expenses.
Research questions:
1. In how far are OECD Health Statistics on private expenditure on health for Belgium reli-
able?
2. What are the major obstacles to a correct estimation of private expenditure on health?
1.3. SuPPlEmEnTary PHySICIanS’ fEES
A supplementary fee is an extra fee charged by health care providers on top of the tariff 
agreed upon by the health insurance system.5
Both in Belgium and in France, supplementary physicians’ fees are a ‘hot’ issue. Physi-
cians can charge supplementary fees in case of special demands made by the patient 
(e.g., a late-night consultation). In Belgium, any physician can charge supplementary 
fees for households whose taxable income exceeds 67,636 EUR per year (figure for 2017). 
Physicians who choose not to be bound by social security tariffs - ‘sector 2’ and ‘non-
conventioned’ physicians in France and Belgium respectively- can charge supplemen-
tary fees to all patients in all circumstances. In Belgian hospitals, supplementary fees can 
be applied by any physician if the patient is staying in a private room.
Patients who are not willing or not able to pay supplementary fees may not be treated 
by the physician of their choice.
Table 2 shows that there is a huge span in private expenditure between a private room 
and a double or common hospital room in Belgium. The span can be explained through 
supplementary fees and -to a lesser extent- room charges, neither of which may be 
charged in a double or common room. In 2015, supplementary fees represented 61 
per cent of private expenditure for a classic hospital stay in a private room (Mutualité 
Chrétienne, 2016).
5	 In	Belgium,	 the	 terms	‘ereloonsupplement’	 (Dutch)	and	‘supplément d’honoraires’	 (French)	are	used	 for	a	
fee	charged	on	top	of	the	official	tariff	set	by	the	social	security	system.	In	France,	the	term	‘dépassement 
d’honoraires’	is	applied.	In	North	America,	the	terms	‘extra	billing’	and	‘balance	billing’	are	used.
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Table 2. Average private expenditure for an admission in a Belgian hospital (EUR, 2015) (Source: Mutualité 
Chrétienne, 2016)
Private room Double or common room
Classic hospital stay (min. 1 night) 1463 278
Surgical one-day clinic 735 122
Non-surgical one-day clinic 437 25
For certain categories of self-employed medical specialists, supplementary fees consti-
tute a substantial part of their income (see Table 3). Supplementary fees represent -on 
average- respectively 35 per cent and 32 per cent of the gross income of Belgian and 
French surgeons in hospitals.6
Table 3. Supplementary fees as a percentage of gross income of sector 2 physicians (France)/self-employed 
physicians (Belgium) providing inpatient care in 2010 (DREES, 2012; Swartenbroekx, 2012).
france belgium
Specialism % of gross income % of gross income
Stomatology 45.6% 15.9%
Surgery 31.9% 34.7%
Gynaecology 29.5% 34.9%
Ophthalmology 25.3% 10.1%
Oto-rhino-laryngology 20.8% 12.3%
Anaesthesia 16.7% 31.5%
Paediatrics 16.7% 21.1%
Psychiatry 16.6% 4.2%
Gastro-enterology 11.6% 11.5%
Radiology 4.0% 13.4%
Cardiology 4.0% 15.0%
Pneumology 4.0% 5.8%
Both in Belgium and France, hospitals also benefit from supplementary fees. In most 
hospitals, physicians have to cede a certain percentage of their supplementary fees to 
the hospital to help finance overhead costs.
Expenditure on supplementary fees is increasing at a pace far exceeding the growth rate 
of total expenditure on health. So far, measures taken in Belgium and France to curb cost 
inflation of supplementary fees have not yet resulted in a stabilisation or a reduction of 
supplementary fees.
6	 Only	the	income	earned	in	hospitals	has	been	taken	into	account.	Supplementary	fees	charged	outside	
of	the	hospitals	are	not	included.	
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In this thesis, we calculate estimates for expenditure on supplementary fees in Belgium. 
We discuss figures on the cost (evolution) of supplementary physicians’ fees in Belgium 
and France. Measures taken to contain costs are then evaluated. The added value of the 
supplementary fee system for physicians and patients is also investigated. Finally, the 
future of supplementary fees in Belgium and France is discussed.
Research questions:
3. What is the cost (evolution) of supplementary physicians’ fees in Belgium and France?
4. How can cost inflation of supplementary physicians’ fees be contained?
5. What is the added value of supplementary physicians’ fees?
6. Is a system of supplementary physicians’ fees charged on top of social security tariffs 
sustainable?
1.4. aCCESS TO nEw HEalTH TECHnOlOGIES
New health technologies come on the market at a rapid pace and -sometimes- at a 
huge cost. Providing access to new health technologies is a serious challenge for many 
countries with mandatory basic health insurance.
While mandatory basic health insurance generally covers a broad range of health tech-
nologies, new technologies may not be -readily- covered because of budgetary reasons 
or because there is (as yet) no unanimity about their evidence-based character or their 
medical necessity. National health authorities can decide not to cover a new health 
technology, even if the technology has been acknowledged by health technology as-
sessment (HTA) centres and/or is covered by health insurers in other countries.
Today, the HTA Core Model is widely used for the assessment of new health technolo-
gies. The model enables effective international production and sharing of HTA results 
in a structured format (Lampe et al., 2009). The model emphasises the multidisciplinary 
nature of assessments, employing the following nine domains: (1) health problem and 
current use of technology, (2) description and technical characteristics of technology, (3) 
safety, (4) clinical effectiveness, (5) costs and economic evaluation, (6) ethical analysis, (7) 
organisational aspects, (8) patients and social aspects and (9) legal aspects.7
The fifth domain, ‘costs and economic evaluation’, is particularly important for the 
reimbursement of new health technologies by health insurance. Economic evaluation 
7	 The	HTA	Core	Model	is	available	at:	https://www.eunethta.eu/hta-core-model/.	
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has been defined as a comparative analysis of alternative courses of action in terms of 
both their costs and consequences (Drummond et al., 2015). The aim of the costs and 
economic evaluation domain is to inform value-for-money judgements about health 
technologies with information about costs, health-related outcomes and economic ef-
ficiency (Canadian Coordinating Office for Health Technology Assessment, 1994). Five 
main types of economic evaluation can contribute to HTA: cost-effectiveness analysis, 
cost-utility analysis, cost-consequences analysis, cost-benefit analysis, and cost-minimi-
sation analysis. Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) compares the costs and effects of at 
least two alternative technologies. The results of such analysis are generally expressed 
in the form of an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER). An ICER represents the 
estimated difference in costs between the comparators divided by the estimated 
difference in effect between the comparators. In an example where the effects of the 
comparators are measured in life years, the estimated ICER could be reported as the 
cost per life-year gained. The ICER approach is currently the most widely used outcome 
of economic evaluations. Whether a technology can be referred to as ‘cost-effective’ 
depends on its relation to any extant ‘decision-makers’ willingness-to-pay’ or ‘societal 
willingness-to-pay’ for an additional unit of health outcome (so-called ‘ICER threshold’). 
If one main aim of a health system is to maximise health-related outcomes given the 
resources available, a technology can be considered as being ‘cost-effective’, i.e. improv-
ing economic efficiency in health care, if its ICER estimate is lower than a threshold value 
(or threshold range). If the estimated ICER is higher than the threshold, the technology is 
not considered to be cost-effective and hence allocation of resources to this technology 
would be unlikely to increase economic efficiency in health care (Cleemput et al., 2009).
The issue of access to new health technologies can best be illustrated by some examples. 
The first example concerns several countries whereas the other examples relate to the 
situation in Belgium.
About one per cent of the population in Western countries is infected with the hepatitis 
C virus. Hepatitis C can lead to liver cirrhosis and liver cancer. Recently, new medica-
tion has come on the market which can eradicate the hepatitis C virus. However, since 
this medication costs 30000 to 50000 EUR per patient and about one per cent of the 
population is affected, reimbursement by mandatory health insurance in many coun-
tries is limited to patients already suffering from liver cirrhosis. People infected with the 
hepatitis C virus who want to avoid developing liver cirrhosis need to pay for the new 
medication out-of-pocket.
In Belgian hospitals, there are lists with out-of-pocket payments for well-defined 
health technologies that are available for the patient. Whereas standard treatment A is 
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covered by mandatory basic health insurance, for treatment B, applying a new health 
technology, one must pay the listed additional out-of-pocket payments. An example of 
a treatment which -between 2011 and 2014- needed to be paid for out-of-pocket is the 
trabecular metal hip (2500 EUR), which is used to replace failed hip implants. The use of 
trabecular metal increases implant stability and enables biologic in-growth, which can 
help lead to long-term fixation. An orthopaedic surgeon explained how he made the 
choice between a classic hip implant, paid for by mandatory basic health insurance, and 
a trabecular metal hip implant, to be paid for out-of-pocket: ‘The trabecular metal hip 
implant option is discussed only with financially well-off patients. It is very awkward to 
discuss a treatment option with patients who cannot afford it.’
In case of an amputation of the leg above the knee, patients in Belgium can choose 
between (electro)mechanical and microprocessor-controlled prosthetic legs. The micro-
processor-controlled prosthetic leg is the closest technology has come to natural walk-
ing. In Belgium, mandatory basic health insurance only reimburses electro-mechanical 
prosthetic legs. Patients who want a microprocessor-controlled prosthetic leg have to 
pay about 30000 EUR out-of-pocket. After 5 to 7 years, the prosthetic leg needs to be 
replaced.
Carotid artery stenting is a procedure that can be used to open a narrowed carotid 
artery. It involves placing a small, expandable tube called a stent in the narrowed artery. 
There are two carotid arteries-one on each side of the neck- that supply blood to the 
brain. These arteries can be narrowed and damaged by fatty deposits called plaque. 
If this plaque breaks open, it may form a blood clot, which could move to the brain 
and cause a stroke. Carotid artery stenting may improve blood flow to the brain and 
lower the risk of stroke. Carotid stents are not reimbursed by mandatory basic health 
insurance in Belgium. Carotid stents -which cost between 1000 and 1500 EUR- must be 
financed out-of-pocket by patients.
The last example concerns the latest developments in cancer treatments, where the 
ability to pay out-of-pocket can make an important difference. The MammaPrint test is a 
genomic test that analyses the activity of certain genes in early-stage breast cancer. The 
MammaPrint test can be used to help make treatment decisions based on the cancer’s 
risk of recurrence within 10 years after diagnosis. Knowing if a woman has a high or low 
risk of early-stage breast cancer recurring might help women and their doctors decide 
if chemotherapy or other treatments to reduce risk after surgery are needed. The Mam-
maPrint test is reimbursed by health insurers in the United States (e.g., Aetna) and in 
the Netherlands, but not by mandatory basic health insurance in Belgium. In Belgium, 
18
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patients need to pay 3000 EUR out-of-pocket for this test.8 A Belgian patient reports 
being told by her physician that physicians are not allowed to discuss tumour genomic 
tests, which need to be paid for out-of-pocket, to avoid patients’ having to refuse tests 
which they cannot afford.9
The Christian Mutuality is the largest ‘sickness fund’ in Belgium, providing mandatory 
basic health insurance but also offering PHI. In November 2017, the Christian Mutuality 
stated that PHI is a must in case of a hospitalisation, even when the patient does not 
choose a private room: ‘Supplementary physicians’ fees cannot be charged in a double 
room. However, the patient bill can still be high. Certain costs are not reimbursed by 
mandatory basic health insurance. For instance, certain hip implants, intraocular lenses 
and materials for fracture fixation. Costs can be high in a double room. These costs have 
to be paid for out-of-pocket.’10 (Christian Mutuality, 2017)
Using Belgium and the Netherlands -two neighbouring countries- as case studies, we 
will discuss and analyse different options for policymakers to deal with new health 
technologies.
Research questions:
7. Are new health technologies equally accessible for patients in Belgium and the Nether-
lands?
8. What can be the role of voluntary private health insurance in providing access to new 
health technologies?
1.5. rEGulaTIOn Of PHI markETS
In the European Union (EU), PHI is, in principle, subject to free market rules and competi-
tion. As an exception, governments may impose rules restricting free competition when 
8	 Cf.	Belgian	newspaper	article	(2017)	‘Ik	moest	tegen	de	volgende	dag	3000	euro	vinden,	anders	geen	kan-
keronderzoek’	(translation:	I	had	to	find	3000	EUR	by	the	next	day,	or	else:	no	cancer	test),	Het Nieuwsblad,	
30	March	2017.	Available	at	http://www.nieuwsblad.be/cnt/dmf20170330_02808104.	
9	 Cf.	 Belgian	 news	magazine	 article	 (2014)	‘Genen	 sturen	de	 strijd	 tegen	 kanker:	 […]	 Ik	 kreeg	 te	 horen	
dat	 artsen	 [genoomtesten]	 zelfs	 niet	mogen	 voorstellen,	 omdat	men	wil	 vermijden	 dat	mensen	 een	
behandeling	moeten	weigeren	omdat	ze	er	geen	geld	voor	hebben.	[…]’,	Knack,	21	May	2014.	
10	 ‘In	een	kamer	voor	 twee	of	meer	personen	mogen	 inderdaad	geen	ereloon-	en	kamersupplementen	
aangerekend	worden.	Toch	kan	de	factuur	ook	dan	hoog	oplopen.	Want	er	kunnen	wel	bedragen	worden	
aangerekend	die	niet	worden	terugbetaald	door	de	ziekteverzekering	en	dus	niet	worden	meegeteld	
voor	 de	maximumfactuur.	 Dat	 zijn	 bijvoorbeeld	 niet-vergoedbare	 implantaten	 zoals	 bepaalde	 heup-
prothesen,	 sommige	 lenzen	 bij	 cataractoperaties	 of	 fixatiemateriaal	 bij	 botfracturen.	 [..]	 Deze	 kosten	
moet	je	dan	volledig	uit	eigen	zak	betalen.’
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PHI serves as a partial or complete alternative to health cover provided by the statutory 
social security system (‘substitutive health insurance’). However, notwithstanding the 
EU’s non-life insurance Directives’ application to PHI, in some Member States govern-
ments have restricted the application of free market rules in the PHI market. In order 
to curb the -often high- premium rate increases under PHI contracts, a ‘medical index’ 
has been created by law in Belgium. Premium rates can only be increased in line with 
the consumer price index or the medical index.11 Only when a PHI product is (expected 
to be) loss-making may the supervisory authority, the National Bank of Belgium, grant 
permission to increase premiums.12 However, the question arises whether such regula-
tion, restricting the free market, is in the best interest of consumers. For instance, the 
medical index cannot be negative, even if the cost evolution in health care were to be. 
Another issue is that a medical index of this sort could act as a disincentive for insurance 
companies to reduce costs, because they know that in the end cost increases will be 
covered by the medical index. In this way, the application of medical indices could even 
have an inflationary effect.
In Belgium, PHI mainly covers hospital care. About half of the money reimbursed by 
PHI relates to the cost of a stay in a private hospital room. Since the quality of care in 
a private room is no better than in a double or common room, it might be difficult to 
uphold the view that special protection from government is needed to secure access to 
private hospital rooms.
In France, a tax exemption is granted to PHI products which do not apply selective 
underwriting. It is not sure whether this is an ideal situation since selective underwriting 
is needed to counteract adverse selection to protect existing clients against free riders 
who abuse the insurance system.
Recent European Court of Justice (ECJ) case law has created uncertainty about the ap-
plication of the free market principles outlined in the EU non-life insurance Directives. 
The ECJ has taken different views in two cases (Commission v. Slovenia (2012)13 and DKV 
Belgium SA v. Association belge des consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL (2013)14) on the 
11	 A	law	introduced	on	17	June	2009	restricted	increases	in	premium	rates	for	existing	contracts	to	increases	
in	the	consumer	price	index	or	the	medical	index	if	and	in	so	far	as	the	evolution	of	the	medical	index	
exceeds	 that	of	 the	consumer	price	 index	 (Article	 204	 Insurance	Law).	The	medical	 index	 reflects	 the	
evolution	of	the	patient	bill.	Because	the	medical	index	did	not	include	a	provision	to	revalorise	ageing	
reserves,	 the	medical	 index	was	 annulled	by	 the	 administrative	 court	 on	 29	December	 2011.	 By	 royal	
decree	of	16	March	2016,	a	new	medical	index	has	been	created,	including	-on	top	of	the	claims	evolu-
tion-	a	provision	of	maximum	2	per	cent	to	cover	the	revalorisation	of	ageing	reserves.
12	 Art.	204,	§4	Insurance	Law	(‘Loi	du	4	avril	2014	relative	aux	assurances’,	Moniteur belge,	30	April	2014).
13	 Case	C-185/11,	Commission	v.	Slovenia	ecli:eu:c:2012:43.
14	 Case	C-577/11,	DKV Belgium SA	v.	Association belge des consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL	ecli:eu:c:2013:146.
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question whether government intervention in setting the prices of PHI contracts is 
consistent with EU regulation. On the one hand, in its ruling of 26 January 2012 in Com-
mission v. Slovenia, the Court concluded that Slovenia’s rules on complementary health 
insurance did not comply with the EU non-life insurance Directives. The Court found that 
a number of provisions in the Slovenian Health Care and Health Insurance Act (‘Zakon o 
zdravstvenem varstvu in zdravstvenem zavarovanju’ (‘zzvzz’)) did not comply with some 
of the basic freedoms outlined in the EU’s non-life insurance Directives. By contrast, by 
its ruling of 7 March 2013 in DKV Belgium SA, the Court upheld the system of restrictive 
price regulation of existing PHI contracts in Belgium. The Court accepted a requirement 
of prior notification and approval of proposed increases in premium rates in the Belgian 
context but not in the Slovenian context.
We will analyse the impact of the two differing ECJ rulings on the application of free-
market principles on PHI markets in the EU. We will discuss the arguments made in 
favour and against restrictive regulation. Starting from the Belgian and Slovenian ECJ 
cases on price regulation in the PHI market, we will broaden the discussion to the ques-
tion of the extent to which free market rules effectively apply to PHI.
Research questions:
9. To what extent do free market rules effectively apply to voluntary private health insur-
ance?
10. What is the future role of voluntary private health insurance within the framework of 
social health insurance systems in the European Union?
1.6. OPTImal dESIGn Of PHI PrOduCTS
Since private expenditure on dental care is quite substantial in most EU countries, we 
have chosen to focus on complementary dental insurance to discuss the issue of optimal 
design of PHI products.
Health insurance is meant to protect against financial risk and to render access to health 
care that would otherwise be unaffordable. In the Netherlands, private dental insurance 
can be bought, which provides a cover limit of 250 EUR per year only. Such products 
are unlikely to provide financial security. In Belgium, France and the Netherlands, reim-
bursement of prosthetic dental treatment (e.g., implants, bridges and crowns) by most 
private dental insurance products is limited to 1000 EUR per year or less. These products 
do not really improve access to costly dental treatment such as implants. The cost of 
an implant is -on average- 2500 EUR. It is not exceptional that 4 implants are needed. 
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The risk of being confronted with a total cost of 10000 EUR, of which only 1000 EUR 
will be reimbursed, is unlikely to give the insured ‘peace of mind’. PHI products offering 
(very) limited coverage do not protect against financial risk nor do they provide access 
to health care that would otherwise be unaffordable.
We develop a framework for optimal health insurance design. The current situation of 
complementary dental insurance in four European countries, Belgium, France, Germany 
and the Netherlands, is examined. We then look for potential explanations for the gap 
between the current offering of dental insurance products and an optimal design of 
dental insurance. We conclude with a discussion on how to improve dental insurance 
design.
Research questions:
11. How can the gap between the current offer of dental insurance products and an optimal 
design of complementary dental insurance be explained?
12. How can current complementary dental insurance design be improved?
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abSTraCT
OECD Health Data are a well-known source for detailed information about health expen-
diture. These data enable us to analyse health policy issues over time and in comparison 
with other countries. However, current official Belgian estimates of private expenditure 
(as published in the OECD Health Data) have proven not to be reliable. We distinguish 
four potential major sources of problems with estimating private health spending: in-
terpretation of definitions, formulation of assumptions, missing or incomplete data and 
incorrect data. Using alternative sources of billing information, we have reached more 
accurate estimates of private and out-of-pocket expenditure. For Belgium, we found dif-
ferences of more than 100% between our estimates and the official Belgian estimates of 
private health expenditure (as published in the OECD Health Data). For instance, accord-
ing to OECD Health Data private expenditure on hospitals in Belgium amounts to €3.1 
billion, while according to our alternative calculations these expenses represent only 
€1.1 billion. Total private expenditure differs only 1%, but this is a mere coincidence. This 
exercise may be of interest to other OECD countries looking to improve their estimates 
of private expenditure on health.
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2.1. InTrOduCTIOn
Health data have a central role to play in supporting stewardship and decision-making 
by both policy makers and other stakeholders (Poullier et al., 2002a; Forde et al., 2013; 
Rosenthal and Smith, 2014). OECD Health Data are a well-known source for detailed 
information about health expenditure. Since all OECD member states have to adhere 
to OECD’s ‘System of Health Accounts’, OECD Health Data are being produced within 
the same framework by every member state (Orosz and Morgan, 2004). OECD Health 
Data are used to analyse health policy issues over time and in comparison with other 
countries (Oderkirk et al, 2013; Gerkens and Merkur, 2010; Keep, 2011). The results of these 
analyses can have far-reaching policy implications. OECD Health Data contain informa-
tion, e.g. on health status, the number of health care providers and health care facilities, 
and on expenditure on health, both public and private.  In this paper we focus on private 
expenditure on health including out-of-pocket expenses.
OECD Health Data on private and out-of-pocket expenditure on health are important for 
the different stakeholders in the health care system. For government and policy makers 
it is important to know how much and what kind of care is being financed privately, and 
for determining whether there might be problems with the accessibility of care. Data on 
private and out-of-pocket expenditure are also indispensable for health insurers, both 
basic and additional health insurers. Basic health insurers need to be able to measure the 
effects of their reimbursement policy, while insurers offering additional health insurance 
need as detailed information as possible about their potential market, constituted of 
privately paid care. Finally, practitioners and patients need comprehensive clarification 
of the costs to be borne by the patient, since treatment decisions may well be influenced 
by cost issues.
We distinguish four potential major sources of problems with estimating private health 
spending: interpretation of definitions, formulation of assumptions, missing or incom-
plete data and incorrect data.
The aim of this paper is to compare official Belgian estimates of private health expendi-
ture (as published in the OECD Health Data) with alternative estimates. Current official 
Belgian estimates of private health expenditure (as published in the OECD Health Data) 
are not reliable mainly because hard data on private expenditure are not transpar-
ent. Using alternative sources of billing information, we have reached more accurate 
estimates of private and out-of-pocket expenditure. This approach may serve for some 
OECD countries to re-examine their sources and methodologies. For other countries, it 
may be irrelevant.
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Definitions
- Health insurance:
 o  Basic health insurance: mandatory universal health insurance, organised by the National Institute for 
Health and Disability Insurance (NIHDI)15 and the sickness funds;
 o  Additional health insurance: both private insurance companies and sickness funds offer voluntary 
additional health insurance;
- Private expenditure on health: sum of co-payments and supplements (see Fig. 1);
  • Services covered by basic health insurance:
  • Co-payment16 = official tariff minus reimbursement by basic health insurance;
  • Supplement = total fee minus official tariff (‘supplemental fee’)17;
 o  Services not covered by basic health insurance:
  • Supplement = total fee (‘supplemental service’);
 o  In this article, the three definitions are being used: ‘supplemental fee’, ‘supplemental service’ and 
‘supplement’ (covering both supplemental fees and supplemental services).
 o  Belgium 2010: €9316 million private expenditure on health18 = €1854 million co-payments19 + €7462 
million supplements;
-  Out-of-pocket expenditure on health: private expenditure on health minus reimbursement by additional 
health insurance and minus reimbursement by non-profit institutions and corporations. Belgium 201020: 
€9316 million private expenditure on health = €1519 million additional health insurance + €51 million 
non-profit institutions + €18 million corporations + €7728 million out-of-pocket expenditure on healtth.
Total fee for service covered by basic health insurance
Official tariff
Supplement (supplemental fee)
Reimbursement Co-payment
Total fee for service NOT covered by basic health insurance
Supplement (supplemental service)
fig.1. Definition of supplements (De Graeve et al., 2007).
2.2.  fOur POTEnTIal majOr SOurCES Of PrOblEmS wITH ESTImaTInG 
PrIVaTE HEalTH SPEndInG
We distinguish four potential major sources of problems with estimating private health 
spending: interpretation of definitions, formulation of assumptions, missing or incom-
plete data and incorrect data.
15	 Rijksinstituut	 voor	 ziekte-	 en	 invaliditeitsverzekering	 (RIZIV)	 /	 Institut	 national	 d’assurance	 maladie-
invalidité	(INAMI).
16	 We	use	the	term	‘co-payment’	to	refer	to	co-payments	and	co-insurance.	Both	are	cost-sharing	arrange-
ments	which	require	the	individual	covered	to	pay	part	of	the	cost	of	care.	A	co-payment	is	a	fixed	fee	
(flat	rate)	per	item	or	service;	in	case	of	co-insurance	the	patient	pays	a	fixed	proportion	of	the	total	cost.
17	 ‘Extra	billing’	and	‘balance	billing’	are	also	being	used	for	health	care	providers	billing	patients	more	than	
what	the	insurer	pays	for	their	services.
18	 OECD	Health	Data	2013,	figures	for	2010.
19	 Source:	NIHDI.
20	 OECD	Health	Data	2013,	figures	for	2010.
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2.2.1. Interpretation of definitions
Since its publication in 2003, the OECD Manual ‘A System of Health Accounts’ (SHA) 
provides a common standard for data collection by the statistical offices (Schneider 
et al, 2010). SHA establishes a conceptual basis of statistical reporting rules and pro-
poses a newly developed International Classification for Health Accounts (ICHA) which 
covers three dimensions: health care by functions of care (what kind of services and 
what types of goods are purchased?); providers of health care services (where does 
the money go to?); and sources of funding (where does the money come from?). The 
proposed accounts are designed to meet the needs of analysts of health care systems 
and policymakers. They provide a common framework for enhancing the comparability 
of data over time and across countries. OECD states that they are intended for use in 
international comparisons that include a broad range of countries with different ways of 
organising health care and its financing (OECD, 2000).
In 2011, an updated version of the OECD SHA Manual has been published (version 2.0). 
Version 2.0 has already been incorporated in the data submissions of some countries. So 
far, version 1.0 has been used for the Belgian submissions.
A narrow or broad interpretation of the definitions listed in SHA can give a totally dif-
ferent result in terms of private or out-of-pocket expenditure on health. This can lead 
to problems when comparing different countries. Private expenditure on homes for the 
elderly can illustrate this problem.
In Belgium, there are two types of homes for the elderly: homes for individuals requiring 
extended nursing care (‘nursing homes’)21 and homes for individuals requiring limited 
care (‘rest homes’)22. For the Belgian figures, the choice has been made to include pri-
vate expenditure for the first type of homes but not for the second type. There are two 
problems with this approach. First, although the SHA category ‘nursing care facilities’23 
indeed is limiting its scope to ‘individuals requiring nursing care’, private expenditure 
on rest homes could be allocated to the SHA category ‘community care facilities for the 
elderly’24. This category addresses ‘persons unable to fully care for themselves and/or 
unwilling to live independently’. Second, in the OECD Health Data for Belgium, public 
expenditure on both types of homes for the elderly has been taken into account.  How-
ever, so far as private expenditure is concerned, only nursing homes have been taken 
21	 ‘Maisons	de	repos	et	de	soins’	(MRS)/‘Rust-	en	verzorgingstehuizen’	(RVT).
22	 ‘Maisons	de	repos	pour	personnes	âgées’	(MRPA)/‘Rustoorden	voor	bejaarden’	(ROB).
23	 HP.2.1 :	SHA	classification	of	expenditure	on	health	by	provider	(‘Health	Provider’).
24	 HP.2.3.
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into account.25  The question can be raised whether including only public expenditure 
on rest homes and not private expenditure does not result in an inconsistency between 
public and private expenditure on health. This example illustrates a problem with the 
interpretation of the SHA boundaries.
2.2.2. formulation of assumptions
Certain assumptions are being made for the calculation of private expenditure on health 
and for the allocation of total private expenditure to the different (sub)sectors. A proxy 
can be used if no exact information is available. Items can be deducted or added in order 
to produce a more coherent picture.
It is important for these assumptions and methods to be transparent. Only when as-
sumptions are transparent can they be criticised and improved.  In this respect, we have 
had an excellent working relationship with the Belgian Federal Public Service Social 
Security responsible for producing the Belgian figures for the OECD Health Data.
An example can clarify this point. According to Belgian National Accounts, household 
consumption on health amounted to €10397 million in 2010 (= private expenditure on 
health). This amount needs to be allocated to the different functions and providers 
of SHA. National Accounts’ estimates need some adaptations in order to be fit for use 
within the SHA framework.
A first limitation of National Accounts’ estimates of household consumption is their not 
taking into account specific transfers from government to households for financing 
health care.  Therefore, in order to avoid double counting, several amounts have to be 
deducted from the €10.4 billion. Payments made by the Flemish long term care insur-
ance26  and by the federal state27 are deducted since they constitute income transfers 
from government to households (together €737 million). It is assumed that households 
spend these transfers completely on the consumption of health care services.
Secondly, co-payments (€2035 million), reimbursement by additional health insurance 
(€1519 million) and the money granted by the social fund of the Belgian Railways (€18 
25	 It	has	been	argued	that	medical	care	in	rest	homes	being	limited,	private	expenditure	in	rest	homes	-i.e.	
the	‘lodging’component	(bed	and	meals)-	cannot	be	taken	into	account,	according	to	the	SHA	manual.
26	 Flemish	long	term	care	insurance	(€280	million)	(‘Vlaamse	zorgverzekering’).
27	 ‘Allocation	pour	 l’aide	aux	personnes	âgées/Tegemoetkoming	voor	hulp	aan	bejaarden’	 (€454	million);	
‘Hulp	van	derden/Aide	d’une	tierce	personne’	(€3	million).
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million) are to be deducted for it is known how these payments have to be allocated to 
the different health care functions and providers (together €3572 million).28
Finally, the remaining amount, €6088 million, is allocated to the different functions and 
providers using co-payments charged in basic health insurance as the distribution key.
An important problem with this methodology is that most of these deductions are made 
from the total figure, €10.4 billion, and not from the figure for the sector the deduction 
is pertaining to. The way private expenditure on homes for the elderly is calculated, 
can illustrate this point. Actually, only the money paid to institutionalised elderly by 
government, by the Flemish community29 and by the federal state30 should be deducted 
from the National Accounts’ estimate for private expenditure on homes for the elderly 
(along with 9% deducted for ‘general expenses’ in elderly care).  Although co-payments 
for nursing home services are almost non-existent and additional health insurance is not 
reimbursing homes for the elderly, a proportional part of total co-payments and of total 
reimbursement by additional health insurance has been deducted from the National Ac-
counts’ figure for private expenditure on homes for the elderly, resulting in an important 
underestimation -about one third- of private expenditure on homes for the elderly.
Another problem with using co-payments as the distribution code for supplements is 
that there is not always a proportional relationship between co-payments and supple-
ments. Certain (sub)sectors have large co-payments but only small supplements while 
other (sub)sectors are characterised by large supplements and (almost) no co-payments.
In 2010, OECD published a Health Working Paper with best practices of calculation 
techniques and recommendations on how to estimate private expenditure on health 
(Rannan-Eliya and Lorenzoni, 2010). National Accounts’ figures on household consump-
tion can be a starting point for the calculation of private expenditure on health but 
adjustments need to be made because of sampling and non-sampling errors.
2.2.3. missing or incomplete data
Detailed information about private expenditure on health is not always readily available 
since most sources of information are private and data are usually not collected at an 
aggregate level.
28	 Source:	Belgian	Federal	Public	Service	Social	Security.
29	 Flemish	long	term	care	insurance	(€111	million)	(‘Vlaamse	zorgverzekering’).
30	 ‘Allocation	pour	l’aide	aux	personnes	âgées/tegemoetkoming	voor	hulp	aan	bejaarden’	(€318	million).
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Private expenditure refers to expenditure by private financing agents which consist of 
four types: corporations, households, private health insurance schemes, and non-profit 
institutions serving households (Rannan-Eliya, 2010). In Belgium, the role of non-profit 
institutions (€51 million) and corporations (€18 million) is very limited. As already stated, 
additional health insurance is financing €1.5 billion and €7.7 billion is being paid out-of-
pocket by the households.31
Detailed information from additional health insurance sources is available but often not 
publicly accessible. Additional health insurance covers private expenses. With 74% of 
the Belgian population being covered by additional health insurance,32 extrapolation of 
data from additional health insurance can give a good estimate of private expenditure 
on health.
Question is if and how information from additional health insurance sources can be 
made publicly available? In many countries, a multitude of actors is active in the field of 
additional health insurance. Therefore, the collection of data at an aggregate level could 
be very useful. However, question is whether complete transparency might disturb fair 
competition amongst private insurers? This could especially be the case in a market 
with one large insurer and several smaller players. In such a market, detailed informa-
tion from the large insurer might be very helpful for the smaller players. If data were 
collected at an aggregate level, the competition issue would be less important. Maybe, 
the professional associations of private insurers could collect all data and publish them 
at an aggregate level without revealing the contribution of the different insurers.
Detailed information on private and out-of-pocket expenditure can also be obtained 
from professional associations of providers and from the industry (e.g. industry market 
data on retail sales of pharmaceuticals, vision products and hearing aids). Problem with 
these sources is that the data often are not publicly available but only on demand. Here 
too, the competition issue is the main reason for the lack of transparency.
Examples of missing data in the Belgian market are the figures on private expenditure 
for psychologists and dietitians. No aggregate data are available. The professional asso-
ciations have made an estimate based on the number of providers, the average number 
of sessions and the average fee charged. According to this methodology, we get a total 
31	 OECD	Health	Data	2013	(figures	for	2010).
32	 In	2010,	out	of	a	total	of	11	million	Belgians,	5,4	million	carried	a	voluntary	additional	health	insurance	with	
a	private	insurance	company	and	2,7	million	with	a	sickness	fund	(sources:	‘Assuralia’	[trade	organization	of	
insurance	companies	active	in	Belgium],	Control	Office	for	the	Sickness	Funds	[‘Controledienst	voor	de	
ziekenfondsen/Office	de	contrôle	des	mutualités’]).
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of €230 million private expenditure on self-employed, registered clinical psychologists 
and of €60 million on self-employed dietitians in Belgium.
Incomplete data can also be a source of error. An example from the Belgian market are 
vision products. The official OECD Health Data figures list €3 million as private expendi-
ture on vision products. This figure pertains solely to co-payments for vision products 
that are reimbursed by basic health insurance (€23 million). Figures on total turnover in 
the market of vision products are not publicly available. Information from the industry 
learns that total turnover amounts to €475 million. This is a good example of how lack of 
information can result in distorted results.
The above mentioned 2010 OECD Health Working Paper No. 52 lists a number of issues 
where reporting may be difficult and proposes certain estimation techniques to fill data 
gaps.
2.2.4. Incorrect data
Incorrect data are the final type of problems. Normally, this type of problems will not be 
very common. Creating transparency can avoid this problem since people will notice 
mistakes and report them.
Sometimes, incorrect data can be a result of dated information. It is therefore important 
to update sources on a regular basis. For instance, for the production of the Belgian 
figures for private expenditure on homes for the elderly, a ratio of 40% nursing homes 
and 60% rest homes has been used. However, in 2010, there were 49.4% nursing homes. 
Since in the OECD Health Data only private expenditure on nursing homes has been 
taken into account, the ratio applied results in an underestimation of private expendi-
ture on homes for the elderly.
As part of the routine data submissions to the OECD, countries are asked to submit a 
metadata file to identify data sources, breaks in series, data gaps and estimation tech-
niques. The content of the metadata files is published in the OECD data base.
2.3.  rElIabIlITy Of ESTImaTES Of PrIVaTE HEalTH SPEndInG: bElGIum 
aS a CaSE STudy
2.3.1. OECd Health data
Health expenditure data are being collected, validated and published in a joint effort by 
OECD, WHO and Eurostat. These organisations do not produce any health expenditure 
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estimates themselves. Estimates are submitted under the responsibility of the national 
authorities. For Belgium, estimates on health expenditure are being produced by the 
Belgian Federal Public Service Social Security.33 In this paper, we analyse the reliability of 
these estimates, which are being produced by the Belgian authorities and published by 
the OECD Health Data.
So far, there is no legal obligation for countries to produce health data. By 2016, it will 
be mandatory for European Union member states to submit a well-defined set of health 
expenditure aggregates.
2.3.2. SHa framework
In Belgium, as in most OECD countries, publicly available information about private 
expenditure on health is limited.  Therefore, many countries need to turn to different 
kinds of sources, ranging from public administration data to surveys.  Within the Belgian 
SHA framework, estimates of private expenditure on health are based on National Ac-
counts’ estimates on the one hand and public administration data on the other hand. 
National Accounts’ estimates of household consumption of health care and long term 
care services are a central reference for the Belgian approach.
The Belgian figures for the OECD Health Data are not based on household budget sur-
veys. It is a well-known problem that data from surveys on private and out-of-pocket 
expenditure on health are prone to measurement errors (Heijink et al., 2011; Xu et al., 
2009).
National health accounts (NHA) are a powerful tool that can be used to improve the 
capacity of decision makers to identify health sector problems and opportunities for 
change and to develop and monitor reform strategies (Berman and Cooper, 1995).
The United States introduced the concept of Health Accounts formally in 1966, followed 
by France in 1972. The OECD began to use the concept in a few countries in 1976 (Poullier 
et al., 2002b). The first table of expenditure on health for the member states of the World 
Health Organization (WHO) was reported in annex 8 of the World Health Report 2000 
(figures for 1997) (World Health Organisation, 2000).
The framework for WHO’s NHA reporting is based on the System of National Accounts 
(SNA) of the United Nations (Poullier et al., 2002b). OECD too states that methodological 
33	 Federale	Overheidsdienst	Sociale	Zekerheid/Service	Public	Fédéral	Sécurité	Sociale.	This	study	has	been	
made	in	close	collaboration	with	this	agency.
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compatibility with SNA accounting rule is a prerequisite for health accounts meeting 
the basic requirements of comparability over time, between countries and with overall 
economic statistics (OECD, 2000).
Schneider holds that from a macroeconomic perspective, the indicators presented by 
SHA are incomplete. Health Satellite Accounts (HSA), which are fully integrated into SNA, 
should be able to answer questions such as: What is the gross value added of the health 
economy? What is the productivity of the branches of the health economy? What are 
the import and export flows and as a result the trade surplus (Schneider et al., 2010)? 
However, SHA version 2.0 (2011) enables countries to measure -among other things- total 
health workforce, value added of health providers and the export and import of medical 
goods and services.
In order to reduce the burden of data collection for the national authorities and to 
increase further harmonisation across national health accounting practices, as of 2006 
there is a joint OECD-Eurostat-WHO SHA data collection based on a joint questionnaire. 
Advantages of this joint effort are the decrease of the burden of data reporting and the 
publication of consistent figures. It is important to note that WHO, Eurostat and OECD 
are aware that the estimates of private expenditure on health vary in their reliability 
across countries and categories, depending on the availability and quality of national 
information (Poullier et al., 2002b). Estimating private expenditure, and specifically out-
of-pocket spending, continues to present difficulties in many countries and is typically 
the largest source of error in estimates of national health spending (Mohanty and Srivas-
tava, 2013; Chawla et al., 1998). The estimation difficulties not only frequently undermine 
the credibility of the health accounts, with the result that policy-makers may doubt the 
validity of the resulting policy implications, but also make international comparisons 
extremely problematic (Rannan-Eliya, 2010).
2.3.3. alternative calculations based on billing information
In order to review OECD Health Data’s estimates for Belgium, we have been using 
publicly available information as well as information from professional associations and 
companies.
Every year, Christian and Socialist sickness funds publish a study about private expen-
diture on hospitals. ‘Assuralia’, the trade organisation of insurance companies active in 
Belgium, publishes data -not always publicly available but available for its members- on 
expenditure by additional health insurance. The same goes for the ‘Office of control 
of the sickness funds’ (‘Office de contrôle des mutualités/Controledienst voor de ziek-
enfondsen’). Several professional associations and companies -mostly market leaders 
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within their sector- have provided us with figures about their sector (e.g. dietitians, 
dermatologists, ophthalmologists, psychologists, ‘Pearle’34 for optical glasses and other 
vision products; ‘Lapperre’35 for hearing aids). Finally, we have been able to use data from 
‘DKV Belgium’36, the market leader for private additional health insurance.
Unfortunately, this information is not always readily available for the state agencies pro-
ducing health accounts or household consumption estimates. This poses a problem. The 
methodological framework for the data collection for the OECD Health Data does not 
exclude alternative calculations. On the contrary, transparency of methodology should 
encourage data sources to be identified. However, methodologies must be robust such 
that data are consistently available to the authorities over time and meet the definitions 
and quality criteria.
For the alternative calculation of private expenditure on health, we have been using the 
same framework and definitions used by the Belgian Federal Public Service Social Se-
curity, producing the official Belgian figures for the OECD Health Data (SHA version 1.0). 
The important differences between the alternative calculation and the official Belgian 
figures can be explained by the different data sources and estimation techniques used.
2.3.3.1.	 Supplemental	fees
Information about supplemental fees in hospitals is more easily available, as supplemen-
tal fees in hospitals are regulated and subject to limitations based on the type of room. 
Sickness funds have detailed billing information from hospitals (including information 
on the supplemental fees charged).
This is not the case for supplemental fees charged in an ambulatory setting. We have 
been able to search the databases of ‘DKV Belgium’ for information on these ambulatory 
supplemental fees.37 About 20% of what ‘DKV Belgium’ reimburses, pertains to ambu-
34	 Pearle	is	the	Belgian	market	leader	for	vision	products	(www.pearle.be).
35	 Lapperre	is	the	Belgian	market	leader	for	hearing	aids	(www.lapperre.be).
36	 Deutsche	 Krankenversicherung	 Belgium	 (‘DKV	 Belgium’),	 a	 private	 insurance	 company,	 is	 the	market	
leader	 in	Belgium	for	additional	health	 insurance	(www.dkv.be).	About	1.8	million	Belgians	have	taken	
out	an	additional	health	insurance	contract	with	‘DKV	Belgium’.	
37	 For	the	alternative	calculation	of	private	expenditure	for	providers	of	ambulatory	health	care,	we	have	
been	using	figures	about	supplemental	fees	coming	from	‘DKV	Belgium’.	We	are	aware	of	the	fact	that	
there	may	be	 some	bias	 as	 to	 these	figures.	 People	 carrying	additional	health	 insurance	may	be	 less	
price-sensitive	 and	 health	 care	 providers	 knowing	 that	 a	 patient	 is	 additionally	 insured	may	 charge	
higher	prices.	However,	contrary	to	hospital	care,	additional	coverage	for	ambulatory	care	is	not	wide-
spread	in	Belgium.	Providers	of	ambulatory	health	care	generally	do	not	take	into	account	the	possibility	
that	a	patient	might	be	carrying	additional	coverage	for	ambulatory	care.	Anyway,	there	are	no	hard	data	
available	about	higher	prices	being	charged	for	ambulatory	care	for	patients	carrying	additional	health	
insurance.	Additional	health	insurers	try	to	reduce	upward	pressure	on	prices	by	certain	measures	such	
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latory care. Supplemental fees are charged by physicians, dentists and other health 
practitioners such as physiotherapists. A supplemental fee is a supplement for a service, 
charged by the practitioner on top of the official tariff set out by basic health insurance.
Sickness funds do not systematically have this information about supplemental fees at 
their disposal, since practitioners are not obliged to give information on supplemental 
fees to the sickness funds and are indeed reluctant to do so.
We have been using information from 1143257 services billed for ambulatory care and 
sent to ‘DKV Belgium’ for reimbursement in 2012 and 2013 (with among others 747,000 
acts referring to physicians, 87000 to dentists and 142000 to physiotherapists).
We have used the available information on supplemental fees to calculate private 
expenditure on ambulatory care provided by physicians, dentists and other health prac-
titioners. Supplemental fees are expressed as a percentage of reimbursement by basic 
health insurance. Therefore, we have multiplied these percentages with total reimburse-
ment by basic health insurance.
Supplemental fee percentages represent a weighted average of a certain (sub)sector. 
Every (sub)specialism has a supplemental fee percentage. For calculating the average 
of a group of (sub)specialisms the weight of each (sub)specialism has been taken into 
account.
2.3.4.  Official belgian estimates (as published in the OECd Health data) versus 
alternative calculations
We have made a comparison of current official Belgian estimates of private health ex-
penditure (as published in the OECD Health Data) with estimates based on alternative 
sources and calculations.
In order to analyse private health expenditure estimates, we applied the methodol-
ogy of the International Classification of Health Accounts: sources of funding (HF) and 
providers of health care services and goods (HP) giving an insight in where the money 
comes from (HF)38 and where the money goes to (HP)39.
as	co-payments	and	price	negotiations	with	providers.	We	assume	 that	 the	upward	pressure	of	addi-
tional	health	insurance	on	supplemental	fees	is	limited	(certainly	so	far	as	ambulatory	care	is	concerned).	
Anyway,	it	might	be	recommended	to	consider	these	percentages	of	supplemental	fees	for	ambulatory	
health	care	as	‘ceiling’	percentages,	real	supplemental	fees	possibly	being	lower.
38	 HF:	‘health	financing’,	expenditure	on	health	by	source	of	funding.
39	 HP:	‘health	provider’,	expenditure	on	health	by	provider.
38
Chapter 2
We will be focusing on some of the most significant differences between the official 
estimates (as published in the OECD Health Data) and the alternative calculations based 
on billing data from the health care sectors: general hospitals (HP.1.1), nursing care facili-
ties (homes for the elderly) (HP.2.1) and community care facilities for the elderly (HP.2.3), 
all other residential care facilities (residential care for the disabled) (HP.2.9), offices of 
other health practitioners (such as physiotherapists and psychologists) (HP.3.3) and vi-
sion products (HP.4.2).
Estimates for the other providers are listed in Table 1.
Unless otherwise specified, all figures pertain to the year 2010.
2.3.4.1. Hospitals: €1.1 billion versus €3.1 billion (Table 1)
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fig. 2. Private expenditure in hospitals in Belgiu  2010 (million €).
2.3.4.1.1. General hospitals40
According to OECD Health Data private expenditure amounted to €2436 million in 2010 
(Fig. 2).
However, a study of hospital bills is putting forward a figure of €966 million only (Fig. 
2). Every year, Christian and Socialist sickness funds, together representing 71.3% of 
Belgian population, publish a study on private expenditure on inpatient care in general 
hospitals (Christelijke Mutualiteit, 2011; Socialistisch Ziekenfonds, 2011). An extrapolation 
40	 HP.1.1.
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of their findings to the entire population results in private expenditure on general hos-
pitals totaling €946 million and €985 million respectively.41 The somewhat lower figure 
of the Socialist sickness fund might be explained by the socio-economic profile of the 
members of the Socialist sickness fund being lower than that of the Christian sickness 
fund, probably resulting in less supplemental fees being charged. Conclusion is that 
private expenditure on inpatient care in general hospitals amounted to an average of 
€966 million in 2010 (including €119 million for day care).
According to OECD Health Data, out-of-pocket expenditure in general hospitals repre-
sented €1611 million in 2010.  This figure is in strong contradiction with the following 
calculus. Additional health insurance provided by private insurance companies reim-
bursed a total of €508 million42 of private expenditure in general hospitals. Additional 
health insurance provided by sickness funds reimbursed a total of €201 million.43 Thus 
-in general hospitals- private expenditure (€966 million) minus reimbursement by ad-
ditional health insurance (€709 million) equals €257 million out-of-pocket expenditure.
2.3.4.1.2. Mental health and substance abuse hospitals44
In Belgium, psychiatric hospitals take care of mental health and substance abuse prob-
lems. In 2010, private expenditure for psychiatric hospitals totaled €95 million (alterna-
tive calculation)45, compared to €451 million listed in the OECD Health Data (Fig. 2).
2.3.4.1.3. Specialty hospitals46
OECD Health Data for 2010 reported €252 million private sector expenditure on specialty 
hospitals 47, and €92 million general government expenditure. The calculation of the 
private expenditure figure is based on the National Accounts’ data for private household 
41	 In	2010,	the	Christian	sickness	fund	covered	41.8%	of	the	Belgian	population	and	the	Socialist	sickness	
fund	29.5%	(source:	NIHDI).
42	 In	2010,	payments	by	additional	health	insurance	provided	by	private	insurance	companies	represented	
€635	million.	With	about	20%	of	this	figure	pertaining	to	ambulatory	health	care	and	psychiatric	hospitals,	
€508	million	is	related	to	general	hospitals.	Source:	‘Assuralia’	(trade	organisation	of	insurance	companies	
active	in	Belgium).
43	 Figure	for	2009.	We	estimate	that	80%	of	payments	made	by	additional	health	 insurance	provided	by	
sickness	funds	pertain	to	general	hospitals	(80%	of	€251	million).	Source:	Control	Office	for	the	Sickness	
Funds,	annual	report	2010.
44	 HP.1.2.
45	 In	2010	there	were	approximately	3.8	million	hospital	days	in	psychiatric	hospitals	(source:	Belgian	Federal	
Public	 Service	 for	 Public	Health.	 FOD	Volksgezondheid,	 veiligheid	 van	de	 voedselketen	 en	 leefmilieu,	
directoraat-generaal	organisatie	van	de	gezondheidszorgvoorzieningen	(2011).		Organisatie	en	financier-
ing	van	de	geestelijke	gezondheidszorg	in	België).	Standard	co-payment	per	hospital	day	amounted	to	
approximately	€20	in	2010	(source:	NIHDI).	Supplements	for	a	private	room	varied	from	€5	to	€50	per	day	
in	 2010	 (source:	‘DKV	Belgium’).	 Since	private	 rooms	are	not	 that	 common	 in	psychiatric	hospitals,	we	
assume	€25	private	expenditure	per	hospital	day	to	be	a	fair	estimate.
46	 HP.1.3.
47	 E.g.	the	multiple	sclerosis	clinic	in	Melsbroek	or	the	Belgian	Sea	Institute	for	Orthopedics	in	Ostend.
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expenditure on hospitals and assimilated care.  In our alternative calculations, private 
expenditure on revalidation taking place in general hospitals (= the bulk of revalidation) 
is comprised in the figure for general hospitals. Since no other data are available, we 
assume that private expenditure in specialty hospitals resembles private expenditure 
in general hospitals.48 This benchmark gives us an estimate of €12 million private expen-
diture on specialty hospitals (compared to the €252 million listed in the OECD Health 
Data).
2.3.4.1.4. Conclusion
Based on effective billing practices in hospitals, we propose an estimate of €1073 million 
private expenditure instead of the €3139 million listed in the OECD Health Data. The 
high figure originates from National Accounts’ overestimation of private expenditure 
in hospitals. Uncertainty remains, however, as to the reasons for this overestimation. 
Erroneous assumptions in the calculations based on National Accounts’ data may be an 
important factor (e.g. possibly double counting of reimbursement by additional health 
insurance). The inclusion of non-health care related expenditure constitutes another 
potential source of error.
2.3.4.2. Nursing and residential care facilities: €2.0 billion versus €0.4 billion (Table 1)
When comparing OECD Health Data estimates with our own estimates, major differences 
come to light. These dissimilarities can be explained by the nature of available data on 
health-related household consumption, as well as by the methodological choices made. 
We will look at the differences more closely here.
2.3.4.2.1. Nursing care facilities (nursing homes for the elderly)49
Data on public and private expenditure for ‘nursing care facilities’ listed in the OECD 
Health Data for Belgium refer to homes for the elderly only.
In Belgium, there are two types of homes for the elderly: homes for individuals requiring 
extended nursing care (‘nursing homes’)50 and homes for individuals requiring limited 
care (‘rest homes’)51.
48	 In	general	hospitals,	the	ratio	of	private	expenditure	to	public	expenditure	is	13.17%	(€966	million/€7332	
million).	When	applying	this	ratio	to	specialty	hospitals	we	get	a	total	of	€12	million	private	expenditure.	
Co-payments	for	specialty	hospitals	amounted	to	€4	million	in	2010.	In	general	hospitals,	co-payments	
represent	approximately	36%	of	total	private	expenditure.	When	applying	this	ratio	to	specialty	hospitals,	
we	get	a	total	of	€11	million	private	expenditure.
49	 HP.2.1.
50	 ‘Maisons	de	repos	et	de	soins’	(MRS)/‘Rust-	en	verzorgingstehuizen’	(RVT).
51	 ‘Maisons	de	repos	pour	personnes	âgées’	(MRPA)/‘Rustoorden	voor	bejaarden’	(ROB).
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fig  3. Private xpenditure in nursing and residential care facilities in Belgium 2010 (million €).
National Accounts’ data indicate that, in 2010, private expenditure on homes for the 
elderly totaled €2391 million. 9% of this total is deducted for ‘general expenses’ in homes 
for the elderly (hairdresser, etc.). If we deduct this 9%, as well as the money transferred 
to institutionalised elderly by government52, we get a total of €1747 million private ex-
penditure on inpatient long term care for the elderly.
However, OECD Health Data are listing only €378 million (Fig. 3).
The difference can be explained by the methodology applied for the production of the 
OECD Health Data for Belgium. Although co-payments are practically non-existent in 
homes for the elderly, a proportional part of total co-payments in Belgian health care 
has been deducted from the National Accounts’ figure for private expenditure on homes 
for the elderly. This is the first reason why the OECD figure is an underestimation (when 
comparing with total private expenditure on homes for the elderly).
52	 Transfer	by	the	Flemish	community	(Flemish	long	term	care	insurance;	‘Vlaamse	zorgverzekering’)	(€111	
million):	in	2010,	71412	people	got	a	montly	allowance	of	€130	for	residential	care	(total:	€111402720)	(cf.	
http://www.zorg-en-gezondheid.be/Cijfers/Vlaamse-zorgverzekering/Lopende-dossiers-tenlastene-
mingen/	 [accessed	10.02.14]).	Transfer	by	the	 federal	state	 (‘allocation	pour	 l’aide	aux	personnes	âgées	
/	 tegemoetkoming	voor	hulp	 aan	bejaarden’)	 (€318	million):	OECD	Health	Data	 state	 that	 70%	of	 the	
allowance	for	aid	to	the	elderly	is	going	to	residential	care.	In	2010,	€317.8	million	out	of	a	total	of	€454.2	
million	 can	 be	 allocated	 to	 residential	 care.	 (cf.	 http://www.handicap.fgov.be/sites/handicap.fgov.be/
files/explorer/nl/overzicht-cijfers-2010.pdf	[accessed	10.02.14]).
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The second reason is that, for the OECD Health Data, only private expenditure on nurs-
ing homes for the elderly53 is considered to be expenditure on health. Expenditure on 
rest homes for the elderly54 is not being considered expenditure on health, based on 
the assumption that the medical component is limited since patients staying in rest 
homes require little or no nursing care. Private expenditure covers mainly the ‘lodging’ 
component of a stay in a home. SHA methodology states that, in contradiction to hos-
pital stays, where the ‘lodging’ (bed and meals) is to be included in health expenditure 
figures, ‘lodging’ cost in homes only is to be considered as health expenditure in so far as 
the provision of health care exceeds the provision of so-called ‘social’ care.  In Belgium, 
the choice has been made to only include private expenditure on nursing homes for the 
elderly in the OECD Health Data for Belgium, due to the relative importance of ‘medical’ 
care provided in nursing homes as opposed to rest homes.
The third reason concerns the number of nursing home beds. OECD Health Data apply 
a ratio of nursing home beds representing 40% of total beds in homes for the elderly, 
whereas this ratio is on the rise and attained 49.4% in 2010.55
When we have a look at the degree of dependency of residents in nursing homes for the 
elderly, we find that 34% is moderately dependent (category B) and 66% is highly de-
pendent (category C or Cd) (48% being demented residents) (Fig. 4, left column).  In rest 
homes, 36% is completely independent (category O), but the other 64% is physically or 
mentally dependent (32% low dependent and 31% moderately and highly dependent) 
(Fig. 4, right column).56  With 64% of the residents in rest homes being dependent, there 
is a strong argument against the view that only private expenditure in nursing homes 
should be included in OECD Health Data and not private expenditure in rest homes. 
Including private expenditure for the moderately and highly dependent in the OECD 
Health Data for Belgium might also be in line with using the (Instrumental) Activities of 
Daily Living criteria (IADL) to distinguish between ‘health care’ and ‘social care’ (OECD, 
2000).
Contrary to the €378 million OECD Health Data figure, on this basis, we calculate €862 
million for private expenditure on ‘inpatient long term nursing care’ for the elderly (when 
considering only nursing homes). When adding up the medium and high dependent 
staying in rest homes, we get €1136 million (Fig. 3).
53	 ‘Maisons	de	repos	et	de	soins’	(MRS)/‘Rust-	en	verzorgingstehuizen’	(RVT).
54	 ‘Maisons	de	repos	pour	personnes	âgées’	(MRPA)/‘Rustoorden	voor	bejaarden’	(ROB).
55	 In	2010,	61966	patients	stayed	in	a	nursing	home	bed	and	63596	in	a	rest	home	bed.	Source:	NIHDI.
56	 Source:	NIHDI,	situation	on	May	31,	2010.
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Fig.4. Degree of dependency of residents in homes for the elderly in Belgium 2010.  
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Since moderately and highly dependent residents are staying in nursing homes and as 
nursing homes are fully taken into account for producing the OECD Health Data figures 
for Belgium, we would suggest taking into account as well the moderately and highly 
dependent residents in rest homes.
Conclusion is that instead of the €378 million listed in the OECD Health Data, we put 
forward a figure of €1136 million for private expenditure on nursing care facilities for the 
elderly (Fig. 3). The discrepancy between the two figures is due to the interpretation of 
definitions, the formulation of assumptions and the use of incorrect data.
2.3.4.2.2. Community care facilities for the elderly (rest homes)57
In 2010, independent or low dependent residents in rest homes for the elderly spent 
a total of €610 million on private expenditure.58. Pursuant to the SHA definition, we 
57	 HP.2.3.
58	 €1.747	billion	(total	private	expenditure	on	inpatient	long	term	care	for	the	elderly)	minus	€1.136	billion	
(private	expenditure	on	nursing	care	facilities	for	the	elderly).
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believe that elderly staying in homes but needing only little assistance, could rightfully 
be categorised under ‘community care facilities for the elderly’. Given the argumentation 
above, while OECD Health Data are listing €0 for this item, in our view, €610 million 
private expenditure should be added (Fig. 3).
2.3.4.2.3. Residential care for the disabled59
In the OECD Health Data for Belgium, public expenditure on ‘all other residential care 
facilities’ comprises residential care for the disabled and medical care in prisons. Since 
data on private expenditure on health in prisons is lacking, we are left with no choice 
but to limit our ‘alternative’ calculations to private expenditure on residential care for the 
disabled. Aggregate figures on private expenditure on residential care for the disabled 
not being available, we have made an estimation, based on partial, publicly available 
figures.60 Actually, we estimate that private expenditure totaled €227 million in 2010.61 As 
a matter of fact, this total is only taking into account the official co-payments62 born by 
the disabled. Expenditure for care not provided by government has not been taken into 
account. While OECD Health Data are listing €0.3 million for this item, we suggest €227 
million to be listed in 2010 for private expenditure on residential care for the disabled 
(Fig. 3).
2.3.4.3. Offices of other health practitioners: €0.7 billion versus €0.2 billion (Table 1)
According to OECD Health Data, total expenditure on providers of ambulatory health 
care63 amounted to €2991 million in 2010 while alternative calculations resulted in a total 
of €3420 million (Table 1). Fig. 5 provides us with a detailed overview. Alternative calcula-
tions show that private expenditure represented €1243 million for physicians, €592 mil-
lion for dentists, €293 million for medical and diagnostic laboratories (medical imaging 
and clinical biology) and €82 million for providers of home health care (nursing). In this 
context, it is appropriate to focus on the ‘offices of other health practitioners’64, health 
practitioners other than physicians and dentists (e.g. physiotherapists, psychologists, 
dietitians).
59	 HP.2.9:	‘all	other	residential	care	facilities’.	In	the	OECD	Health	Data	for	Belgium,	public	expenditure	on	‘all	
other	residential	care	facilities’	comprises	residential	care	for	the	disabled	and	medical	care	in	prisons.	
60	 Question	nr.	114	in	Flemish	Parliament	on	6	December	2012	(http://www.vlaamsparlement.be/Proteus5/
showSchriftelijkeVraag.action?id=761812	[accessed	10.02.14]);	Zorgregierapport	31	december	2010	(http://
www.vaph.be/vlafo/view/nl/464335-Zorgvragen.html	 	 [accessed	 10.02.14]);	 Eigen	 financiële	 bijdrage	
VAPH	2010	(http://www.vaph.be/vlafo/view/nl/3994560		[accessed	10.02.14]).
61	 This	estimation	has	been	validated	by	the	authorities	(cf.	e-mail	dd.	May	30,	2013,	Ritje	Pauwels,	advisor	
Flemish	Minister	Jo	Vandeurzen).
62	 ‘Eigen	financiële	bijdrage’.
63	 HP.3.
64	 HP.3.3.
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fig. 5. Private expenditure for providers of ambulatory heath care in Belgium 2010 (million €).
OECD Health Data give us a figure of €182 million for private expenditure on ambulatory 
health care provided by health practitioners, other than physicians and dentists, in 2010 
(Fig. 5).
We performed a calculus based on data from basic health insurance (NIHDI) and from 
additional health insurance (‘DKV Belgium’). It should be emphasised that -to a large 
extent- these ‘other health practitioners’ cover activities not reimbursed by basic health 
insurance.  Publicly available information about these activities is therefore limited.
Public expenditure represented €987 million in 2010 (Fig. 6).65
Private expenditure consists of co-payments and supplements. On the one hand, there 
are supplements linked to care that is covered by basic health insurance (‘supplemental 
fees’). On the other hand, there are supplements for care that is not covered by basic 
health insurance (‘supplemental services’).
2.3.4.3.1. Co-payments
According to basic health insurance data, in 2010, the total sum of co-payments to be 
allocated to ‘other health practitioners’ amounted to €150 million (Fig. 6).
65	 For	our	estimates,	we	have	transferred	‘psychotherapy’	from	HP.3.3	to	HP.3.1	(‘Offices	of	physicians’),	since	
this	particular	type	of	psychotherapy	is	being	provided	solely	by	psychiatrists.	The	result	of	this	transfer	
is	a	decrease	of	€73	million	public	expenditure	on	HP.3.3	 together	with	a	decrease	of	€13.5	million	co-
payments.
46
Chapter 2
2.3.4.3.2. Supplemental fees
On average, other health practitioners charge 7.6% supplements (weighted average) for 
care covered by basic health insurance.66 This results in a total amount of €75 million 
supplemental fees (Fig. 6).67
2.3.4.3.3. Supplemental services
The estimates for private expenditure on traditional, complementary and alternative 
medicine (‘TCAM’), provided by other health practitioners -mainly by physiotherapists- 
working in an ambulatory setting, amounted to about €146 million in 2010 (Fig. 6). This 
sum consists of €6.4 million for homeopathy, €22.2 million for acupuncture, €90.1 million 
for osteopathy and €27.6 million for chiropractic.68
Consultations with self-employed, registered clinical psychologists are not reimbursed 
by basic health insurance in Belgium.  According to the Belgian Federation of Psycholo-
gists69, private expenditure for psychologists represented approximately €230 million in 
2010 (Fig. 6).70
Consultations with self-employed dietitians are only exceptionally reimbursed by basic 
health insurance.71 The Flemish Professional Association of Dietitians supports the figure 
of €58.9 million of private expenditure on dietary advice for the Belgian market (Fig. 6).72
We assume other private expenditure for care not covered by basic health insurance 
could be estimated at 5% of public expenditure plus co-payments (Fig. 6) (e.g. TCAM 
other than homeopathy, acupuncture, osteopathy and chiropractic; services by podolo-
gists, physiotherapists, speech therapists not reimbursed by NIHDI). Five percent might 
indeed be a fair approximation, given the fact that private expenditure for psycholo-
gists, dietitians and homeopathy, acupuncture, osteopathy and chiropraxy has been 
calculated separately.
66	 Source:	‘DKV	Belgium’	(cf.	‘3.2.	Alternative	methodology’).
67	 7.6%	x	€987	million.
68	 Estimate	based	on	reports	nr.	148,	153	and	154	of	the	Belgian	Health	Care	Knowledge	Center	(KCE)	and	on	
the	Belgian	Health	Interview	Survey	2008	(‘Enquête	de	Santé/Gezondheidsenquête	2008’).
69	 ‘Fédération	Belge	des	Psychologues/Belgische	Federatie	van	Psychologen’	(FBP/BFP).
70	 Approximately	 5000	 self-employed,	 registered	 clinical	 psychologists	 are	 active	 in	 Belgium.	Many	 self-
employed	psychologists	have	another,	day	time	job	(as	an	employee).	With	on	average	20	sessions	per	
week	and	an	average	cost	for	the	patient	of	€50	per	session,	we	have	a	turnover	of	approximately	€230	
million	on	ambulatory	psychotherapy	provided	by	self-employed,	 registered	clinical	psychologists	 (46	
weeks	activity	per	year).
71	 A	limited	number	of	consultations	is	reimbursed	by	NIHDI	in	case	of	diabetes	or	chronic	kidney	failure.
72	 Approximately	1000	self-employed	dietitians	are	active	in	Belgium.	Average	cost	per	consultation:	€50	for	
the	first	(and	second)	consultation,	€25-€30	for	follow-up	consultations.	1000	FTE	dietitians	x	40	consulta-
tions	per	week	(8	consultations	at	€50	and	32	consultations	at	€27,5)	x	46	weeks	per	year	=	€58.9	million.
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2.3.4.3.4. Conclusion
While OECD Health Data are listing €182 million private expenditure on ambulatory care 
provided by other health practitioners, we have calculated a total of €717 million (Fig. 
5).  The difference pertains mainly to care not covered by social security and for which 
publicly available information is rather scarce (‘missing or incomplete data’).
        
 
       
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
       
        
        
       
        
        
Fig.6. Private expenditure for other health practitioners (e.g. fysiotherapists, psychologists, dietitians) in Belgium 2010 (million €).  
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2.3.4.4. Medical goods: €2.6 billion versus €2.5 billion
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2.3.4.4.1. Pharmaceuticals73
OECD Health Data give us a figure of €2434 million for private expenditure on health in 
pharmacies in 2010 (HP.4.1).  Consumption of pharmaceutical products through other 
retail selling channels (e.g. bandages in supermarkets) is not included in this estimate, 
due to a lack of information.
According to the Belgian Association of Pharmacists74, private expenditure on ambula-
tory medicines totaled €1775 million in 2010 (prescribed medicines 1082 million75, over-
the-counter medicines €693 million) (Fig. 7).
Private expenditure on para-pharmaceutical products (‘other medical non-durables’) 
amounted to €946 million.76  Some of these para-pharmaceutical products are health 
care related and some are not. We assume 50% of them to be health care related (€473 
million) (e.g. bandages, incontinence articles).
Due to missing data and interpretation of definition problems, OECD Health Data’s al-
location to the different categories of pharmaceuticals is not correct (Fig 7, first three 
columns).
2.3.4.4.2. Vision products77
According to alternative billing information, private expenditure on glasses and other 
vision products represented €357 million in 2010,78 where OECD Health Data are listing 
€2.6 million only (Fig. 7). The reasons for this discrepancy are missing data and the as-
sumption that private expenditure for vision products can be adequately calculated 
using co-payments (amounting to merely €1 million for vision products).
73	 So	far	as	pharmaceuticals	are	concerned,	we	will	also	be	using	the	ICHA-HC	classification	(expenditure	
on	health	by	function)	since	this	classification	allows	for	a	more	detailed	analysis	(i.e.	distinction	between	
prescribed	medicines,	OTC	medicines	and	other	medical	non-durables):	HC.5.1.
74	 ‘Association	Pharmaceutique	Belge/Algemene	Pharmaceutische	Bond	(APB)’.
75	 Co-payments	on	prescribed	medicines	reimbursed	by	basic	health	insurance	representing	€499	million	
and	not	reimbursable	prescribed	medicines	€583	million.
76	 Source:	‘Association	Pharmaceutique	Belge/Algemene	Pharmaceutische	Bond’	(2011).
77	 HP.4.2.
78	 In	2010,	total	turnover	in	the	market	of	vision	products	was	€475	million.	This	market	can	be	split	up	in	
glasses	 (50%),	 spectacle	 frames	 (30%),	contact	 lenses	 (10%)	and	sunglasses	and	other	vision	products	
(10%)	(source:	‘Pearle’).	When	assuming	one	third	of	the	expenditure	 for	spectacle	 frames	to	be	‘luxury	
expenditure’	and	deducting	this	10%	together	with	the	10%	expenditure	on	sunglasses	and	other	vision	
products,	we	get	a	turnover	of	€380	million.	When	deducting	€23	million	public	expenditure	we	get	a	
total	of	€357	million	private	expenditure	on	glasses	and	vision	products.
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2.4. dISCuSSIOn
OECD Health Data are a well-known source for detailed information about expenditure 
on health. These data are an important tool for analysing health policy issues over time 
and in comparison with other countries. This study has made clear that current official 
Belgian estimates of private health expenditure (as published in the OECD Health Data) 
are not reliable. We have distinguished four potential major sources of problems with 
estimating private health spending: interpretation of definitions, formulation of as-
sumptions, missing or incomplete data and incorrect data.
As an alternative for the current OECD Health Data for Belgium, we have used reliable 
billing information to calculate private expenditure on health. Such billing information 
is not always publicly available. For Belgium we find differences of more than 100% 
between the OECD Health Data and our estimates, both underestimations and overesti-
mations. For instance, according to OECD Health Data private expenditure on hospitals 
amounts to €3.1 billion, while according to our alternative calculations based on billing 
information these expenses are only €1.1 billion.  An overview of our results is given in 
Table 1.
In 2010, total private expenditure on health in Belgium amounted to €9.3 billion ac-
cording to OECD Health Data and €9,4 billion according to alternative calculation. The 
fact that the two figures for total private expenditure are almost identical, is a mere 
coincidence. When we look at the composition of total private expenditure, we notice 
important differences. However, these differences are not interdependent. E.g. private 
expenditure on hospitals (€3.3 billion versus €1.1 billion) does not affect private expen-
diture on homes for the elderly (€400 million versus €1.7 billion). Allocating €2 billion 
less to hospitals and €1.3 billion more to homes for the elderly cannot be considered 
communicating vessels.
Reliable figures about private expenditure on health are important for the different 
stakeholders in the health care system. In many countries, OECD Health Data on private 
expenditure provide stakeholders with relevant information about e.g. out-of-pocket 
expenses and access to care, and can have important policy implications. However, 
based on these data stakeholders may come to wrong conclusions and wrong policies. 
For example, policy makers in Belgium might overestimate the ‘problem’ of accessibil-
ity of hospital care; and additional health insurers might believe there still to be huge 
market opportunities, while additional health insurance covering hospital costs in fact 
is a saturated market. Another example is homes for the elderly. The OECD Health Data 
state that private expenditure on homes for the elderly in Belgium represents about 
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€400 million, with alternative calculations providing us with a figure of €1.7 billion. This 
kind of figures may be important for governments deciding upon investing or not in 
higher pensions for instance.
This raises the question how the reliability of data on private expenditure can be im-
proved. So far as the interpretation of definitions and the formulation of assumptions 
is concerned, creating transparency and stimulating critical analyses can lead to more 
consistent data. In 2008 Pacolet published a study on the application of the System of 
Health Accounts in Belgium (Pacolet and Borghgraef, 2008). He suggested a methodol-
ogy to be implemented, resulting -for 2003- in total expenditure on health amounting to 
11.1% of GDP and private expenditure on health totaling 30,4%. For the same year 2003, 
the methodology applied for the OECD Health Data 2013 resulted in total expenditure 
on health amounting to 10.0% of GDP and private expenditure on health totaling 24,8%. 
Pacolet proposed to include additional health care costs into the OECD Health Data, 
especially relating to homes for the elderly.  In the current OECD Health Data for Bel-
gium, this large definition has not been followed. Similar interpretation problems exist 
in accounting. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), a seven member inde-
pendent board, develops standards for accounting and reporting in the United States, 
the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). The FASB sets out to improve 
corporate accounting practices by enhancing guidelines set out for accounting reports, 
identifying and resolving issues in a timely manner and creating a uniform standard 
across the financial markets.
As for missing, incomplete or incorrect data, drilling new sources of information may 
help to find new, reliable data. Some sources are publicly available.79 Unfortunately, 
several sources used in this study are not -readily- publicly available, making it hard 
for public agencies to adjust their estimates. Ideally, agreements about the recurrent 
delivery of crucial figures could be made between the owners of these sources and the 
national statistical authorities producing the health data (e.g. for medical goods such as 
vision products and pharmaceuticals). Additional health insurers have data on private 
expenditure and reimbursement by additional health insurance. It should be possible to 
create a certain level of transparency, at least for the national statistical authority that 
produces the health data. Within the context of this study, the collaboration between 
experts from public agencies and health insurers has proven fruitful and may lead to 
future improvements of the OECD Health Data estimates for Belgium. A major problem 
is the care that is not reimbursed, not by basic nor by additional health insurance. Here, 
79	 E.g.	Christian	and	Socialist	sickness	funds’	annual	study	on	hospital	costs.
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Table 1. Expenditure on health by provider and source of funding: OECD Health Data versus alternative 
calculations (Belgium 2010) (million €).
General
government
expenditure
(OECd)
Private
sector
expenditure
(OECd)
Private sector
expenditure
(alternative
calculations)
Hospitals  8612  3139  1073
General hospitals  7332  2436  966
Mental health and substance abuse hospitals  1188  451  95
Specialty (other than mental health and substance abuse 
hospitals)
 92  252  12
nursing and residential care facilities  4238  397  1991
Nursing care facilities (homes for the elderly)  2344  378  1136
Residential mental retardation, mental health and substance 
abuse facilities
 109  18  18*
Community care facilities for the elderly  0***  0  610
All other residential care facilities  1784  0  227
Providers of ambulatory health care  8766  2991  3420
Offices of physicians  3240  1537  1243
Offices of dentists  770  584  592
Offices of other health practitioners  987  182  717
Out-patient care centres  278  1  1*
Medical and diagnostic laboratories  1471  184  293
Providers of home health care  1242  10  82
Other providers of ambulatory health care  778  492  492*
retail Sale and other providers of medical goods  3764  2459  2627
Dispensing chemists (pharmacies)  3731  2434  2248
(Pharmaceutical and other medical non-durables - HC.5.1) ( 3735)** ( 2317)** ( 2248)**
Retail sale and other suppliers of optical glasses and other 
vision products
 23  3  357
Retail sale and other suppliers of hearing aids  0  20  20*
(Hearing aids - HC.5.2.3) ( 45)** ( 56)** ( 60)**
Retail sale and other suppliers of medical appliances (other 
than optical goods and hearing aids)
All other miscellaneous sale and other suppliers of 
pharmaceuticals and medical goods
 10  2  2*
Provision and administration of public health programs  874    
General health administration and insurance  1501  331  331
Other industries (occupational health care / private 
households)
 333  0  0
Total general government expenditure / Total private sector 
expenditure
 28088  9316  9442
Total expenditure  37404  37530
Total private sector expenditure (% of total expenditure) 24.9% 25.2%
* When no alternative data are available, OECD figures for private expenditure are being used.
** Figures for HC.5.1 and HC.5.2.3 have not been used to calculate total expenditure.
*** General government expenditure on community care facilities for the elderly is comprised in general 
government expenditure on nursing care facilities (homes for the elderly).
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it would be very helpful if professional associations would publish consistent, yearly 
updated data on utilisation and financing of the care provided by their members.
OECD, Eurostat and WHO are well aware of the issue of the (un)reliability of data on pri-
vate and out-of-pocket expenditure on health. Eurostat might soon launch a survey with 
its member states to make an inventory of all sources of out-of-pocket expenditure.80
2.5. COnCluSIOn
Reliable information on private expenditure on health is important. Private expenditure 
and especially out-of-pocket expenditure can have a negative impact on the accessibil-
ity of health care. Figures on private and out-of-pocket expenditure are a crucial starting 
point when examining the accessibility of certain (sub)sectors of health care (Frenk et 
al., 2006). However, current official Belgian estimates of private health expenditure (as 
published in the OECD Health Data) are not reliable mainly because hard data on private 
expenditure are not transparent. Using some alternative sources of billing information, 
we have reached more accurate estimates of private and out-of-pocket expenditure. This 
approach may serve for some OECD countries to re-examine their sources and method-
ologies. For other countries, it may be irrelevant. Rannan-Eliya holds that out-of-pocket 
expenditure on health has proved to be one of the components with least reliability in 
most health accounts (Rannan-Eliya, 2010). OECD, WHO and Eurostat have taken and are 
taking several initiatives to improve the reliability of private health expenditure data. 
In the next editions of the OECD Health Data, some of the Belgian figures for private 
expenditure on health will be adapted according to the findings of this study.
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3.1. InTrOduCTIOn
definitions
Extra billing is the practice of health care providers charging a supplementary fee on top of the tariff agreed 
upon by health insurance. This tariff may include a co-payment or co-insurance to be borne by the patient.
In Belgium, the term ‘ereloonsupplement’ (in Dutch) and ‘supplément d’honoraires’ (in French) is used for a fee 
charged on top of the official tariff set by basic health insurance.
In France, the term ‘dépassement d’honoraires’ is used and in Germany, ‘Steigerungssatz’.
In the U.S., the term ‘balance billing’ is used for health care providers billing patients more than what the insurer 
pays for their services. In Canada, ‘extra billing’ is the preferred term.
In many countries, extra billing is a controversial issue. In Belgium, some political parties 
are proposing a prohibition or a strict limitation of extra billing, especially for inpatient 
care. They are afraid that extra billing jeopardises accessibility of medical care for low-
income groups. In France, in 2012, in order to stop excesses, extra billing by physicians 
has been limited to 150% on top of social security tariffs. In Canada and the U.S., discus-
sion about extra billing continues. In Canada, opponents of extra billing think it will 
erode Canada’s public health care system and give way to a two-tier system.
Driven by the economics of medical practice before the spread of health insurance, doc-
tors applied price discrimination by charging patients according to what they thought 
each patient could afford. The use of sliding fee scales persisted until widespread health 
insurance drove a standardis ation of fees (Hall and Schneider, 2008).
The goal of this paper is twofold. First, we provide new detailed estimates on extra bill-
ing in Belgium (e.g. total amount of extra billing, split between in- and outpatient care 
and between the different health care providers). Second, we put forward and discuss 
several policy issues concerning extra billing that may be helpful for policymakers who 
decide about different policy options such as ‘laissez-faire, regulation or prohibition’.
3.2. THE PraCTICE Of EXTra bIllInG In bElGIum
3.2.1. regulatory framework for supplementary fees in belgium
In Belgium, the legal basis for charging supplementary fees can be found in the Health 
Care Professions Act, which states that practitioners can set their fees freely. The Code of 
medical ethics holds that physicians should be moderate when determining their fees 
and be willing to explain to their patients why they are charging a certain fee.
According to article 50 of the Health Insurance Act, every two years, an agreement is 
made between the trade unions of the physicians and the ‘sickness funds’ (representing 
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their members as social insurees). Physicians can choose to adhere to the agreement 
(‘conventioned’ physicians) or they can choose completely not to adhere (‘non-conven-
tioned’) or partially, for certain well defined days and hours (‘partially conventioned’). 
Partially conventioning is only possible with regard to ambulatory patients.81 ‘Conven-
tioned’ physicians get an annual contribution from compulsory health insurance for 
their future pension (4506 EUR in 2014).
Invariably since 1964, the biannual agreement between physicians and sickness funds 
has listed situations in which conventioned physicians are at liberty to deviate from the 
official tariffs set by compulsory health insurance, i.e. for special demands made by a 
patient (e.g. a private room in a hospital or a consultation late at night).
The agreement also allows conventioned physicians to charge supplementary fees for 
households whose taxable income exceeds 66709 EUR per year (figure for 2014). How-
ever, since it is rather awkward to ask patients for proof of their exact taxable income, 
physicians have not been using this possibility so far. Dentists no longer have this pos-
sibility at their disposal since it has been left out in the biannual agreement between 
dentists and sickness funds.
As from 1 January 2013, supplementary fees have been forbidden by Belgian govern-
ment for patients staying at least one night in double and common rooms in hospitals.82 
As from 27 August 2015, supplementary fees are also forbidden for one-day admissions 
in double or common rooms.
Every hospital has to define a maximum percentage of supplementary fees that can be 
charged (a percentage of the official tariff of the compulsory health insurance system). 
Today, maximum percentages for supplementary fees range between 0% and 300%. 
Today, just one single hospital (Saint Luke hospital in Bruges) has set out different 
percentages for non-conventioned (300%) and conventioned (100%) physicians. Since 
there is no limitation by law, hospitals are at liberty to set the maximum percentage of 
supplementary fees as high as they prefer.
81	 First	stipulated	in	the	2009-2010	national	convention	between	physicians	and	sickness	funds.
82	 Several	associations	of	physicians	filed	an	appeal	in	the	Belgian	Constitutional	Court	against	the	abolish-
ment	of	supplementary	fees	 in	double	and	common	rooms.	 In	 its	 judgment	of	17	July	2014,	the	Court	
stated	that	the	new	law	respected	the	equilibrium	between	an	equal	access	to	health	care	and	an	equi-
table	income	for	physicians	(with	the	new	law	allowing	physicians	to	continue	to	charge	supplementary	
fees	in	private	rooms).
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There are important regional differences in the maximum percentage of supplementary 
fees charged. In 2014, on average, general hospitals in Flanders applied a maximum 
percentage of 118%, general hospitals in Wallonia 195% and general hospitals in Brussels 
279%.83 Within the same hospital, there can also be differences between specialties. For 
instance, in the Saint Augustine hospital in Antwerp, certain specialties (e.g. the gynae-
cologists) apply the maximum of 200% set by the hospital, while other specialties apply 
a maximum of 130%.
3.2.1.1.	 Impact	of	supplementary	fees
Until 1 July 2014, the official admission form a patient has to sign when s/he is being 
hospitalised stated that the patient had no free choice of physician when s/he was not 
willing to pay supplementary fees. In the new admission form, defined by the Royal 
Decree of 17 June 2014, this phrase has been omitted.
In Belgium, according to article 6 of the Patient Rights Act, a patient can freely choose 
his/her physician. However, physicians are free to refuse treatment, with an exception 
for urgent treatments (Nys, 2001; Vansweevelt and Dewallens, 2014). As a result, patients 
refusing to pay supplementary fees, may not be treated by the physician of their choice.
3.2.1.2.	 Transparency
Article 8, §2 of the Patient Rights Act states that the patient needs to be duly informed 
about the financial consequences of a medical intervention in order to be able to give 
his/her informed consent. This includes information about supplementary fees and 
information about the ‘convention status’ of the physician (whether the physician re-
spects the official tariffs set by compulsory health insurance) (Dijkhoffz, 2004). Charging 
supplementary fees in hospitals is strictly regulated. Every hospital has to provide the 
patient with a list of the maximum supplementary fees that can be charged (expressed 
as a percentage of the official tariffs set by compulsory health insurance). The admission 
form to be signed by the patient allows him/her explicitly to choose supplementary fees 
not to be charged.
Charging supplementary fees in an outpatient setting is less regulated. Physicians only 
have to put up a notice in their waiting room with their ‘convention status’ (stating 
whether or not they stick to the official tariffs set by compulsory health insurance). They 
do not have to list the level of supplementary fees charged. Recently, a new law has cre-
ated more transparency, obliging physicians to specify - in certain circumstances - the 
83	 Calculation	based	on	the	maximum	percentage	of	supplementary	fees	listed	in	the	‘internal	regulation’	
of	every	hospital.
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supplements charged on the patient bill (when billing electronically and when at the 
same time billing care reimbursed by social security and care not reimbursed by social 
security).84
3.2.2. new figures on supplementary fees in belgium
Using data from Deutsche Krankenversicherung Belgium (‘DKV Belgium’), the market 
leader for additional health insurance, we have been able to calculate estimates on 
supplementary fees for outpatient care (cf. footnotes 7 and 8). So far, only for inpatient 
care reliable estimates on supplementary fees have been published in Belgium. Combin-
ing existing estimates for inpatient care with new estimates for outpatient care, based 
on authors’ own calculations, makes it possible - for the first time - to present a reliable 
estimate of the total amount of supplementary fees charged by health care providers.
In 2012, supplementary fees were 1.2 billion EUR on a total of 8.8 billion EUR private 
expenditure and 39.6 billion EUR total expenditure on health. Supplementary fees repre-
sented 14% of total private expenditure on health, while co-payments represented 21%. 
The bulk of total private expenditure (60%) comprised payments for care not included 
in the basic package of the National Institute of Health and Disability Insurance (NIHDI) 
(cf. figure 1).
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Private expenditure on health in Belgium in 2012 (OECD Health Statistics 2015, authors’ own 
calculations; sources: Christian sickness fund, DKV Belgium, NIHDI) (billion €) 
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figure 1. Private expenditure on health in Belgium in 2012 (billion €) (OECD Health Statistics 2015, authors’ 
own calculations; sources: Christian sickness fund, DKV Belgium, NIHDI)85
84	 Art.	22-23	wet	van	17	 juli	2015	houdende	diverse	bepalingen	 inzake	gezondheid,	Belgisch Staatsblad	 17	
August	2015.
85	 The	amounts	listed	are	estimates,	after	extrapolation	of	the	findings	of	the	Christian	sickness	fund	(for	
inpatient	care)	and	DKV	Belgium	(for	outpatient	care)	respectively.
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Traditionally, supplementary fees for inpatient care have been in the spotlights. About 
75% of all Belgians are carrying additional health insurance covering inpatient care 
(including supplementary fees). However, less than 5% have comprehensive additional 
coverage for outpatient care.
Figure 2 shows that the total amount of supplementary fees charged in Belgium in 2012, 
is estimated at 1.2 billion EUR, with inpatient care accounting for 31% of total amount of 
supplementary fees and outpatient care for 69%.
Physicians and dentists are responsible for the bulk of supplementary fees in outpatient 
care. Dentistry is especially well represented. For certain types of dental care the official 
tariff set by basic health insurance is quite low, resulting in important supplementary 
fees (e.g. orthodontics and periodontology). Often, dentists use new techniques, the 
additional cost of which is not always readily reimbursed by basic health insurance. 
Supplementary fees can be used to finance these new techniques. Today, less than 5% 
of all Belgians are carrying additional dental insurance. The number of insured is likely 
to increase since several sickness funds recently have started to offer additional dental 
insurance products.
Most supplementary fees attributed to the category ‘offices of other health practitioners’ 
are charged by physiotherapists. ‘Medical and diagnostic laboratories’ comprehend 
medical imaging and clinical biology centres. It is rather rare that supplementary fees 
are being charged by providers of home health care services.
Table 1 gives an overview of supplementary fees expressed as a percentage of total fees 
earned.
In a hospital, supplementary fees charged by physicians represent 11.4% of fees earned. 
In an ambulatory setting, this figure is 9.2% (5.8% for general practitioners and 14.8% for 
specialists).
Dentists charge substantial supplementary fees for orthodontic treatments (143.7%) 
because reimbursement by basic health insurance for this kind of treatment is limited.
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Fig. 2. Supplementary fees in Belgium in 2012 (authors’ own calculations; sources: Christian sickness fund, 
DKV Belgium, NIHDI) (million €). 
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figure 2. Supple entary fees in Belgium in 2012 (million €) (authors’ own calculations; sources: Christian 
sickness fund86, DKV Belgium87,88, NIHDI)
86	 For	 the	estimation	of	 supplementary	 fees	 charged	 for	 inpatient	 care	we	have	been	using	 the	annual	
study	on	hospital	bills,	published	by	the	Christian	sickness	fund.	In	2012,	the	Christian	sickness	fund	cov-
ered	41.6%	of	the	Belgian	population	(source:	NIHDI).	CM,	Negende	barometer	van	de	ziekenhuisfactuur,	
7	November	2013	 (figures	 for	2012)	 (http://www.cm.be/binaries/CM-255-NL-9deCM-barometer_tcm375-
137079.pdf,	accessed	5	October	2015).
87	 For	the	estimation	of	supplementary	fees	charged	in	an	ambulatory	setting,	we	have	been	able	to	use	
data	from	DKV	Belgium,	the	market	leader	in	additional	health	insurance	(covering	16.4%	of	the	Belgian	
population	in	2012).	About	20%	of	what	DKV	Belgium	reimburses,	pertains	to	ambulatory	care	(people	
carrying	a	 full	cover	 for	ambulatory	care	and	people	carrying	a	cover	 for	pre-	and	posthospitalisation	
costs).	We	have	been	using	information	from	1432429	services	billed	for	ambulatory	care	and	sent	to	DKV	
Belgium	for	reimbursement	in	2012,	2013	and	2014	(with	among	others	921000	acts	referring	to	physicians,	
118000	to	dentists	and	189000	to	physiotherapists).	We	calculated	supplementary	fees	as	a	percentage	
of	reimbursement	by	basic	health	 insurance	plus	co-payments.	We	multiplied	these	percentages	with	
total	reimbursement	by	basic	health	insurance	plus	co-payments	to	get	estimates	for	total	amounts	of	
supplementary	 fees.	 Supplementary	 fee	percentages	 represent	a	weighted	average	of	a	certain	 (sub)	
sector.	Every	(sub)	specialism	has	a	supplementary	fee	percentage.	For	calculating	the	average	of	a	group	
of	(sub)	specialisms	the	weight	of	each	(sub)specialism	has	been	taken	into	account.	For	outpatient	care,	
OECD’s	Health	Provider	classification	has	been	followed.
88	 We	are	aware	of	the	fact	that	there	may	be	some	bias	as	to	the	data	from	DKV	Belgium.	People	carry-
ing	additional	health	insurance	might	be	less	price	sensitive	and	health	care	providers	knowing	that	a	
patient	is	additionally	insured	might	charge	higher	prices.	However,	additional	coverage	for	ambulatory	
care	is	not	widespread	in	Belgium	(less	than	5%	of	the	population).	Providers	of	ambulatory	health	care	
generally	do	not	take	into	account	the	possibility	that	a	patient	might	be	carrying	additional	coverage	for	
ambulatory	care.	We	assume	that	the	upward	pressure	of	additional	health	insurance	on	supplementary	
fees	 is	 limited	so	far	as	ambulatory	care	 is	concerned.	Anyway,	 it	might	be	recommended	to	consider	
the	percentages	of	supplementary	fees	for	ambulatory	health	care	presented	here	as	‘upper	limit’,	real	
supplementary	fees	maybe	being	somewhat	lower.
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Table 1. Supplementary fees as a percentage of ‘total fees earned based on the official tariffs, including 
co-payments’ (Belgium) (2012) (authors’ own calculations; sources: Christian sickness fund, DKV Belgium 
and NIHDI89
InPaTIEnT CarE
Physicians working in hospitals 11.4%
OuTPaTIEnT CarE
Offices of physicians 9.2% Offices of dentists 24.5%
1. Gynaecology 6.9% 1. Conservative treatment 11.8%
2. Surgery 19.4% 2. Prosthetic treatment 46.9%
3. Technical acts 4.6% 3. Orthodontic treatment 143.7%
4. Consultations and house calls 8.9% 4. Periodontal treatment 27.1%
        - General practitioners 5.8% Offices of other health practitioners 6.6%
              House calls 1.6% 1. Speech therapists 0.9%
              Consultations 9.0% 2. Providers of bandages 28.3%
        - Specialists (consultations) 14.8% 3. Physiotherapists 5.6%
              Cardiologists 9.2% 4. Providers of orthopedic material 15.7%
              Dermatologists 16.1% 5. Midwives 19.3%
              Gerontologists 9.4% medical and diagnostic laboratories 4.4%
              Internal medicine specialists 4.7% 1. Clinical biology 1.6%
               Neurologists, psychiatrists and 
neuropsychiatrists
7.8% 2. Medical imaging 6.1%
              Oncologists and haemotologists 4.4% Providers of home health care services 0.8%
              Pediatricians 9.6% 1. Nurses 0.8%
              Other medical specialists 21.0%
3.3. POlICy ISSuES COnCErnInG EXTra bIllInG
3.3.1. additional health insurance
In hospitals in Belgium, the bulk of supplementary fees is covered by additional health 
insurance. About 75% of Belgians carry an additional cover for hospital costs. Because of 
this high percentage, additional hospitalisation insurance is said to have an inflationary 
effect on supplementary fees. People carrying additional health insurance may be less 
price-sensitive and health care providers, knowing that a patient is additionally insured, 
may charge higher prices. There certainly is an interaction between supplementary fees 
and additional health insurance, since the first additional health insurance - covering 
89	 Total	private	expenditure	on	hospitals	 represents	8.5%	of	total	expenditure	on	hospitals.	Total	supple-
mentary	fees	represent	35.6%	of	total	private	expenditure	on	hospitals.
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private hospitalisation costs - came on the market in Belgium in 1964, the same year 
universal health insurance was established (creating the possibility of - legally - charging 
supplementary fees).
Contrary to hospital costs, and with 69% of total supplementary fees in Belgium be-
ing charged in an ambulatory setting, it is remarkable that less than 5% of Belgians are 
carrying full additional coverage for outpatient costs. Since full additional coverage 
for ambulatory care is not widespread in Belgium, providers of ambulatory health care 
generally do not take into account the possibility that a patient might be carrying ad-
ditional coverage for ambulatory care. Therefore, so far as ambulatory care is concerned, 
we assume the upward pressure of additional health insurance on supplementary fees 
to be limited.
Additional health insurers may try to reduce upward pressure on prices by certain mea-
sures such as deductibles, co-insurance and price negotiations with providers.
In Belgium, there is no tax deductibility for premiums paid for additional health insur-
ance. For individual and group contracts alike, there are no fiscal incentives.
3.3.2. Patients facing financial problems
According to the Belgian Health Interview Survey (2013), 26 % of households say that 
private expenditure on health is (very) hard to bear (32 % if the reference person is > 75 
years old). In 2013, 8% of Belgian households had to postpone medical care for financial 
reasons (Demarest, 2015).
Debt as a result of private health care costs and debt as a result of energy costs are 
said to be among the most important risk factors for sinking into poverty in Belgium 
(Vranken et al., 2009).
Government has implemented a number of specific measures to improve accessibility 
for high risk and low income people, such as preferential reimbursement for low income 
groups (‘Verhoogde Tegemoetkoming’/‘Intervention Majorée’) and yearly subsidies 
for chronic patients (e.g. for incontinence material). In 2001, a maximum billing system 
(‘MAF’) has been introduced. This measure improved the out-of-pocket maximum, 
already introduced in 1994 under the social and fiscal exemption mechanism for certain 
vulnerable categories, by extending the scheme to all households and to other types of 
user charges. MAF ensures that, according to the family’s net income, each household 
has an annual out-of-pocket maximum for all ‘necessary health care expenses’ (Corens, 
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2007). As soon as expenses reach the set ceiling, any further health care costs are covered 
in full by the health insurance fund for the remaining part of the year.
However, only care reimbursed by basic health insurance is taken into account for the 
calculation of the MAF. Supplementary fees and room charges for private rooms in hos-
pitals but also supplements for medical material that is not reimbursed by basic health 
insurance are not covered by the MAF system.
Patients who have no additional health insurance coverage, need to pay for supplemen-
tary fees out-of-pocket. About 25% of the Belgians are not carrying additional health 
insurance. Some of them choose not to because they have sufficient financial resources 
to do without insurance. A large group however may be too old, too sick or too poor - or 
a combination of the three - to buy an additional coverage.
3.3.3. Inpatient versus outpatient setting
Unlike France where additional health insurance is providing a large coverage for both 
inpatient and outpatient costs, additional coverage in Belgium is focusing on inpatient 
costs only (‘hospitalisation insurance’). Less than 5% of the Belgians are carrying a full 
additional cover for outpatient costs. However, since 69% of total supplementary fees 
in Belgium is being charged in an ambulatory setting, ambulatory supplementary fees 
might in certain circumstances constitute a financial barrier for low income groups.
A further restriction of supplementary fees in hospitals, might result in a compensa-
tory increase of ambulatory supplementary fees. Physicians may also transfer certain 
procedures to an ambulatory setting. So far, ambulatory supplements are only scarcely 
regulated.
3.3.4. Increase of social security tariffs and supplementary fees
A supplementary fee is a fee charged on top of the social security tariff and expressed 
as a percentage of that tariff. When the tariff is being increased, the supplementary fee 
automatically follows suit. For instance, when a tariff increases from 1000 to 1200 EUR, a 
200% supplementary fee results in 2400 EUR instead of 2000 EUR. It is sometimes argued 
that in 1964, at the start of the current Belgian health insurance system, social security 
tariffs were relatively low and physicians could charge supplements to patients that 
could afford to pay more. As a consequence, some consider supplements as a part of the 
regular physician fee and social security tariffs as the physician fee for socially deprived 
patients (Van de Voorde et al., 2014). Of course, this argument ought to be reconsidered, 
when social security tariffs increase and do reflect the full price.
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In 2013-2015, several hospitals in the region of Namur have increased their maximum 
percentage of supplementary fees, from 100% to 200%.90 These increases may be in-
spired by the desire to align with hospitals in the rest of Wallonia but of course they are 
not building stones for the financial sustainability of the supplementary fee system.
3.3.5. reform of the hospital financing system
Federal Belgian government has decided that the hospital financing system needs to 
be reformed. On 26 September 2014, the Belgian Health Care Knowledge Centre has 
published an extensive report on the reform (Van de Voorde et al., 2014). For this report, 
the Centre has intensively been consulting with all stakeholders.
Some stakeholders hold that supplements already have been heavily restricted over the 
last years. They believe that further regulation might encourage a further shift from hos-
pitals towards private practices resulting in a dual health care system. Another group of 
stakeholders fears that supplementary fees in private rooms will further increase. They 
suggest to further restrict supplementary fees. Some stakeholders propose to just stop 
charging supplementary fees altogether. Others suggest to limit supplementary fees to 
a maximum percentage.
Some stakeholders consider charging supplementary fees in private rooms in hospitals 
to be a strange and unacceptable system, since different prices are being charged for 
the same care.
Conclusion of the report is that stakeholders have very divergent opinions on the further 
restriction of supplementary fees. For the moment, a reform of the supplementary fee 
system seems to be ‘out of scope’.
3.3.6. Income for health providers
For certain groups of self-employed physicians in Belgium and France providing inpa-
tient care, extra billing constitutes a substantial part of their income (cf. Table 2). Extra 
billing represents respectively 35% and 32% of total income of Belgian and French sur-
geons. In ambulatory care in Belgium, 9.2% of total income of all physicians is provided 
by extra billing.
90	 For	instance,	Centre	Hospitalier	Régional	Sambre	et	Meuse,	Clinique	Maternité	Sainte	Elisabeth,	Clinique	
Saint	Luc	and	Centre	Hospitalier	Universitaire	Dinant	Godinne.
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Table 2. Share of supplementary fees in the income of self-employed physicians providing inpatient care 
in France and Belgium in 2010
Specialism
france belgium
% of gross income % of gross income
Stomatology 45.6% 15.9%
Surgery 31.9% 34.7%
Gynaecology 29.5% 34.9%
Ophthalmology 25.3% 10.1%
Oto-rhino-laryngology 20.8% 12.3%
Anaesthesia 16.7% 31.5%
Paediatrics 16.7% 21.1%
Psychiatry 16.6% 4.2%
Gastro-enterology 11.6% 11.5%
Radiology 4.0% 13.4%
Cardiology 4.0% 15.0%
Pneumology 4.0% 5.8%
Source: Drees, 2012 (FR); Swartenbroekx et al., 2012 (BE).
In the Netherlands, price discrimination by physicians was legally banned in the 1990’s. 
Before, in hospitals different fees were charged to members of sickness funds on the one 
hand and privately insured people at the other hand. In the 1960’s for a ‘first class’ private 
patient staying in a single hospital room the fee for an inpatient treatment by a medical 
specialist could be tenfold the fee for the same treatment for a ‘third class’ sickness fund 
patient staying on ward. During several decades of fee regulation by Dutch government 
the differences in fees gradually converged to zero, without seriously reducing the 
income of medical specialists. In 2012, Dutch medical specialists earned more than their 
colleagues in neighbouring countries Belgium, Denmark and Germany (Kok et al., 2012).
3.3.7. revenue for hospitals
In Belgium, hospitals also do benefit from supplementary fees. In most hospitals, physi-
cians have to cede a certain percentage of their supplementary fees to the hospital to 
help finance its overhead costs. E.g., hospitals have been raising the maximum level 
of supplementary fees from 100% to 150% of official tariffs to generate money for the 
construction of new hospital facilities.
However, self-employed physicians contribute more to the hospital’s overhead costs 
with revenue from reimbursement by basic health insurance than with revenue from 
supplementary fees. In 2010, physicians overall contributed 41% of their total revenue 
from reimbursement by basic health insurance to financing hospitals (Belfius, 2011). 
Revenue from supplementary fees contributed for a varying but substantially lower 
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percentage. For example, while 31% of the revenue of gynecologists generated by re-
imbursement by basic health insurance is transferred to the hospital, only 15% of their 
revenue from supplementary fees goes to the hospital (Swartenbroekx et al., 2012).
The University Hospital of Antwerp explains on its website what is being done with the 
proceeds of the supplementary fees. Proceeds of supplementary fees are being used ‘to 
finance new medical techniques that are not yet reimbursed by government, to keep 
the hospital’s budget in balance and to finance professional literature, training abroad 
and special equipment for the physicians’ (UZA, 2012).
3.3.8. Competition between hospitals and physicians
If a hospital wants to attract a physician with a top reputation, offering the possibil-
ity to charge substantial supplementary fees, may constitute an important element in 
convincing the physician to switch hospitals. As a result, supplementary fee percentages 
tend to evolve to the same level within the same region or city. Most hospitals in Brus-
sels apply a maximum level of supplementary fees of 300% of the official tariffs. Over 
the past few years, all hospitals in Antwerp have been increasing the maximum level of 
supplementary fees to 200%.
However, this mechanism does have an inflationary effect on supplementary fees and 
on the premiums of additional health insurance covering these supplementary fees. 
Another problem is that in most occasions the hospital and not the physician is charging 
the supplementary fee, leaving no room for appraisal by the physician and resulting in 
hospitals almost always - for every patient - charging the maximum percentage.
3.3.9. Extra comfort for patients
Patients willing to pay extra may be offered convenient consultation hours and comfort-
able private rooms in hospitals. In Belgium for instance, a general practitioner can charge 
supplementary fees for special demands made by the patient, e.g.: home calls at night 
or during the weekend when the physician is not on call, consultations after 9 pm or 
during the weekend, explicitly demanded by the patient. However, does a private room 
in a hospital still represent ‘luxury’ in an era when in the rest of the economy private 
rooms have become the norm? Imagine the receptionist in a hotel asking you whether 
you would prefer a private room or a room to be shared with a stranger. Anyway, while 
it is understandable that a patient needs to pay extra to the hospital for the use of a 
luxurious private room, it is difficult to understand why s/he should pay extra to the 
physician for staying in a single room.
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3.3.10. waiting time
Since health care providers can increase their income by engaging in extra billing, they 
might be motivated to provide extra consultation or operation time. This could result in 
avoiding or decreasing waiting lists.
In Germany, patients are covered either by statutory health insurance (SHI) or by private 
health insurance (PHI). Due to a 20%-35% higher reimbursement of physicians for pa-
tients with PHI, it is claimed that patients with SHI are faced with longer waiting times 
when it comes to obtaining outpatient appointments. Lungen et al. (2008) have shown 
that patients carrying SHI face waiting times for an appointment that are 3.08 times 
longer than patients carrying PHI. Other studies confirm their findings (Roll et al., 2012; 
Farnworth, 2003). Countries facing waiting lists have developed a whole set of remedies 
to tackle this problem. In Spain, bonuses for specialists who achieved waiting-times re-
ductions (that accounted for two to three per cent of their salary) may have contributed 
to the steady reduction in waiting times (Siciliani and Hurst, 2005). In the Netherlands, 
extra billing is forbidden.91 However, the Dutch regulatory authority has stated that 
in future it might be possible for an intermediary to pay extra to a provider in order 
to get faster treatment, as long as other patients are not pushed aside (Nederlandse 
Zorgautoriteit, 2009).
3.3.11. accessibility of care
In health care, the term ‘equity’ often is used in the sense that every person should have 
access to health care on the basis of need and not ability to pay (Richards, 2008). Accord-
ing to Weale and Clark the principle of equity means that all should have access to high 
quality, comprehensive care without financial barriers to access (Weale and Clark, 2009).
Sometimes, new medical technology is only available for patients who are willing and 
able to pay supplementary fees. Dentists for instance use new techniques, the additional 
cost of which is not always readily reimbursed by basic health insurance. Supplementary 
fees can be used to finance these new techniques. Patients who are not able to pay these 
supplementary fees, may not have access to the new dental materials that are being 
used.
3.3.12. access to time-consuming and/or complex procedures
Sometimes, the official tariff agreed by health insurance, does not meet the expecta-
tions of physicians. When a fee for a certain service is perceived to be too low, physicians 
may refrain from performing that service. Waiting lists may arise or better-remunerated 
91	 Cf.	art.	35,	lid	1	Mededingingswet.
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alternatives may be suggested to the patients. When two different procedures are avail-
able for the treatment of the same medical problem, a time-consuming and complex 
procedure (golden standard) at the one hand and an easier, faster procedure on the 
other hand, physicians may choose to perform the latter if reimbursement for the time-
consuming and complex procedure is perceived as being (too) low. Two examples.
Autologous reconstruction of the breast after amputation for breast cancer - a DIEP-flap 
reconstruction - currently is reimbursed by compulsory health insurance in Belgium at 
a rate of 1527 EUR. A DIEP flap is a type of breast reconstruction in which blood vessels 
called deep inferior epigastric perforators (DIEP), and the skin and fat connected to 
them are removed from the lower abdomen and transferred to the chest to reconstruct 
a breast after mastectomy (Blondeel, 1999). A recent study of Damen et al. (2011) revealed 
that in the Netherlands actual total cost for a unilateral DIEP-flap reconstruction was 
12,848 EUR, with actual surgery costs amounting to 6346 EUR. With Belgian and Dutch 
prices for health services generally not diverging very much, there may be an important 
gap in Belgium between the fee agreed by health insurance and the real cost of the 
DIEP-flap reconstruction, a procedure taking more than 6 hours with several surgeons. 
Generally, plastic surgeons charge 200% or 300% supplementary fees to fill the gap. 
These supplementary fees are generally reimbursed by additional health insurance. 
About 75% of the Belgian population carries an additional coverage for hospital costs. 
Access to a DIEP-flap reconstruction may be financially difficult for patients who do not 
have such coverage.
Mohs surgery is used to treat skin cancer. During the surgery, after each removal of tissue, 
while the patient waits, the pathologist examines the tissue specimen for cancer cells, 
and that examination informs the surgeon where to remove tissue next. Mohs surgery is 
the treatment of choice for certain types of skin cancer because of its high cure rate and 
maximal conservation of tissue (Gloster et al., 1996). Analysis of the existing literature on 
Mohs surgery relative to surgical excision confirms that Mohs surgery is a cost-effective 
treatment. It is lower in cost than surgical excision, which often includes an ambulatory 
surgical centre facility fee and a subsequent re-excision procedure (Tierney and Hanke, 
2009). In Belgium, reimbursement by compulsory health insurance of surgery for skin 
cancer amounts to 441 EUR (2014). Supplementary fees - e.g. 100% or 200% - play an 
important role as an incentive for dermatologists to effectively choose for the time-
consuming procedure of Mohs surgery and not for the one-time broad surgical excision.
Reconstruction of the breast after breast cancer can be performed either with own 
tissue or with a breast implant. Since reimbursement by basic health insurance in 
Belgium of a breast reconstruction with own tissue is quite limited - as opposed to a 
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reconstruction with an implant - a breast reconstruction with an implant is more likely to 
happen when no supplementary fees can be charged. The same goes for Mohs surgery 
for the treatment of skin cancer. In the absence of supplementary fees a one-time broad 
surgical excision may be preferred by the surgeon (and the hospital) instead of the time-
consuming step by step approach of Mohs surgery. The divide between those having 
access or not to (new) time-consuming and complex medical procedures paid for with 
supplementary fees, runs pretty much along the same line as the divide between those 
who have an additional cover and those who have not.
3.3.13. Quality of care
In a theoretical study, Glazer and McGuire (1993) have shown that restrictions on extra 
billing come at a price as doctors have an incentive to reduce the quality of their services. 
A physician can be regarded as making two choices to maximise profit, the price for 
the price-paying patients (patients willing to pay extra), and the quality for the fee-only 
patients (patients not willing to pay extra). Physicians’ equilibrium choice of quality and 
price depends on the level of fee set by the regulator. When the fee is low enough, no 
patients will be taken at the fee only. When the fee is high enough, no patients will be 
charged extra. When the fee is set in the range between the minimum fee, necessary 
to induce physicians to take some patients at the fee only, and the optimal fee, high 
enough to avoid patients being billed extra, some patients are served for the fee but the 
quality to the fee-only patients is less than or equal to the quality for the price-paying 
patients. Glazer and McGuire hold that quality is set at a higher level for both patients 
paying the price and those not paying a supplemental price when price discrimination 
is permitted. The reason is that when discrimination is prohibited, physicians can only 
extract rents by setting quality. They do so by reducing quality, and therefore saving on 
costs.
Kifmann and Scheuer (2011) applied the findings of Glazer and McGuire to Medicare in 
the U.S. They studied the effects of ‘balance billing’, i.e. allowing physicians to charge 
a fee from patients in addition to the fee paid by Medicare. In contrast to Glazer and 
McGuire, they did not find that allowing balance billing is generally superior as balance 
billing allows physicians to increase their rents.
An empirical study of the effects of Medicare restrictions on extra billing in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s has been performed by McKnight (2007) She found that these restric-
tions reduced out-of-pocket medical expenditure of Medicare beneficiaries by 9%. With 
the exception of a significant fall in the number of follow-up telephone calls, her study 
showed little evidence that physicians changed their behavior in response to the extra 
billing restrictions.
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An important question is whether extra billing creates extra value for the patient? In 
health care, ‘value’ can be defined as the health outcome achieved for the money spent. 
While most hospitals in Brussels charge 300% supplementary fees, three times the of-
ficial tariff, hospitals in more rural areas charge 100%. Is the value offered in Brussels’ 
hospitals indeed twice the value offered in hospitals that are 50 or 100 kilometers away 
from Brussels (the cost of living being only slightly higher in Brussels)?
In the 1990’s the effect of the choice of a private room in a hospital on the care provided 
has been analysed for certain diagnoses (normal delivery, caesarean section, cataract 
operation, cholecystectomy, spinal fusion, lung cancer and myocardial infarction). The 
conclusion was that, apart from epidural anesthesia during childbirth being more fre-
quently applied for patients staying in a private room, no other medical acts had been 
provided in private rooms versus common rooms in Belgian hospitals (Calcoen and Cor-
remans, 1995). A review of the literature by van de Glind et al. (2007) - that included no 
studies about the Belgian situation - found that private rooms have a moderate effect on 
patient satisfaction with care, noise and quality of sleep, and the experience of privacy 
and dignity. Conflicting results were found for hospital infection rates and there was no 
evidence on recovery rates and patient safety.
3.3.14. Transparency
There are problems with extra billing as to transparency. Sometimes it is not clear for the 
patient when supplementary fees can be charged. In Belgium for instance, a regulatory 
framework has created transparency on supplementary fees for inpatient treatment, but 
this is not the case for ambulatory care.
There is little or no transparency about the extra value offered for the extra - supplemen-
tary - money paid. In Germany, supplementary fees exceeding 130% of the official tariff 
need to be motivated (in writing). In France and Belgium, such motivation is not obligatory.
3.3.15. financial sustainability
Between 1998 and 2010, in Belgian hospitals, total bill for the patient for a ‘classical’ 
hospital stay (including minimum one night) has increased with 1.6% per year while 
total amount of supplementary fees has increased with 6.6% per year (both figures after 
adjusting for inflation) (CM, 2011). The share of supplementary fees in the total bill for the 
patient has increased from 20% to 35%.
In 2013, 23% of all ‘classical’ hospital stays were in a private room (CM, 2014). This percent-
age is likely to increase over the next years, since newly built hospital facilities typically 
provide 50% private rooms. With a majority of the Belgian population carrying an ad-
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ditional hospitalisation insurance covering supplements in a private room, the demand 
for a private room is exceeding the offer.
Most supplementary fees are covered by additional private health insurance. When 
supplementary fees continue to rise, insurance premiums will need to follow suit. At 
a certain point in time, customers might no longer be ready to pay (ever) increasing 
insurance premiums to finance (ever) increasing supplementary fees.
3.4. PrOHIbIT, rEGulaTE Or laISSEZ-faIrE?
How can it be explained that extra billing did survive the standardisation of fees driven by 
(universal) health insurance? When studying methods of payment used in public health 
care programs worldwide, Marmor and Thomas (1972) found that the methods for pay-
ing physicians are extraordinarily diverse but share a remarkably close resemblance to 
what physicians were used to before the programs began. The system of supplementary 
fees that enables physicians to charge more to richer patients is indeed a continuation 
of the former practice of physicians using sliding fee scales depending on the income 
of the patient.
The practice of extra billing can be prohibited (e.g. the Netherlands) or (almost) com-
pletely left alone (‘laissez-faire’) (e.g. Belgium and France). In between, a continuum of 
more or less restrictive regulation can be opted for.
3.4.1. Is a prohibition of extra billing feasible?
An argument that is often used in the discussion about extra billing is that official tariffs 
are too low and need to be compensated by the possibility to charge supplementary 
fees. Following this reasoning, an option could be to increase official tariffs so as to 
meet the sum of official tariffs plus supplementary fees. To that purpose, 1.2 billion EUR 
would need to be transferred from supplementary fees to official tariffs in Belgium. A 4% 
increase of government spending on health care could cover this transfer.
A complete ban on supplementary fees could lead to a two-tiered system consisting 
of a public system at the one hand and a private system at the other hand with private 
practices being only accessible for people willing to pay the full price out-of-pocket (or 
through additional health insurance). However, the success of these private practices 
would highly depend upon the functioning of the public sector. In the absence of wait-
ing lists and concerns about the quality delivered in the public sector, private practices 
might not be very successful (Flood, 2006).
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3.4.2. from laissez-faire to a more regulated system of extra billing?
From the previous section, it is clear that extra billing has some disadvantages. Extra 
billing can have an impact on access to new medical techniques and on access to time-
consuming and complex procedures. There is an impact on waiting times. There is a 
lack of transparency about the supplementary fees charged and about the extra value 
offered for the extra money paid. There is a strong interaction between extra billing 
and additional health insurance. The last 10-20 years we have seen a sharp increase of 
supplementary fees charged in countries such as Belgium and France. A further increase 
might endanger the financial sustainability of the system of extra billing.
Regulation could provide a solution for the issues raised, i.e. equal access to health care, 
transparency and financial sustainability:
• restricting supplementary fees to a maximum limit (cf. Germany and France92);
• stimulating physicians to use a sliding scale when charging supplementary fees (ac-
cording to the degree of difficulty and the time needed);
• having physicians and not hospital administrations decide upon the supplementary 
fees charged in hospitals;
• providing patients with information on the supplementary fees charged, also for 
outpatient care;
• implementing the German practice of a justification in writing might be considered 
for supplementary fees exceeding a certain limit93;
• ensuring that treatment options are equally accessible for patients not able to pay 
supplementary fees (cf. breast reconstruction with own tissue, Mohs surgery).
Changes in regulation will need to be supported by the health care providers. As pro-
ducers of a crucial service in industrial countries, and a service for which governments 
can seldom provide short-run substitutes, health care providers have the overwhelming 
political resources to influence decisions regarding payment methods (Marmor and 
Thomas, 1972).
92	 On	23	October	2012,	physicians’	trade	unions	and	health	insurance	agreed	on	a	limit	for	supplementary	
fees	of	1.5	times	the	official	tariffs	set	by	compulsory	health	insurance.	Before,	supplementary	fee	percent-
ages	could	be	as	high	as	500%.
93	 For	personal	services,	according	to	 the	degree	of	difficulty	and	the	time	needed,	private	patients	can	
be	charged	up	to	130%	on	top	of	the	official	tariff.	For	technical	services,	supplementary	fees	are	limited	
to	80%	and	for	laboratory	tests	15%	is	the	limit.	When	the	medical	problem	is	particularly	difficult	and	
time	consuming,	supplementary	fees	can	attain	250%	for	personal	services,	150%	for	technical	services	
and	30%	for	laboratory	tests.	These	higher	supplementary	fees	need	to	be	justified	in	writing.	Exception-
ally,	 these	 limits	 can	be	 exceeded	on	 the	 condition	 that	 a	written	 contract	 is	made	with	 the	patient	
(‘Honorarvereinbarung’).	(Verband	der	privaten	Krankenversicherung.	PKV-Info.	Die Gebührenordnung für 
Arzte, ein kleiner Leitfaden.	 http://www.dkv.com/downloads/die_gebuehrenordnung_fuer_aerzte_ein_
kleiner_leitfaden.pdf,	accessed	7	October	2015)
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Health care providers are not likely to support a drastic change in the regulation of 
supplementary fees (such as a prohibition of extra billing), unless there is a compensa-
tion (e.g. in the form of an increase in government financing).
Normally, patients’ willingness to pay supplementary fees should depend upon the 
value they get for the extra money spent. Supplementary fees can buy comfort, e.g. a 
private room in a hospital or a consultation at a convenient time, possibly a reduction 
in waiting time and access to well-reputed physicians. Patients paying supplementary 
fees might expect better quality to be offered. However, to the extent that patients can-
not judge the quality of services, the efficiency of extra billing may be questionable 
(Kifmann and Scheuer, 2011). In the meantime, the willingness to pay supplementary 
fees for non-medical amenities such as shorter waiting times for non-urgent treatments, 
could be considered a consequence of the right to ‘autonomy’, namely people’s right to 
spend their money as they choose.
3.5. COnCluSIOn
Extra billing can be dealt with in three ways: prohibit, regulate or laissez-faire.
In the Netherlands, extra billing has been completely prohibited. U.S. Medicare94 and pri-
vate health insurers in Germany have regulated and restricted extra billing. In Belgium and 
France health care providers have a considerable freedom to charge supplementary fees.
Regulation sits on a continuum between a total ban and complete liberty. In the Neth-
erlands, for instance, regulation eventually led to a prohibition of extra billing. Recently, 
new rules in Belgium (a ban on supplementary fees in double and common hospital 
rooms) and France (a limitation of supplementary fees to 150% on top of official tariffs) 
have been introduced to try to contain some of the negative effects of extra billing.
Governments can impose more regulation. Health care providers and payers can make 
agreements to voluntarily restrict extra billing. Creating more transparency about the 
practice of extra billing and the value created for the extra money paid, might also have 
a self-regulating effect.
94	 Fees	 set	by	Medicare	 for	physicians	who	have	not	enrolled	 in	 the	participating	provider	program	are	
95%	of	the	fees	set	for	participating	physicians.	Total	billed	charges	for	non-participating	physicians	have	
been	restricted	to	115%	of	fees	set	by	Medicare.	Since	the	fee	for	non-participants	is	95%	of	the	fee	for	
participants,	physicians	have	effectively	been	permitted	to	balance	bill	their	patients	only	9.25%	above	
the	Medicare	participating	physician	fee	since	1993	(9.25	=	[95	*	1.15	–	100]	/	100)	(McKnight,	2007.)
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If extra billing is to be restricted or forbidden, special attention is to be given to the 
effect on the comfort of patients (e.g. waiting lists) and the income of health care provid-
ers (and hospitals).
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abSTraCT
In Belgium and France, physicians can charge a supplementary fee on top of the tariff set 
by the mandatory basic health insurance scheme. In both countries, the supplementary 
fee system is under pressure because of financial sustainability concerns and a lack of 
added value for the patient. Expenditure on supplementary fees is increasing much 
faster than total health expenditure. So far, measures taken to curb this trend have not 
been successful. For certain categories of physicians, supplementary fees represent one-
third of total income. For patients, however, the added value of supplementary fees is 
not that clear. Supplementary fees can buy comfort and access to physicians who refuse 
to treat patients who are not willing to pay supplementary fees. Perceived quality of care 
plays an important role in patients’ willingness to pay supplementary fees. Today, there 
is no evidence that physicians who charge supplementary fees provide better quality 
of care than physicians who do not. However, linking supplementary fees to objectively 
proven quality of care and limiting access to top quality care to patients able and will-
ing to pay supplementary fees might not be socially acceptable in many countries. Our 
conclusion is that supplementary physicians’ fees are not sustainable.
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3.1. InTrOduCTIOn
Driven by the economics of medical practice prior to the spread of health insurance, physi-
cians applied price discrimination by charging patients according to what they thought 
each patient could afford. The use of sliding fee scales persisted until widespread health 
insurance drove a standardisation of fees (Hall and Schneider, 2008). Nonetheless, supple-
mentary fee systems continue to exist in countries with universal health insurance.
The goal of this paper is to answer the following questions: How can cost inflation of supple-
mentary fees be contained? What is the added value of supplementary fees? Is a system of 
supplementary physicians’ fees charged on top of social security tariffs sustainable?
The paper focuses on Belgium and France, and starts with an analysis of the system of 
supplementary fees in the two countries. Next, possible measures to curb cost inflation of 
supplementary fees are discussed. Further, the added value of supplementary fees is ana-
lysed, in particular the link between supplementary fees and quality of care. The paper 
concludes with a discussion of the future of supplementary fees in Belgium and France.
definitions and terminology
A supplementary fee is an extra fee charged by health care providers on top of the tariff agreed upon by 
health insurance. This tariff may include a co-payment or co-insurance to be borne by the patient.
In Belgium, the term ‘supplementary fee’ (‘ereloonsupplement’ [Dutch] / ‘supplément d’honoraires’ [French]) is 
used for a fee charged on top of the official tariff set by social security.
In France, the term ‘dépassement d’honoraires’ is applied.
In North America, the term ‘extra billing’ or ‘balance billing’ is used.
3.2. SuPPlEmEnTary fEES In bElGIum and franCE
Before the spread of health insurance, physicians applied price discrimination by charg-
ing patients according to what they thought each patient could afford. Cross subsidies 
between the rich and the poor were organised by physicians on a micro level. Manda-
tory, universal health insurance established cross-subsidisation between the rich and 
the poor and between the healthy and the sick on a macro level. Health insurance has 
taken over the role of individual physicians in ensuring access to health care for the poor 
and the sick. Nonetheless, supplementary fees are still applied today in Belgium and 
France, two countries that have a long-standing history of universal health insurance.
In the following section, an analysis of the system of supplementary fees in Belgium and 
France will be presented. First, the regulatory framework for supplementary fees will be 
described. Second, the current situation will be discussed.
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3.2.1. belgium
3.2.1.1.	 Regulatory	framework
The current system of supplementary fees saw the light in 1964, when basic health insur-
ance became a mandatory part of the social security system.
The legal basis for charging supplementary fees can be found in the Health Care Profes-
sions Act, which states that practitioners can freely set their fees.95 The Code of Medical 
Ethics provides that physicians should be moderate when determining their fees and be 
willing to explain to their patients why they are charging a certain fee.
As from 1964, an agreement on physicians’ fees has been made every two years between 
the physicians’ representative associations and the ‘sickness funds’ (not-for-profit enti-
ties providing mandatory basic health insurance).96 Physicians can choose to adhere to 
the agreement (‘conventioned’ physicians) or they can choose not to adhere at all (‘non-
conventioned’) or only to partially adhere, i.e., for certain well defined days and hours 
(‘partially conventioned’). Partial conventioning is only possible for outpatient care. 
Conventioned physicians get an annual contribution from the social security system for 
their pension (4790 EUR in 2017).
Non-conventioned physicians are not bound by official social security tariffs. They are at 
liberty to charge supplementary fees on top of official tariffs. However, supplementary 
fees can never be charged for emergency care.
Since 1964, the biannual agreement between physicians and sickness funds has consis-
tently listed situations in which conventioned physicians are at liberty to deviate from 
the official tariffs set by mandatory basic health insurance, i.e., for special demands 
made by a patient (e.g., a private room in a hospital or a consultation after 9 pm).
The agreement also allows conventioned physicians to charge supplementary fees for 
households whose taxable income exceeds 67636 EUR per year (figure for 2017).97 How-
ever, since it may be rather awkward to ask patients for proof of their taxable income, 
physicians have not commonly used this possibility so far.
95	 Art.	35	Health	Care	Professions	Act	 (Loi coordonnée du 10 mai 2015 relative à l’exercice des professions des 
soins de santé),	Moniteur belge,	18	June	2015,	p.	35172.
96	 According	to	article	50	of	the	Health	Insurance	Act	(Loi relative à l’assurance obligatoire soins de santé et 
indemnités coordonnée le 14 juillet 1994),	Moniteur belge,	27	August	1994,	p.	21524.
97	 Para.	11.4	National	agreement	between	physicians	and	sickness	funds	2016-2017	(Accord national médico-
mutualiste 2016-2017),	 Institut	national	d’assurance	maladie-invalidité	 (INAMI).	Available	at	http://www.
inami.fgov.be/fr/professionnels/sante/medecins/soins/Pages/accord-medico-mutualiste
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All hospital physicians, both conventioned and non-conventioned, are allowed to charge 
supplementary fees to patients who are staying in a private room. As of January 1, 2013, 
the Belgian authorities have prohibited the charging of supplementary fees for patients 
staying at least one night in double and common rooms in hospitals.98 As of August 27, 
2015, supplementary fees have also been prohibited for one-day admissions in double or 
common rooms. Every hospital has to define a maximum percentage of supplementary 
fees that can be charged (expressed as a percentage of the official social security tariff ). 
Since there is no limitation by law, hospitals are at liberty to set the maximum percent-
age of supplementary fees as high as they prefer.
Supplementary fees can be charged to rich and poor patients alike. Supplementary fees 
can be avoided by choosing a double or common room in a hospital and by consulting a 
conventioned physician during regular consultation hours for outpatient care.
In Belgium, according to the Patient Rights Act, a patient can freely choose his/her 
physician. Reciprocally, physicians are free to refuse treatment, except for urgent treat-
ment (Nys, 2001; Vansweevelt and Dewallens, 2014). As a result, patients who refuse to 
pay supplementary fees may not be treated by the physician of their choice. Upheaval 
in the press about physicians pushing their patients towards private hospital rooms 
where they can charge supplementary fees,99 eventually led to new legislation, which 
came into effect on 7 January 2017 and which prohibits hospital physicians from dis-
criminating between patients who pay supplementary fees and those who do not.100 
Physicians can no longer refuse to treat patients who do not choose a private hospital 
room (supplementary fees being chargeable only to patients staying in a private room). 
The new law explicitly forbids hospital physicians to use waiting time to discriminate 
between patients who pay supplementary fees and those who do not. The law clearly 
states that every patient is entitled to the same quality of care whether or not he/she is 
paying supplementary fees.101 However, as this new legislation applies to inpatient care 
98	 Several	associations	of	physicians	filed	an	appeal	in	the	Belgian	Constitutional	Court	against	the	prohibi-
tion	of	 supplementary	 fees	 in	double	and	common	 rooms.	 In	 its	 judgment	of	 17	 July	 2014,	 the	Court	
stated	that	the	new	law	respected	the	equilibrium	between	equal	access	to	health	care	and	an	equitable	
income	for	physicians	(with	the	new	law	allowing	physicians	to	continue	to	charge	supplementary	fees	
in	private	rooms).
99	 For	instance,	Belgian	newspaper	article	(2016)	‘Sonja	moest	van	chirurg	eenpersoonskamer	nemen	of	ze	
werd	niet	geopereerd’	(translation:	Sonja	had	to	take	a	private,	one-bed	hospital	room	or	her	surgeon	
would	not	operate),	Het Laatste Nieuws,	28	November	2016.	Available	at	http://www.hln.be/hln/nl/957/
Binnenland/article/detail/3010975/2016/11/28/Sonja-moest-van-chirurg-eenpersoonskamer-nemen-of-
ze-werd-niet-geopereerd.dhtml	
100	 Art.	112	Law	of	18	December	2016	providing	for	different	measures	on	health	care	(Loi du 18 décembre 2016 
portant des dispositions diverses en matière de santé),	Moniteur belge,	28	December	2016,	p.	89736.
101	 Art.	 112	 Law	of	 18	December	 2016	 holding	 different	measures	 in	 health	 care	 (Loi du 18 décembre 2016 
portant des dispositions diverses en matière de santé),	Moniteur belge,	28	December	2016,	p.	89736.
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alone, physicians can still refuse to treat outpatients who are not willing or not able to 
pay supplementary fees.
3.2.1.2.	 Current	situation
Currently, 84 per cent of all physicians adhere to the national agreement between physi-
cians and sickness funds (INAMI, 2016a). For outpatient care, these conventioned physi-
cians can only charge supplementary fees in case of special demands by the patient. For 
inpatient care, they can charge supplementary fees to patients staying in a private room. 
Physicians who have opted out of the national agreement between physicians and sick-
ness funds (non-conventioned physicians) are at liberty to set their fees. However, for 
inpatient care they can only charge supplementary fees to patients staying in a private 
room. In 2015, 23 per cent of all patients stayed in a private room (Mutualité Chrétienne, 
2016).
In hospitals, supplementary fees range between one and three times the official tariff. 
There is a wide variation in price-setting behaviour, which cannot be explained by ob-
servable hospital characteristics (Lecluyse et al., 2009). There are also significant regional 
differences, with most Flemish hospitals charging 100 per cent of the official tariff, most 
Walloon hospitals 200 per cent and most Brussels’ hospitals 300 per cent (Mutualité 
Chrétienne, 2016).
Table 1 shows that there is a huge span in private expenditure102 between a private room 
and a double or common hospital room. The span can be explained through supple-
mentary fees and –to a lesser extent– room charges, neither of which may be charged 
in a double or common room. Room charges for a private room vary between 18 and 
164 EUR per day (Mutualité Chrétienne, 2016). In 2015, supplementary fees represented 
61 per cent of private expenditure for a classic hospital stay in a private room (Mutualité 
Chrétienne, 2016).
Table 1. Average private expenditure for an admission in a Belgian hospital (EUR, 2015) (Source: Mutualité 
Chrétienne, 2016)
Private room Double or common room
Classic hospital stay (min. 1 night) 1463 278
Surgical one-day clinic 735 122
Non-surgical one-day clinic 437 25
102	 Private	expenditure	comprises	the	health	costs	that	are	not	covered	by	mandatory	basic	health	insur-
ance.
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In 2012, the total amount of supplementary fees charged by physicians in Belgium 
represented 781 million EUR (381 million EUR for inpatient care and 400 million EUR for 
outpatient care) (Calcoen et al., 2015).
3.2.1.3.	 Cost	inflation
The total amount of supplementary fees charged for classic hospital stays in Belgian 
hospitals (including minimum one night) has increased by 7.1 per cent per year between 
1998 and 2010. Over the same period, the total hospital bill for patients has increased by 
3.0 per cent (Mutualité Chrétienne, 2011).103 After inflation adjustment, supplementary 
fees have increased by 32 per cent between 2004 and 2015, whereas the total patient bill 
has decreased by 5 per cent (Mutualité Chrétienne, 2016).
Unfortunately, data on supplementary fees for outpatient care are scarce and do not 
allow an evaluation of changes over time.
3.2.2. france
3.2.2.1.	 Regulatory	framework
The current system of supplementary fees was introduced in 1980.  At the time, phy-
sicians demanded a higher income and the government decided not to increase the 
public health budget, but instead allowed physicians to charge supplementary fees 
(‘dépassements d’honoraires’) (Auguste, 2012).
In France, physicians can either receive a salary or be self-employed. The latter are called 
‘liberal physicians’ (‘des médecins libéraux’). Salaried physicians cannot charge supple-
mentary fees.
Liberal physicians are divided in three categories or ‘sectors’ (‘secteurs’). Sector 1 physi-
cians are bound by the official social security tariffs. Sector 2 physicians are allowed to 
charge supplementary fees on top of social security tariffs. Sector 3 physicians operate 
outside the social security system. Their patients are not reimbursed by social security.
Sector 1 physicians need to respect the fees set in the national medical convention, 
which is concluded between mandatory basic health insurance and the representa-
103	 The	figures	mentioned	(7.1	per	cent	and	3.0	per	cent)	are	compound	annual	growth	rates.	The	figures	are	
based	on	an	analysis	of	all	hospital	bills	of	the	members	of	the	Christian	Mutualities.	On	31	December	
2015,	the	Christian	Mutualities	covered	4,574,738	people	or	41.2	per	cent	of	the	Belgian	population	(INAMI,	
2016b).		
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tive associations of liberal physicians.104 Sector 1 physicians are allowed only to charge 
supplementary fees in case of ‘special demands’ made by the patient, for instance, for a 
consultation outside normal hours.
Liberal physicians need to choose whether they wish to adhere to the convention 
(sector 1 or 2) or not (sector 3). If they adhere to the convention, they need to choose 
between sector 1 and 2 when they first start a practice. Only physicians who hold certain 
titles – for instance, ‘chief resident’, ‘resident’ or ‘assistant’ (both active in hospitals or as a 
general practitioner)– can opt for sector 2.105
It is not permitted to charge supplementary fees to patients who get subsidies from the 
government for additional health insurance.106
The College of Physicians states that physicians ought to determine their fees with tact 
and moderation (‘avec tact et mesure’).107 Physicians ought to use four criteria: (1) the 
financial capacity of the patient; (2) the time needed and complexity of the intervention; 
(3) the reputation of the physician; (4) particular demands of the patient. Physicians 
need to give their patients written information for all fees exceeding 70 EUR.
In May 2012, the College of Physicians issued a recommendation, providing that a limit of 
3 or 4 times the official social security tariff should be respected when charging supple-
mentary fees.108
In France, there are 2 types of hospitals: public (‘hôpital [public]’) and private (‘clinique 
[privée]’). Charging supplementary fees is a common practice in private hospitals but is 
also possible in public hospitals. Physicians working in public hospitals are allowed to 
have a ‘private practice’ (‘activité privée’) for a maximum of 20 per cent of their time. How-
ever, it is not easy to verify compliance with this 20 per cent limit (Auguste, 2012). Part 
of the supplementary fees charged in private and public hospitals goes to the hospital 
104	 National	convention	between	liberal	physicians	and	social	security.	27	August	2016.	Available	at	https://
www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jo_pdf.do?cidTexte=JPDF2310201600000010&categorieLien=id
105	 Art.	38.1.1	National	convention	between	liberal	physicians	and	social	security.	27	August	2016.	
106	 In	2014,	7.4	per	cent	of	those	covered	by	additional	health	insurance	benefited	from	a	public	programme	
providing	free	coverage	to	the	poorest	(‘Couverture Universelle Maladie complémentaire’	 [‘CMU-c’]).	 Indi-
viduals	with	an	income	just	above	the	CMU-c	ceiling	can	get	a	voucher	to	partially	fund	the	premium	for	
an	additional	health	insurance	contract	(‘l’Aide au paiement d’une Complémentaire Santé’	[‘ACS’]).
107	 Art.	R.4127-53	Public	Health	Law.	Available	at	https://www.conseil-national.medecin.fr/article/article-53-
tact-et-mesure-277
108	 College	 of	 Physicians.	 Recommendation	 available	 at	 https://www.conseil-national.medecin.fr/article/
acces-aux-soins-recommandations-du-cnom-1185
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in return for using hospital accommodation, equipment and personnel. This is also the 
case in Belgium.
3.2.2.2.	 Current	situation
Whereas for Belgium no public data on supplementary fees are available, for France 
both social security (Sécurité sociale, 2016b) and a public agency providing technical 
information on hospitals109 collect data on supplementary fees and make them available 
to the public.
59 per cent of all general practitioners and 46 per cent of all specialists work as ‘liberal 
physicians’ (Barlet and Marbot, 2016). 25.3 per cent of liberal physicians are sector 2 physi-
cians who are allowed to charge supplementary fees on top of official social security 
tariffs: 43.4 per cent of all specialists and 9.0 per cent of all general practitioners. The 
majority of surgeons (79.9 per cent) and gynaecologists (58.9 per cent) work in sector 
2. Sector 1 physicians –73.9 per cent of liberal physicians– are bound by social security 
tariffs. 912 physicians, representing 0.8 per cent of all liberal physicians, choose to work 
in sector 3 (Sécurité sociale, 2016a).110
Whereas only 38 per cent of all hospital beds in France are private,111 62 per cent of all sur-
gical interventions in France are performed in private hospitals.112 Supplementary fees 
are applied for about half of all surgical procedures in France (Barlet and Marbot, 2016). 
For instance, supplementary fees are charged for 60 per cent of all cataract operations in 
private hospitals. For cataract operations, supplementary fees represent on average 79 
per cent of the official tariff.113 In 2014, a total of 805 million EUR of supplementary fees 
was charged in private hospitals. 114 In public hospitals, this figure was 69 million EUR 
(Clavreul, 2014).
109	 Agence	technique	de	l’information	sur	l’hospitalisation.	Information	available	at	http://www.atih.sante.fr/
depassements-d-honoraires
110	 All	figures	for	2014	(situation	on	31	December	2014).
111	 Association	of	hospitals.	Information	available	at	https://www.hopital.fr/Nos-Missions/L-hopital-au-sein-
de-l-organisation-generale-de-la-sante/Les-etablissements-publics-de-sante
112	 Federation	of	private	hospitals.	 Information	available	at	http://www.fhp-lr.com/Federation-Hospitalisa-
tion-Privee/Les-cliniques-privees/Le-secteur-MCO/Le-Secteur-MCO-fer-de-lance-de-l-hospitalisation-
privee_47_.html
113	 Figure	 retrieved	 from	 http://www.66millionsdimpatients.org/depassements-dhonoraires-en-cliniques-
restes-a-charge-au-menu/
114	 Figures	 on	 private	 hospitals	 (‘cliniques’)	 retrieved	 from	 http://www.66millionsdimpatients.
org/depassements-dhonoraires-en-clinique-les-chiffres-de-laugmentation/	 and	 from	 http://
www.66millionsdimpatients.org/depassements-dhonoraires-en-cliniques-restes-a-charge-au-menu/
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In 2014, supplementary fees amounted to 2.8 billion EUR in France. The bulk of supple-
mentary fees, 2.5 billion EUR was charged by specialists, whereas only 300 million EUR 
was charged by general practitioners (Sécurité sociale, 2016b).
3.2.2.3.	 Cost	inflation
The percentage of liberal physicians working in sector 2, who are authorised to charge 
supplementary fees, has slightly increased from 24.7 per cent in 2000 to 25.3 per cent in 
2014. While the percentage of general practitioners working in sector 2 has decreased 
from 13.9 per cent to 9.0 per cent, the percentage of specialists working in sector 2 has 
increased from 37.1 per cent to 43.4 per cent (Sécurité sociale, 2016b). Today, 59 per cent 
of all new medical specialists choose to work in sector 2 (Barlet and Marbot, 2016).
Average supplementary fees in sector 2 have risen from 25 per cent of official tariffs in 
1990 to 54 per cent in 2010 (Léchenet, 2012).
Between 2011 and 2015, the total amount of supplementary fees in private hospitals has 
risen from 676 million EUR to 867 million EUR (+ 28 per cent).
In 2014, total supplementary fees charged by physicians amounted to 2.8 billion EUR 
(Sécurité sociale, 2016b), while in 2011 the figure was 2.4 billion EUR (Auguste, 2012).
3.2.3. additional health insurance
In Belgium, additional health insurance mainly covers hospital costs. Therefore, the term 
‘hospitalisation insurance’ is used. About 75 per cent of Belgians have such hospitalisa-
tion insurance. The bulk of supplementary fees in hospitals is covered by hospitalisation 
insurance. About 95 per cent of the French have an additional health insurance, covering 
a broad range of inpatient and outpatient health care services. In France, additional 
health insurance reimburses both inpatient and outpatient supplementary fees.
Cost inflation of supplementary fees leads to higher premiums for additional health 
insurance. In Belgium, for instance, as a result of recent increases in supplementary fees, 
two insurers have applied premium rate increases for their additional hospitalisation 
insurance products of 16 per cent and 47 per cent respectively (Sury, 2016).
Additional insurance can also have an inflationary effect on supplementary fees. People 
holding additional health insurance may be less price-sensitive. Knowing that a patient 
is additionally insured may lead health care providers to charge higher fees. Dormont 
and Péron (2016) showed that the average amount of supplementary fees charged 
for a consultation to patients holding additional health insurance contracts covering 
91
Supplementary physicians’ fees: A sustainable system?
Ch
ap
te
r 3
.2
supplementary fees increased by 32 per cent. Insurance also led to an increase of 9 per 
cent in the number of consultations with specialists who charge supplementary fee. 
Feldstein (1970) was one of the first to note that widespread health insurance can lead 
to an increase in the price of health care, which undermines the value of insurance and 
decreases consumer welfare.
3.2.4. belgium versus france
In Belgium, proportionally more supplementary fees are charged compared to France 
(see table 2).
Table 2. Supplementary fees in Belgium and France (2012)
belgium france
Total Average per
inhabitant
Total Average per
inhabitant
Supplementary fees charged for outpatient care €400 million €36 €1851 million €28
Supplementary fees charged in hospitals €381 million €34 €793 million €12
Total supplementary fees €781 million €70 €2644 million €40
Sources: Calcoen et al., 2015; DREES; Eurostat
Table 3 shows that the most important differences between Belgium and France are 
related to the ‘convention’ status of the physician –i.e., whether the physician has signed 
the national agreement between physicians and mandatory basic health insurance– 
and the possibility for the physician to refuse to treat patients who are not willing or not 
able to pay supplementary fees.
Table 3. Regulatory framework for supplementary fees in Belgium and France
belgium france
Are supplementary fees linked to the ‘convention’ status of the 
physician?
Yes, but only for 
outpatient care
Yes, for 
outpatient and 
inpatient care
Are supplementary fees for inpatient care linked to a private room in 
a hospital?
Yes No
Do physicians need to be moderate when determining supplementary 
fees (College of Physicians)?
Yes Yes
Are persons with low incomes exempt from supplementary fees? No Yes
Can physicians refuse to treat patients who refuse to pay 
supplementary fees?
Outpatient care: 
yes; inpatient 
care: no
Yes
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3.3. mEaSurES TO Curb COST InflaTIOn
Both in Belgium and in France, there is much concern about the financial sustainability 
of the supplementary fee system. Expenditure on supplementary fees increases at a 
pace that exceeds the rate at which total expenditure on health care is increasing. Both 
in Belgium and in France, the bulk of supplementary fees is covered by additional health 
insurance. Sustained rapid growth of supplementary fees leads to sharp increases in 
premiums for additional coverage. Several measures can be taken to reverse this trend. 
In this section, we will give an overview of measures to curb cost inflation of supple-
mentary fees (see table 4). Some measures involve regulation by the authorities. Other 
measures –i.e., 3.6, 3.7, 3.8 (and 3.4)– are initiatives which can be taken by additional 
health insurance providers.
3.3.1. Prohibiting supplementary fees
As from 1 January 2013, supplementary fees can no longer be charged in double and 
common rooms in Belgian hospitals. However, this has not led to a reduction of supple-
mentary fees, since more supplementary fees have been charged in private rooms. 
Between 2013 and 2015, supplementary fees have increased by 9.7 per cent (Mutualité 
Chrétienne, 2016).
Physicians wish to maintain their income. Therefore, when a particular source of revenue 
is no longer available, other sources are likely to be increasingly exploited. For instance, 
if supplementary fees were to be completely forbidden in hospitals, there might be a 
shift towards the outpatient sector.
An alternative to supplementary fees is an increase in fees paid by mandatory basic 
health insurance. This has been implemented in the Netherlands. During several decades 
of fee regulation by the Dutch government, supplementary fees gradually converged 
to zero, without seriously reducing the income of medical specialists. In 2012, Dutch 
medical specialists earned more than their colleagues in neighbouring countries, such 
as Belgium, Denmark and Germany (Kok et al., 2015).
3.3.2. Setting indicative/reference tariffs for supplementary fees
On 25 October 2012, an agreement on supplementary fees was signed by the profes-
sional association of additional health insurers, the representative associations of liberal 
physicians and mandatory basic health insurance in France.115 Under this agreement, the 
115	 Cf.	annex	no.	8	 to	 the	national	agreement	signed	on	26	July	2011	by	 the	 liberal	physicians	and	health	
insurance	 (Avenant n° 8 à la convention nationale organisant les rapports entre les médecins libéraux et 
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total amount of supplementary fees charged by a physician during one year should not 
exceed 150 per cent of the total social security tariffs charged in that same year. The 150 
per cent mark is an average over a whole year, meaning that a physician can continue 
to charge high supplementary fees, e.g., 400 per cent, as long as at the end of the year 
the average is close to 150 per cent. However, sanctions for exceeding the 150 per cent 
reference have not been defined and have not been applied.116 So far, this measure has 
not resulted in a reduction of supplementary fees.
In Belgium, the current national agreement between the physicians’ representative as-
sociations and the sickness funds stipulates that a mechanism of indicative tariffs for 
supplementary fees is to be studied.117
3.3.3. Introducing supply-side restrictions
On 25 October 2012, an agreement on supplementary fees was signed in France by the 
professional association of additional health insurers, the physicians’ representative 
associations and mandatory basic health insurance (see above). In addition to the 150 
per cent reference for supplementary fees, the agreement introduced the ‘access to 
care contract’ (‘contrat d’accès aux soins’).118 A sector 2 physician who signs this contract 
agrees not to increase supplementary fees above the average supplementary fees he/
she charged in 2012 (with a limit of 100 per cent of social security tariffs). He/she also 
guarantees not to decrease the part of his/her activity where no supplementary fees are 
charged. In return, part of the social security contributions of the participating physician 
is paid by the government. Additional health insurers promised to improve the mecha-
nisms for reimbursing supplementary fees charged by physicians who have signed the 
contract. The parties to the 2012 agreement stated that social security tariffs ought to be 
increased in order to decrease the need to charge supplementary fees.
Unfortunately, the introduction of the ‘access to care contract’ has not led to a contain-
ment of supplementary fees. The total amount of supplementary fees has increased 
by 6.6 per cent between 2012 and 2014 (Béguin, 2015). Supplementary fees in private 
hospitals have increased from 724 million EUR in 2012 to 866 million EUR in 2015 (+ 19.7 
l’assurance maladie signée le 26 juillet 2011),	 Paris,	 25	October	 2012.	 Available	 at	 https://fr.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Avenant_n%C2%B08_%C3%A0_la_convention_m%C3%A9dicale
116	 Roucous,	 D.	 La	 vérité	 sur	 les	 honoraires	 des	médecins	 et	 leur	 remboursement.	 L’Humanité.	 11	 Febru-
ary	 2016.	 Available	 at	 https://www.humanite.fr/la-verite-sur-les-honoraires-des-medecins-et-leur-
remboursement-598348	
117	 Para.	4.3	National	agreement	between	physicians	and	sickness	funds	2016-2017	(Accord national médico-
mutualiste 2016-2017),	 Institut	national	d’assurance	maladie-invalidité	 (INAMI).	Available	at	http://www.
inami.fgov.be/fr/professionnels/sante/medecins/soins/Pages/accord-medico-mutualiste
118	 As	from	1	January	2017,	the	‘access	to	care	contract’	has	been	renamed:	‘l’option	pratique	tarifaire	maîtri-
sée’	(OPTAM).
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per cent).119 Physicians who wish to continue to charge high supplementary fees stay 
out of the contract. Physicians who sign the contract carry on with their current practice. 
As the number of medical specialists choosing to work in sector 2 is increasing, so is 
total amount of supplementary fees.120 In addition, sector 1 chief residents have been 
allowed to sign the contract as well, which creates additional cost inflation (UFC, 2013). 
Only 27 per cent of all physicians –and 23 per cent of medical specialists– working in 
sector 2 have signed the ‘access to care contract’. Of the sector 2 ophthalmologists and 
surgeons, 10 and 15 per cent respectively adhere to the ‘access to care contract’.121 From 
these figures, it is clear that the ‘access to care contract’ has not been a success so far.
3.3.4. Capping supplementary fees
In neither Belgium nor France has a maximum limit for supplementary fees been defined 
by law. Physicians are free to charge supplementary fees, which can be as high as 500 per 
cent or more of social security tariffs.
In Belgium, every hospital must define a maximum limit for supplementary fees, to be 
respected by all physicians working in that hospital. However, this maximum limit can 
be easily adapted, by a simple decision of hospital management.
A legal cap on supplementary fees might be an effective measure, since there is no 
escape route (apart from increasing the frequency of charging supplementary fees). In 
October 2016, an agreement was reached in Belgium by physicians and sickness funds, 
limiting supplementary fees for breast reconstruction to 100 per cent of social security 
tariffs. This measure has been beneficial to breast cancer patients, i.e., those who do not 
enjoy additional health insurance.
In France, the system of ‘access to care contracts’ (see above) has far-reaching conse-
quences for the reimbursement of supplementary fees by additional health insurance. 
Most additional health insurance contracts in France are so-called ‘solidarity contracts’. 
Solidarity contracts are exempted from a 7 per cent solidarity tax on additional health 
insurance contracts. Since 1 January 2016, employers have been obliged to offer an ad-
ditional health insurance contract (‘complémentaire santé’) to their employees. For soli-
darity contracts, no social taxes (‘charges sociales’) are due on the part of the premium 
paid by the employer and the part paid by the employee is tax deductible. Contracts 
119	 Figures	retrieved	from	http://www.66millionsdimpatients.org/depassements-dhonoraires-en-cliniques-
restes-a-charge-au-menu/
120	 Average	supplementary	fees	charged	by	their	specialty	in	their	region	is	the	reference	for	new	entrants.
121	 Mercer	 (2016).	 https://www.mercer.fr/content/dam/mercer/attachments/private/nurture-cycle/fr-2016-
barometre-sante-bilan-acces-soins-hb-mercer.PDF	
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which do not qualify as ‘solidarity contracts’ are more expensive for both the employer 
and the employee. Solidarity contracts aim at reducing supplementary fees charged by 
sector 2 physicians who have not signed the ‘access to care contract’. Reimbursement of 
supplementary fees by a solidarity contract is limited to 100 per cent of social security 
tariffs. This is the same limit to be respected by physicians who have signed the ‘access 
to care contract’.
So far, solidarity contracts have not succeeded in reducing total amount of supplemen-
tary fees charged. This is due to the limited number of physicians who have signed the 
‘access to care contract’. In addition, the 100 per cent limit for supplementary fees can 
be circumvented by buying a ‘supplementary’ additional health insurance contract 
(‘surcomplémentaire santé’). Such ‘supplementary’ additional health insurance provides 
coverage for supplementary fees that exceed the 100 per cent limit of ‘solidarity’ con-
tracts. A ‘surcomplémentaire santé’ can be bought by an individual as an add-on to his or 
her additional health insurance or by the employer as an employee benefit.
Additional health insurers can also decide on their own initiative to cap reimbursement 
of supplementary fees. In Flanders-the northern, Dutch speaking region of Belgium- for 
instance, reimbursement of supplementary fees has been capped at 100 per cent by the 
Christian Mutuality, one of the largest providers of additional health insurance.
3.3.5. restricting differences in quality of care
Perceived quality of care has an important effect on willingness to pay supplementary 
fees. Due to this effect, regulating (i.e., limiting) physicians’ ability to provide better qual-
ity of care for patients who pay supplementary fees could help to curb cost inflation. On 
7 January 2017, new legislation came into force in Belgium, providing that, in hospitals, 
every patient is entitled to the same quality of care irrespective of supplementary fees 
being paid or not. However, the success of these regulations will depend on their en-
forceability. So far, there has been little or no effect on the supplementary fee system in 
Belgium.
3.3.6. negotiating supplementary fees by additional health insurance
Social security tariffs are the result of negotiations on a national level between health 
insurers and physicians’ representative associations. This is not the case for supplemen-
tary fees, which are charged on top of social security tariffs. In theory, the patient could 
discuss prices with his or her physician. However, in practice, this is not likely to be very 
successful because of the asymmetrical relationship between patient and physician. 
When additional health insurance reimburses supplementary fees, additional health 
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insurers could negotiate supplementary fees with the physicians’ representative asso-
ciations. Clout would increase if additional health insurers would join forces.
3.3.7. Counteracting moral hazard by additional health insurance
Insurance providing coverage for supplementary fees creates moral hazard. Insurance 
that makes all care free of out-of-pocket spending leads to nearly 50 per cent greater 
spending (Pauly, 2007). Moral hazard can be reduced by cost-sharing arrangements such 
as deductibles and co-insurance and by managed care (e.g., negotiating supplementary 
fees, see above). Recently, 150-175 EUR deductibles have been applied in Belgium. Co-
insurance has not yet been introduced. However, substantial co-insurance, e.g., 25 per 
cent, could be particularly effective in fighting excessive supplementary fees. Probably 
the most effective means of combatting excessive prices is for the insured to be required 
to retain a sufficiently large share of the risk that it is in his immediate interest to resist 
outrageous prices (Berliner, 1982).
3.3.8. Taking legal action against excessive supplementary fees
Patients can go to court to fight excessive supplementary fees. In Belgium and France, 
legal action can be based on the deontological code which states that physicians should 
be ‘moderate’ when determining their fees. In both countries, civil actions are possible 
based on the good faith principle in contractual relationships and the prohibition on 
abuse of a dominant position (‘la lésion qualifiée’). There may also be a role there for the 
insurer. If amounts are claimed under insurance policies which are excessive, the insurer 
should not shy away from legal action. Judgments of higher courts, i.e., supreme court 
judgments, could have an important effect on the supplementary fee system.
3.3.9. Conclusion
Several measures to curb cost inflation of supplementary fees can be implemented by 
both the authorities and the insurers. In Belgium and France, several measures have 
not yet been implemented or only to a limited extent (see Table 4). In France, more 
measures have been implemented than in Belgium. So far, measures that have been 
implemented in these countries have not yet resulted in a stabilisation or a reduction of 
supplementary fees.
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Table 4. Measures to curb cost inflation of supplementary fees
Initiated by the authorities belgium france
Prohibiting supplementary fees a a
Setting indicative/reference tariffs for supplementary fees - 
Introducing supply-side restrictions - 
Capping supplementary fees - -
Capping reimbursement of supplementary fees by additional health insurance - 
Restricting differences in quality of care b -
Initiated by insurers belgium france
Capping reimbursement of supplementary fees  
Negotiating supplementary fees - -
Applying deductibles  -
Applying co-insurance - -
Taking legal action against excessive supplementary fees -c -c
a  Both in Belgium and in France, supplementary fees have only been prohibited for limited groups (e.g., people who get 
subsidies to buy additional health insurance) or in certain circumstances (e.g., emergency care)
b  Since January 2017, physicians may no longer discriminate between patients who pay supplementary fees and those 
who do not. This legislation applies to inpatient care alone. The new rules are not well known by the public. So far, they 
have not been enforced.
c  Legal action has only been taken by individuals in isolated cases. There are only judgments from lower courts.
3.4. addEd ValuE Of SuPPlEmEnTary fEES
Historically, both in Belgium and in France, the system of supplementary fees was 
introduced to allow physicians to increase their revenue. Hence, the added value of 
supplementary fees for the physician is clear: a source of (extra) income. However, the 
added value for the patient is not clear.
In the 1990s, the Belgian courts already dealt with the issue of whether the system of 
supplementary fees linked to the use of a private hospital room could be justified from 
a legal standpoint. Two courts –in 1993 and in 1997 respectively– ruled that supple-
mentary fees are not acceptable unless additional health services are provided by the 
physician (‘qu’il existe un “supplément” de prestations en contrepartie du “suppléments 
d’honoraires”’).122 The judges stated that extra services needed to be provided for the 
extra money paid in order for the supplementary fees to be justified (‘quid pro quo’). 
Since the two courts ruled at first instance, the judgments only had a limited impact.
122	 Court	of	 first	 instance	Antwerp	 27	May	 1993	 (Rechtbank van eerste aanleg Antwerpen),	DCCR	 1994,	 762.	
Court	of	first	instance	Liège	12	November	1997	(Tribunal de première instance Liège),	JLMB,	1999,	277.
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3.4.1. added value for the physician: extra income
For certain categories of self-employed medical specialists, supplementary fees con-
stitute a substantial part of their income (see table 5). Supplementary fees represent 
respectively 35 per cent and 32 per cent of the total income of Belgian and French 
surgeons.
Table 5. Supplementary fees as a percentage of gross income of sector 2 physicians (France)/self-employed 
physicians (Belgium) providing inpatient care in 2010 (DREES, 2012; Swartenbroekx, 2012).
Specialism
france belgium
% of gross income % of gross income
Stomatology 45.6% 15.9%
Surgery 31.9% 34.7%
Gynaecology 29.5% 34.9%
Ophthalmology 25.3% 10.1%
Oto-rhino-laryngology 20.8% 12.3%
Anaesthesia 16.7% 31.5%
Paediatrics 16.7% 21.1%
Psychiatry 16.6% 4.2%
Gastro-enterology 11.6% 11.5%
Radiology 4.0% 13.4%
Cardiology 4.0% 15.0%
Pneumology 4.0% 5.8%
Both in Belgium and France, hospitals also benefit from supplementary fees. In most 
hospitals, physicians have to cede a certain percentage of their supplementary fees to 
the hospital to help finance overhead costs.
3.4.2. added value for the patient?
Whereas the added value for the physician is clear, this is not the case as far as the 
patient is concerned.
3.4.2.1.	 Comfort	and	access
Patients willing to pay supplementary fees may be offered convenient consultation 
hours late at night or comfortable private rooms in hospitals. However, while it is under-
standable that a patient might have to pay extra to the hospital for the use of a luxurious 
private room, it is difficult to understand why he/she should pay extra to the physician 
for staying in a private room.
A physician can refuse to treat a patient if he/she is not willing to pay the supplementary 
fees charged by that physician. Dormont and Péron (2016) found that French patients 
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might choose to consult sector 2 specialists, who can charge supplementary fees, be-
cause they have difficulties in gaining access to other physicians, i.e., sector 1 specialists 
who do not charge supplementary fees. If, in a certain region, there are fewer sector 1 
specialists, patients face search costs, waiting time and transportation costs in order to 
consult a specialist who does not charge more than the regulated fee.
3.4.2.2.	 Quality	of	care	–	pay	for	performance
In a theoretical study (Glazer and McGuire, 1993), it has been argued that restrictions on 
supplementary fees come at a price as physicians have an incentive to reduce the quality 
of their services. A physician can be regarded as making two choices to maximise profit: 
the price for the price-paying patients (patients willing to pay extra), and the quality for 
the fee-only patients (patients not willing to pay extra). Physicians’ equilibrium choice 
of quality and price depends on the level of fee set by the regulator. When the fee is low 
enough, no patient will be taken at the fee only. When the fee is high enough, no patient 
will be charged extra. When the fee is set in the range between these two fee levels, 
some patients are served for the fee, but the quality to the fee-only patients is less than 
or equal to the quality for the price-paying patient. Kifmann and Scheuer (2011) applied 
the findings of Glazer and McGuire to Medicare in the U.S. They studied the effects of 
‘balance billing’, i.e., allowing physicians to charge a fee from patients in addition to the 
fee paid by Medicare. In contrast to Glazer and McGuire (1993), they found that allowing 
balance billing generally is not superior as balance billing allows physicians to increase 
their rents. An empirical study of the effects of Medicare restrictions on extra billing in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s was performed by McKnight (2007). She found that these 
restrictions reduced out-of-pocket medical expenditure of Medicare beneficiaries by 9 
per cent. With the exception of a significant fall in the number of follow-up telephone 
calls, her study showed little evidence that physicians changed their behaviour in re-
sponse to the extra billing restrictions.
In Belgian hospitals, supplementary fees are linked to the use of a private room. A review 
of the literature found that private rooms have a moderate effect on patient satisfaction 
with care, noise and quality of sleep, and the experience of privacy and dignity (van de 
Glind et al., 2007). Conflicting results were found for hospital infection rates. In addition, 
there was no evidence on recovery rates and patient safety. In France, the thriving of 
sector 2 medical specialists, who can charge supplementary fees, may be due to patients 
believing that these physicians provide better quality of care (Dormont and Péron, 2016). 
The idea that an expensive physician must be an excellent physician might play a role. 
Value might also be attributed to supplementary fees by patients believing that extra 
payments for physicians motivate them to go the extra mile.
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Today, quality of care is high up on the political agenda. Donabedian’s (1997) structure-
process-outcome model for quality of care is widely accepted. Information technology 
enables and facilitates the collection and the use of data to measure and to follow up on 
quality of care. For instance, in the United States, the Core Quality Measure Collabora-
tive, led by public health plans, commercial insurers, providers and consumers, is trying 
to reach consensus on core performance measures (CMS, 2016).
Pay-for-quality or pay-for-performance payment methods were introduced several 
years ago (e.g., Epstein, 2004). The pay-for-performance model offers financial incentives 
to providers to improve quality and efficiency. Typically, incentives are paid on top of 
the standard fee-for-service compensation if the provider meets or exceeds certain pre-
established metrics of performance. For instance, the ‘physician value modifier program’ 
rewards physicians with bonus payments when their performance attains specified 
measures of quality and cost (Baird, 2016).
The question is whether supplementary fees could play a role in the implementation 
of a pay-for-performance model? In the past, patients had little objective data at their 
disposal on the quality of health care services provided by an individual physician. 
Today, such data are being made available. Processing such data can provide objective 
information on the quality of care provided by an individual physician. As long as there 
is no transparency on the quality of care provided by physicians, physicians can charge 
supplementary fees even if the quality of care they provide is substandard. With more 
transparency being created on the quality of care provided, it is likely that the value of 
supplementary fees will increasingly be questioned in the future. It can be expected 
that patients will only be willing to pay supplementary fees for physicians who effec-
tively provide above standard quality of care. But then another problem will arise. If 
supplementary fees are to be linked to objectively and transparently demonstrated top 
quality, a problem of equal access to care will arise. Limiting access to top quality care to 
patients who are able to pay supplementary fees is in contradiction with the principle of 
equal access to care. Equal access to health care is at the core of equity in health which 
implies that ideally everyone should have a fair opportunity to attain their full health 
potential and, more pragmatically, that no one should be at a disadvantage in achieving 
this potential, if it can be avoided (Whitehead, 1992).
A two-tiered system, with better quality only available to those who are able and willing 
to pay extra, is considered to be socially undesirable in many countries.
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3.4.2.3.	 Conclusion
Patients who pay extra money expect extra value. Convenient consultation hours late at 
night may represent added value. Location can also play a role in patients’ willingness 
to pay supplementary fees. Patients face search costs, waiting time and transportation 
costs to consult with a physician who does not engage in extra billing in regions where 
physicians who stick to social security tariffs are scarce.
Perceived quality of care plays an important role in patients’ willingness to pay supple-
mentary fees. Growing availability of objective data on quality of care might well be a 
game changer. In future, physicians will increasingly need to justify why they charge a 
higher price. Limiting access to objectively proven top quality care to patients able and 
willing to pay supplementary fees may not be socially acceptable in many countries. In 
these countries, it is unlikely that governments will choose for supplementary fees to be 
used as an incentive for physicians to provide better quality of care. 
3.5. COnCluSIOn
In some countries, such as Belgium and France, physicians can charge a supplementary 
fee on top of the tariff set by basic health insurance.
Both in Belgium and in France, there is much concern about the financial sustainability 
of the system of supplementary fees. Expenditure on supplementary fees is increasing 
at a pace that exceeds the rate at which total expenditure on health care is increasing. 
Both in Belgium and in France, the bulk of supplementary fees is covered by additional 
health insurance. Sustained rapid growth of supplementary fees leads to sharp increases 
in premiums for additional coverage.
In section 3, we discussed measures to contain cost inflation of supplementary fees. 
Supplementary fees can be prohibited for certain categories of patients (e.g., persons 
with low incomes) and in certain situations (e.g., emergency care). Reference tariffs can 
be set and supplementary fees can be capped. Supply-side restrictions can be intro-
duced and differences in quality of care can be limited. Insurers providing coverage for 
supplementary fees also have an important role to play. Coverage of supplementary fees 
can lead to both patient-induced and physician-induced moral hazard. Therefore, insur-
ers ought to effectively counteract moral hazard by implementing measures such as 
co-insurance, deductibles and managed care. So far, measures implemented in Belgium 
and France have not yet resulted in a stabilisation or a reduction of supplementary fees.
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The added value of supplementary fees for the physician is clear: extra income. However, 
for the patient added value of supplementary fees is not clear. Supplementary fees can 
buy comfort, e.g., convenient consultation hours. Physicians can refuse to treat patients 
who are not willing or able to pay supplementary fees. However, there is no evidence 
that physicians who charge supplementary fees provide a higher quality of care than 
physicians who do not.
Today, supplementary fees are not based on hard, publicly available data on quality of 
care. With information on differences in quality of care offered by individual physicians 
becoming more readily available, more transparency on the added value of supplemen-
tary fees will be created. Physicians will have to prove that they are ‘worth the extra 
money’. However, limiting access to –objectively proven– top quality physicians to pa-
tients who can afford to pay supplementary fees, is in contradiction with the principle of 
accessibility of care. To do so would be to create a two-tiered health care system where 
only those who can pay supplementary fees out-of-pocket or take out private additional 
health insurance to cover supplementary fees have access to the best physicians. In 
many countries, this is considered to be socially unacceptable.
Our conclusion is that supplementary physicians’ fees are not sustainable.
Since supplementary fees constitute an important source of revenue for certain medi-
cal specialists and physicians are a strong lobby group, a policy gradually restricting 
supplementary fees might be preferable. Today, both in Belgium and in France, the first 
steps in limiting supplementary fees have already been set. With the lack of added value 
for the patient becoming more apparent, this process is likely to continue over the next 
few years.
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abSTraCT
New health technology comes on the market at a rapid pace and –sometimes– at a 
huge cost. Providing access to new health technology is a serious challenge for many 
countries with mandatory health insurance. Should new health technology be available 
for all, for nobody, or only for those who are able and willing to pay out-of-pocket?
This article analyses access to new health technology in Belgium and the Netherlands, 
using eight concrete examples as a starting point for comparing the two –neighbour-
ing– countries. Contrary to the Netherlands, out-of-pocket payments for new health 
technology are widely accepted and practiced in Belgium. This difference is largely the 
result of different regulatory environments. A major difference is the way that entitle-
ments to care are described: closed and explicit in Belgium versus open and non-explicit 
in the Netherlands. The characteristics of in-kind policies versus reimbursement policies 
also play a role.
Allowing out-of-pocket payments for new health technology has consequences for the 
patients. It leads to greater access to new health technology (for those who are able and 
willing to pay), but has a negative effect on equal access to care. Choice and transpar-
ency are enhanced by allowing out-of-pocket payments for new health technology.
It could be argued that lack of coverage by mandatory health insurance should not 
render private access to new health technology impossible.
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4.1 InTrOduCTIOn
In many countries with mandatory health insurance a serious challenge is how to deal 
with new health technology, for example, an innovative hip prosthesis, a computerised 
prosthetic leg, robot-assisted cardiac surgery, non-invasive prenatal testing and new 
cancer medicines and orphan drugs. While mandatory health insurance generally 
covers a broad range of health technology, new technology may not be –readily– cov-
ered because of budgetary reasons or because there is no unanimity (yet) about the 
evidence-based character or the medical necessity. In case of doubt, national health 
authorities can decide not to cover a new health technology, even if the technology 
has been acknowledged by health technology assessment centres and/or is covered by 
health insurers in other countries.
Should new health technologies –that have proved at least an acceptable level of evi-
dence–be available for all, possibly with some cost-sharing, or only for those who are 
able and willing to pay the full cost?
Using two neighbouring countries (Belgium and the Netherlands) as case studies, we 
will discuss and analyse different options for policy makers to deal with new health 
technology. In Belgian hospitals there are lists with out-of-pocket payments for well-
defined health technologies available for the patient [1,2]. Whereas standard treatment 
A is covered by mandatory basic health insurance, for treatment B, applying new health 
technology, one must pay the listed additional out-of-pocket payments. For examples of 
such treatments B in Belgium, see table 1.
Table 1. Health technology available to patients but to be financed out-of-pocket (Belgium) (2015)
new health technology Price (to be paid out-of-pocket)
Robot-assisted coronary bypass surgery (da Vinci) [3] €1200
Trabecular metal acetabular revision system (Zimmer) (revision hip 
replacement surgery) (2011–2014) [4]
€2569
Cervical intervertebral disc prosthesis (cervical degenerative disc disease or 
herniated disc) [1]
€2776
Microprocessor-controlled prosthetic leg (Genium) [3] €27177
MammaPrint (gene assay for breast cancer patients) [3,5] €2675
Non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT) (serum marker screening for certain 
chromosomal abnormalities in a developing foetus) [1]
€460
Ofatumumab (Arzerra) 300 mg + (7*1,000 mg) or 300 mg + (11*2,000 mg) 
(orphan drug to treat chronic lymphocytic leukaemia) [6,7,8]
€17875 – €54604
Nivolumab (Opdivo) 3 mg/kg every two weeks (6 months treatment) 
(cancer medicine to treat adults with melanoma or lung cancer) [6,7,8]
€48972
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In Belgium there is an enumerative, limitative list of medical goods and services covered 
by mandatory health insurance (Dutch: ‘nomenclatuur van de geneeskundige verstrek-
kingen’). Whether a new technology gets on this list, is being decided by the national 
health authorities. Reimbursement can be denied when national authorities find there 
may be an issue of therapeutic evidence or cost-effectiveness. In the Netherlands, there 
is no such list. New technology is covered by mandatory health insurance if it meets the 
criteria of ‘current scientific knowledge and practice’ (Dutch: ‘stand van wetenschap en 
praktijk’).
The listed treatments B as well as the additional out-of-pocket payments may differ 
among hospitals. Only patients who are able and willing to pay the additional out-
of-pocket payments have access to treatment B. People can buy voluntary additional 
insurance that covers these additional out-of-pocket expenses.
In the Netherlands the situation is totally different. Dutch hospitals do not have such 
lists and the general perception is that additional payments for new health technology 
are legally forbidden. So at first glance the Belgian health care system could be charac-
terised as a two-tier system and the Dutch health care system as an egalitarian system.
This observation raises several questions. First, are these new health technologies in 
the Netherlands available for all, for nobody, or only for selected groups of patients? In 
the latter case: for which groups, and are the selection criteria explicit and transparent? 
Second, how can the observed differences between Belgium and the Netherlands be 
explained? Third, what are the consequences for the patient?
The goal of this paper is to answer the above mentioned questions. According to the 
phrase ‘You best understand and appreciate your own health care system by analysing 
other health care systems’ the answers to the above questions and the discussion can 
provide valuable insights for health policymakers in other countries.
4.2 rEGulaTOry framEwOrk In bElGIum and THE nETHErlandS
We are using a broad definition of health technology, including implants, prostheses, 
in vitro diagnostics and drugs as well as equipment. Table 2 provides health technology 
examples that in 2015 were not covered by mandatory basic health insurance in Belgium.
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Table 2. Health technology examples: situation in Belgium and the Netherlands (2015) (same examples as 
table 1)
Technology belgium The netherlands
robot-assisted cardiac surgery
A form of heart surgery performed through 
very small incisions in the chest. With the use of 
tiny instruments and robotic devices, surgeons 
are able to perform several types of heart 
surgery in a way that is much less invasive than 
other types of heart surgery. The procedure 
is sometimes called da Vinci surgery because 
that is the name of the robot often used for this 
procedure.
Not covered by 
mandatory basic health 
insurance.
The cost is to be borne by 
the patient.
Covered by mandatory basic 
health insurance.
Physicians, hospitals and 
insurers choose whether, where 
and when robot-assisted cardiac 
surgery can be used.
Trabecular metal acetabular revision system 
(TmarS)
Hip revision surgery involves the removal of 
failed implants, and replaces them with new 
ones. The use of trabecular metal increases 
implant stability and enables biologic in-
growth, which can help lead to long-term 
fixation.
Not covered by 
mandatory basic health 
insurance till 2014.
The cost was to be borne 
by the patient.
As from 2014, TMARS is 
covered by mandatory 
basic health insurance.
Covered by mandatory basic 
health insurance.
Physicians, hospitals and 
insurers choose whether, where 
and when TMARS can be used.
Cervical intervertebral disc prosthesis
(e.g. MOBI-C, Bryan Cervical Disc)
An alternative for cervical spinal fusion for the 
treatment of symptomatic (e.g. radicular neck 
and/or arm pain and/or functional/neurological 
deficit) cervical degenerative disc disease or 
herniated disc.
The cervical intervertebral disc prosthesis is 
authorised by the American Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) [9], acknowledged by 
health technology assessment centers (e.g. 
National Institute for Clinical Excellence [10]) 
and is being covered by leading American 
health insurers (e.g. Blue Cross / Blue Shield 
[11]).
Not covered by 
mandatory basic health 
insurance.
The cost is to be borne by 
the patient.
Not covered by mandatory basic 
health insurance.
The prosthesis does not meet 
the criteria of ‘current scientific 
knowledge and practice’ in the 
Netherlands [12].
The prosthesis cannot be 
separately billed to the patient.
microprocessor-controlled prosthetic leg
(e.g. C-Leg, Genium)
A prosthetic limb with several sensors that 
gather and calculate data. These computerised 
prostheses are claimed to be a significant 
improvement over the conventional 
mechanically controlled prostheses.
Not covered by 
mandatory basic health 
insurance.
The cost is to be borne by 
the patient.
This prosthesis is rarely covered 
by mandatory basic health 
insurance, only when the 
mechanical alternatives do not 
provide an adequate solution.
mammaPrint
A gene assay that may help to identify those 
breast cancer patients that may safely forgo 
chemotherapy.
Not covered by 
mandatory basic health 
insurance.
The cost is to be borne by 
the patient.
Although the National Health 
Care Institute (‘Zorginstituut 
Nederland’) has stated that the 
MammaPrint does not meet 
the criteria of ‘current scientific 
knowledge and practice’ [13], 
many Dutch health insurers do 
provide coverage.
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4.2.1. belgium
Health insurance in Belgium operates as a reimbursement system. All goods and ser-
vices that are covered by mandatory basic health insurance have a six digit code. In 
case of a life-threatening or rare disease, an intervention from a ‘Special Solidarity Fund’ 
(‘Bijzonder solidariteitsfonds’, a public fund) can be asked for products that are not (yet) 
covered by basic health insurance [18]. This fund decides on a case per case basis about 
reimbursement for individual patients.
Implants need to be notified to the National Institute for Health and Disability Insurance 
(‘Rijksinstituut voor ziekte- en invaliditeitsverzekering’). However, notification does not 
Table 2. Health technology examples: situation in Belgium and the Netherlands (2015) (same examples as 
table 1) (continued)
Technology belgium The netherlands
non-invasive prenatal genetic testing (nIPT)
A serum marker screening for certain 
chromosomal abnormalities in a developing 
foetus (e.g. Down syndrome).
Not covered by 
mandatory basic health 
insurance.
The cost is to be borne by 
the patient.
Not covered by mandatory basic 
health insurance.
NIPT is available only in 8 
university hospitals in the 
context of study protocols 
Trident 1 and 2.
As from 1 April 2014 until 31 
March 2017 there was only 
access for pregnant women 
presenting a high risk for a 
trisomy baby (Trident 1) [14].
As from 1 April 2017 all pregnant 
women will have access to NIPT 
in the context of the Trident 2 
study [15].
Ofatumumab (Arzerra)
An orphan medicine used to treat chronic 
lymphocytic leukaemia.
Not covered by 
mandatory basic health 
insurance.
The cost is to be borne by 
the patient.
Covered by mandatory basic 
health insurance.
nivolumab (Opdivo)
A cancer medicine used to treat adults with 
melanoma or squamous non-small cell lung 
cancer.
Not covered by 
mandatory basic health 
insurance in 2015
In principle, the cost 
is to be borne by the 
patient. However, a 
‘compassionate use’ / 
‘medical need’ program 
was running for 
Nivolumab in 2015.
As from April 1, 2016 
Nivolumab is covered by 
mandatory basic health 
insurance.
Not covered by mandatory basic 
health insurance in 2015.
The Dutch Health Authority has 
stated that the use of Nivolumab 
was not cost-effective [16].
As from March 1, 2016 
Nivolumab is covered by 
mandatory basic health 
insurance because, after 
negotiations, the price has been 
reduced [17].
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automatically imply reimbursement by basic health insurance (with reimbursement 
rates varying between 100% and 12%). In case costs of the application procedure exceed 
foreseeable profits, medical firms may not apply for reimbursement, e.g. in case of new 
technology that will be only rarely used. For notified implants that are not covered by 
basic health insurance the full cost has to be borne by the patient.
The template of the hospital bill is defined by law. Drugs, implants, prostheses and other 
medical devices that are not covered by mandatory basic health insurance have to be 
explicitly mentioned on the bill. Some hospitals provide extensive lists of non-covered 
goods and services that need to be paid for out-of-pocket [1,2].
In every hospital there is a ‘Committee for Medical Material’ (‘Comité voor medisch ma-
teriaal’), where management, pharmacists and physicians sit together to discuss what 
medical material can be used within the hospital. The committee for medical material 
creates and updates a formulary of medical material being used in the hospital. Health 
technology and health economics assessments are being made. The most important cri-
teria are patient safety, added value (compared to similar products) and cost. There are 
three options: reimbursement by mandatory basic health insurance (or by the ‘Special 
Solidarity Fund’), financing by the hospital (e.g. a special fund created by the hospital) 
or billing to the patient.
Non-coverage is common for health technologies for which there is no (complete) una-
nimity (yet) about the evidence. E.g. although cervical intervertebral disc prostheses are 
approved by the American FDA, there is no unanimity about the use of these prostheses. 
In Belgium, lumbar intervertebral disc prostheses are reimbursed by basic health insur-
ance whereas cervical prostheses are not. American health insurance companies such 
as Aetna and Blue Cross / Blue Shield do reimburse cervical prostheses but not lumbar 
prostheses.
82% of all Belgians benefit from voluntary additional hospital insurance (figure for 2015) 
[19,20]. This additional insurance is covering co-payments, supplementary physician’s 
fees, and health technology that is not (yet) reimbursed by basic health insurance. 
The coverage for health technology constitutes an important element for competition 
between insurance companies providing additional health insurance. Coverage for new 
medical devices and drugs differs strongly from company to company.
According to the Belgian Patient Rights Act health care providers are obliged to inform 
their patients about the different treatment options and the cost for the patient [21]. 
However, physicians may be reluctant to do so (and thereby raise hope) if they expect 
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that the patient eventually might not be able to pay out-of-pocket for the new implant 
or the new drug [22].
4.2.2. The netherlands
In the Netherlands, there is a mandatory basic health insurance. On top of this manda-
tory insurance, 84% of the Dutch have subscribed to voluntary additional health insur-
ance (figure for 2015) [23].
When assessing out-of-pocket payments for new health technology in the Dutch health 
care system, three elements need to be taken into consideration.
(1) How are entitlements to care defined within mandatory health insurance? In Belgium, 
there is a clear list of medical goods and services that are covered by mandatory in-
surance. Entitlements to care are explicitly formulated. As a consequence, it also clear 
which care is not covered (= care which is not on the list). In the Dutch regulation there 
is a non-explicit, open formulation of the entitlement to care. Dutch law stipulates that 
the insured is entitled to care which is in conformity with the criteria of ‘current scientific 
knowledge and practice’ (Dutch: ‘stand van wetenschap en praktijk’). It is the individual 
insurer that in first instance decides, by contracting with individual hospitals, which 
specific treatments are effectively available for their insured. The National Health Care 
Institute (‘Zorginstituut Nederland’) checks some new technologies for their conformity 
with the criteria of ‘current scientific knowledge and practice’, e.g. very expensive tech-
nologies. In theory, all care which is in conformity with the criteria of ‘current scientific 
knowledge and practice’ is reimbursable. However, in practice the possibilities for the 
application and the reimbursement of new technology are not unlimited and choices 
are being made by insurers and providers. These choices are being reflected in the 
contracts between insurers and hospitals. Budgetary considerations play a role in the 
choices made (2015 May 7 email from J Hallie, Zorginstituut Nederland; unreferenced). 
Consequently, specific goods and services that are covered by mandatory health insur-
ance, may appear not to be available in clinical practice, as a consequence of specific 
budgettary restraints or other elements in the contract between the insurer and the 
hospital.
(2) According to article 35, §1 of the Health Care Market Regulation Act (‘Wet Marktor-
dening Gezondheidszorg’) health care providers are allowed to charge only a global 
price for a ‘Diagnosis Treatment Combination’ (‘DTC’). A DTC comprises all inpatient 
and outpatient treatments for a certain diagnosis during a certain period of time, e.g. 
three months (in Dutch: ‘Diagnose Behandel Combinatie’, ‘DBC’). A consequence of this 
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‘integral tariff system’ is that all costs of the treatment trajectory have to be included in 
the tariff.
(3) The distinction between a benefits-in-kind policy (‘naturapolis’) and a reimbursement 
policy (‘restitutiepolis’) is important. Unlike Belgium where there are only reimburse-
ment policies, Dutch insured can choose between a benefits-in-kind policy and a reim-
bursement policy. In the Netherlands in 2015, 55% of the insured had a benefits-in-kind 
policy, 23% a reimbursement policy and 22% a combined policy (benefits-in-kind for 
some types of care and reimbursement for other types of care) [24].
With a benefits-in-kind policy, the patient gets the treatment that has been bought by 
the insurer from the contracted provider. Whether this treatment includes new health 
technology depends on which treatment has been bought by the insurer. A benefits-
in-kind policy entitles the insured to receive care and obliges the insurer to deliver or 
contract the care (‘duty of care’; in Dutch: zorgplicht). If the insured visits contracted pro-
viders, the insurer pays the full bill to the provider. If the insured visits a non-contracted 
provider, the insured receives from the insurer a reimbursement as determined in the 
insurance contract (e.g., 75% of the usual price in the market). Anyway, because of the 
integral tariff system no supplement can be charged by the provider to the patient for 
the use of new health technology. The insurer and the hospital have the contractual 
freedom not to include expensive new health technologies although they meet the cri-
teria of ‘current scientific knowledge and practice’ (2015 June 17 email from K Siemeling, 
Zorginstituut Nederland; unreferenced; 2015 June 18 email from JP Plass, Nederlandse 
Vereniging van Ziekenhuizen; unreferenced). They could choose for a cheaper or more 
cost-effective substitute that also meets the criteria of ‘current scientific knowledge 
and practice’. For example, an insured patient who needs prostate surgery is entitled 
to receive this surgery, but whether or not it is robot-assisted surgery depends on the 
care that the insurer has purchased from the hospital to which the patient is admitted. 
Because of his duty-of-care (in Dutch: ‘zorgplicht’) an insurer must always make sure that 
his insured are receiving the appropriate care that they are entitled to and that meets 
the criteria of ‘current scientific knowledge and practice’. An important question then is 
in how far there is transparency for the insured about the use of new health technology?
A reimbursement policy entitles the insured to being reimbursed for his health care ex-
penses, insofar as the prices charged are market conform. The patient, as the purchaser 
of care, is concluding a contract with the health care provider. In principle, the provider 
could bill the full price to the patient, including a ‘supplement’ for new health technology 
(as part of the integral tariff ), and the health insurer could limit reimbursement to the 
market-conform price, which might be lower than the price charged by the provider. In 
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order to find out whether this possibility is effectively being applied, we have contacted 
the association of hospitals (‘Nederlandse Vereniging van Ziekenhuizen’), the associa-
tion of medical specialists (‘Federatie Medisch Specialisten’), the association of health 
insurers (‘Zorgverzekeraars Nederland’) as well as the National Health Care Institute 
(‘Zorginstituut Nederland’). Based on their answers there is no doubt that the general 
perception is that in Dutch hospitals in practice no such ‘supplements’ on top of the 
regular ‘DTC-price’ are being charged (2015 July 7 email from ACM Van Harderwijk, Fed-
eratie Medisch Specialisten; unreferenced; 2015 June 18 email from JP Plass, Nederlandse 
Vereniging van Ziekenhuizen; unreferenced; 2015 June 4 and 8 emails from J Veerkamp, 
Zorgverzekeraars Nederland; unreferenced; 2015 June 17 email from K Siemeling, Zorgin-
stituut Nederland; unreferenced).
In the Netherlands, a new treatment may be conditionally accepted, when its ‘cost’-
effectiveness still has to be proven. This new treatment is then being offered in a limited 
number of hospitals only. E.g. from April 1, 2015 until October 1, 2019, hyperthermic 
intraperitoneal chemotherapy (HIPEC) for the treatment of peritoneal carcinosis for 
patients with colorectal cancer is being provided in 7 hospitals [25]. After October 1, 2019, 
a decision will be taken whether or not HIPEC will be reimbursed by mandatory basic 
health insurance.
So far as prostheses are concerned in the Netherlands, reimbursement is limited to the 
cheapest adequate solution.
When basic health insurance does not (yet) reimburse, both in Belgium and the Neth-
erlands, medical firms sometimes set up a compassionate use / medical need program, 
whereby medical firms finance the cost of new drugs or new medical material.
4.3. COnCluSIOn
The Dutch health care system is very much an egalitarian system. Expenditure on general 
hospitals is almost completely covered by mandatory basic health insurance. Out-of-
pocket expenditure represents only 0.4% of total expenditure on hospitals. The situation 
is very different in Belgium, where private expenditure on general hospitals amounts to 
17.5% of total expenditure on hospitals. Additional health insurance is covering 8.5% of 
total expenditure on hospitals [26]. In 2015, 9.2 million Belgians benefited from voluntary 
additional health insurance (82% of the population) [19,20].
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While in the Netherlands it is theoretically possible to charge a supplement for new 
health technology to patients who have a reimbursement policy, the general perception 
is that this is not happening in practice. Although the Dutch government is promoting 
competition on price and quality among health insurers and health insurance policies 
and although legislation allows them to do so, health insurers are not offering two 
benefits-in-kind policies A and B whereby for policy A treatment A has been contracted 
and for –the more expensive– policy B treatment B, using new health technology, has 
been contracted.
Recently, concerns have been raised in the press about Dutch hospitals not always or 
not immediately providing the patient –for financial reasons– with the best treatment 
available. E.g. bevacizumab (Avastin) might not be given to all patients with colon carci-
noma because some hospitals prefer not to pay for this expensive treatment [27].
Contrary to the Netherlands, Belgium has a two-tiered system so far as access to new 
health technology is concerned. Access to new health technology depends on the 
patient being informed about the new technology and the ability and willingness to 
pay out-of-pocket. Covering new health technology that is not (yet) reimbursed by basic 
health insurance is one of the reasons for the existence of additional health insurance 
in Belgium.
4.3.1. access to new health technology in the netherlands
Certain treatments are covered for nobody by mandatory health insurance in the Neth-
erlands, e.g. cervical intervertebral disc prosthesis (see table 2). These treatments may 
also not be charged to the patient. As a consequence, they are not accessible for Dutch 
patients. Other treatments are covered but under strict conditions, e.g. non-invasive 
prenatal testing (see table 2). Patients who do not meet the conditions may be tempted 
to look for these treatments abroad. Often, new technologies are covered by manda-
tory health insurance in the Netherlands that are not covered in Belgium (see table 2). 
However, it is not always clear for the Dutch patient which insurers and which hospitals 
do offer a specific new health technology. In principle, the patient can check the website 
of the insurer or enquire with the insurer by telephone. Insurers are obliged to give a 
detailed answer to such questions. However, in practice this possibility is not often used.
4.3.2. Explanation of observed differences
The regulatory framework is an important explanatory factor for the differences between 
Belgium and the Netherlands. In Belgium, there is a closed, enumerative list of medical 
goods and services covered by mandatory health insurance. As a consequence, there is 
transparency about which treatments are not being covered. In the Netherlands, there 
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is no such list. Dutch law stipulates that care that meets the criteria of ‘current scientific 
knowledge and practice’ is to be covered by mandatory health insurance. However, un-
less the National Health Care Institute has assessed a certain treatment, insurers and 
hospitals do not necessarily all have the same approach towards that treatment (2015 
May 22 email from J Hallie, Zorginstituut Nederland; unreferenced). This may cause a less 
transparent situation for the patient in the Netherlands.
The existance of in-kind health insurance policies in the Netherlands, as opposed to 
Belgium, may also help explain differences in access to new health technology. With 
in-kind policies, patients’ choice is limited to the care contracted by the health insurer.
4.3.3. Consequences for the patient
Allowing out-of-pocket payments (or coverage by additional health insurance) for new 
health technology of course has consequences for the patient (see table 3). Whereas the 
Belgian approach may do better in terms of ‘access to new health technology’ for those 
who are able and willing to pay, the Dutch approach has a better score for ‘equal access 
to care’. In Belgium patients have more choice, if they can pay. Of course, condition is 
that they are informed about the existence of other treatment options. Based on the 
Patient Rights Act of 2002, their doctor should inform them about all treatment op-
tions, including those that are not covered by mandatory basic health insurance. More 
research is needed on the question to what extent doctors effectively perform this task. 
For instance, doctors might be inclined to only inform well-off patients who can afford 
to pay out-of-pocket for an expensive new health technology.
Within the Dutch health system there is less transparency on the availability of new 
health technology. Out-of-pocket payments for new health technology do not exist in 
the Netherlands. The comprehensiveness of the statutory benefits package may be part 
of the explanation. However, since it is impossible for the benefits package to cover all 
new health technologies, Dutch patients may not have access to certain new technolo-
gies. It is quite likely that some patients may go abroad in order to get access to these 
technologies by paying out-of-pocket.
Yearly, about 2500 Dutch patients who do not meet the conditions for reimbursement 
of the non-invasive prenatal test (NIPT), have the test performed in Belgium [28]. In its 
letter of 13 January 2015 to the Dutch parliament, the Dutch government stated that no 
official data are available about physicians in the Netherlands referring pregnant women 
to hospitals in Belgium or sending blood samples to laboratories abroad for a NIPT. The 
government stated that in the Netherlands the NIPT can only legally be performed in 
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the context of a study protocol and that physicians who collaborate with laboratories 
abroad might be breaking the law [28].
Another element of the Dutch health care system may also negatively affect transpar-
ency. Since health insurers and hospitals are free to contract, including on the use of 
new health technologies, the patient may not know about new technologies being used 
in one hospital but not in the other.
Table 3. Effects of allowing out-of-pocket payments for new health technology
Criteria Effect
Access to new health technology for those who are able and willing to pay positive
Equal access to care negative
Choice positive
Transparency positive
There seems to be a trade-off between equal access to care on the one hand and choice 
and transparency on the other hand. In a two-tier health care system, there is no equal 
access to new health technology. In an egalitarian system transparency on where and 
what technology is being used, as well as choice are limited.
82% of the Belgian population and 84% of the Dutch population has subscribed to ad-
ditional health insurance (figures for 2015) [19,20,23]. While Belgian additional insurance 
is mainly offering coverage for inpatient costs, Dutch additional insurance focuses on 
outpatient costs such as dental care and physiotherapy. As opposed to Belgium, ad-
ditional health insurance in the Netherlands does not offer coverage for new health 
technology which is not (yet) covered by basic insurance. In Belgium, the role of ad-
ditional insurance in covering new health technology is recognised by the government. 
The Belgian ‘Special Solidarity Fund’, which is an integral part of mandatory basic health 
insurance, explicitly stipulates that patients first have to seek reimbursement for a new 
technique from their voluntary additional health insurance before they can file a request 
with the Fund [29].
4.4. dISCuSSIOn
Comparing access to new health technology in Belgium and in the Netherlands, two 
neighbouring countries, leads to some interesting discussion points. What are the 
consequences of a more egalitarian versus a more libertarian approach? What are the 
consequences for the patient of open non-explicit versus closed explicit description 
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of entitlements? What is the role of voluntary additional health insurance in providing 
access to new health technology? And what are the health policy implications for other 
countries?
4.4.1. Egalitarianism versus libertarianism
In 2008, a review commissioned by the British government was published by Richards 
on how patients might combine privately purchased care with care provided by the 
National Health System [30]. Richards [30] sees a tension between the principle of equity 
and the principle of personal autonomy. The term ‘equity’ is used in a broad sense to 
mean that every person should have access to health care on the basis of need and not 
ability to pay [31]. The term ‘autonomy’ is used to denote a very specific principle, namely 
people’s right to spend their money as they choose. One could argue that a health care 
system could meet both the equity and the autonomy principle by offering a compre-
hensive basic health insurance on the one hand and the individual right to buy health 
technology that is not (yet) covered by basic health insurance on the other hand. The 
tension between equity and autonomy is being reflected by two opposite views on the 
provision of health care: the libertarian and the egalitarian view [32]. In the libertarian 
view, access to health care is part of society’s reward system, and, at the margin at least, 
people should be able to use their income and wealth to get more or better health care 
than their fellow citizens should they so wish. In the egalitarian view, access to health 
care is every citizen’s right (like access to the ballot box or to safe drinking water), and 
this ought not to be influenced by income or wealth.
Although the Dutch decentralised system with competing insurers allows for, in theory, 
the insurers to offer health insurance products that compete on price and quality, we 
concluded in the previous paragraph that in practice we do not observe competing 
health insurance products that distinguish themselves by offering access to the latest 
new (expensive) health technology. Although there are some differences among the 
competing health insurance products offered in the Netherlands, these differences are 
not related to new (expensive) health technology. Therefore, as far as access to new 
health technology is concerned, the Netherlands in practice seem to favour a more 
egalitarian approach, while the Belgian approach may be perceived as more libertarian.
4.4.2. Open non-explicit versus closed explicit description of entitlements
In many countries, there is a strong tendency towards greater transparency about the 
quality of care. With a clear, closed list entitlements to care tend to be transparent and 
explicit, as opposed to a system with an open, non-explicit description of entitlements. 
Implicit and non-transparent entitlements can be illustrated by Kaiser Permanente 
generally defining ‘a covered service’ as ‘one performed or prescribed by a Permanente 
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doctor’ [33]. But what are the consequences of greater transparency on new health tech-
nology for an egalitarian health care system? A greater transparency might reveal the 
existence of inequalities in access to new health technology, e.g. new technology not 
being covered by basic insurance or only for certain groups. Of course, such inequalities 
are at odds with the premises of an egalitarian system.
4.4.3. Voluntary additional health insurance
Voluntary additional health insurance can offer coverage for health technology that is 
not (yet) covered by mandatory health insurance.
Coverage by additional health insurance can be limited with only certain types of health 
technology being covered or caps being applied but coverage can also be more ex-
tensive. Coverage of new health technology can be a major competitive factor among 
additional health insurers. This is for instance the case in Belgium. This competition 
among additional health insurers is in line with Pauly’s pleading for competition among 
health plans based on the rate at which new technology is introduced [34].  In a highly 
standardisd market for health insurance, any additional treatment or drug covered by 
an insurance contract may be a decisive factor encouraging patients to sign it with the 
insurer offering the widest or most differentiated coverage [35].
Access to new health technology may also be influenced by the interaction between 
mandatory basic insurance and voluntary additional insurance. Mandatory health insur-
ance can decide not to cover a certain medical technique and to wait for new evidence 
or for prices to decrease. In the meantime, the technique can be financed out-of-pocket 
or through additional insurance. Out-of-pocket financing and additional insurance can 
play the role of a ‘waiting room’ for promising new health technologies, before they are 
being covered by mandatory insurance. Of course, this will only work for technology for 
which there is sufficient (and growing) evidence.   E.g. as from 2011 the TMARS hip pros-
thesis (see tables 1 and 2) has been covered by additional health insurance in Belgium 
before being covered by mandatory health insurance as from 2014. Mandatory health in-
surance taking over coverage from additional insurance, can free up financial resources 
with additional insurers allowing them to finance other new technologies. Since access 
to voluntary health insurance may be difficult for ‘the sick, the old and the poor’, the 
‘waiting room’ function of additional insurance should be limited and mandatory health 
insurance should be offering a comprehensive coverage of new health technology.
4.4.4. Policy implications for other countries
Accessibility of new health technology which is not (yet) reimbursed by mandatory 
basic health insurance is an important health policy issue. The reason a new health 
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technology is not covered by mandatory insurance can be the lack of unanimity on its 
evidence-based character. A technology may be successfully assessed and reimbursed 
in one country, but not in another one.
Prohibiting access to new health technology which is not (yet) covered by mandatory 
insurance may prove to be difficult to enforce. Rather, in order to protect citizens from 
paying out-of-pocket for totally ineffective technology, information can be provided on 
the reasons why some new health technology has not been included in the mandatory 
benefits package. Mandatory registration of all new health technology can be used to 
prevent unsafe health technology from being marketed and used.
The availability of clear information on new health technology that is not (yet) reim-
bursed by mandatory basic health insurance is a crucial factor. In a globalizing world, 
such information is likely to be increasingly available, at least for people that are well 
networked.
An analysis of the Belgian and the Dutch approach reveals that a closed explicit system 
of entitlements to care may create an environment in which patients (and their doctors) 
are encouraged to look for and to use new health technologies which are not (yet) re-
imbursed by mandatory insurance. Reimbursement by additional health insurance can 
also facilitate the use of new health technologies, e.g. by providing reimbursement for 
technologies that are not yet reimbursed by mandatory basic health insurance but that 
are under review for reimbursement (= ‘waiting room function’). Risk-averse individuals 
may want to protect both their health and their wealth by assuring access to expensive 
health technology not (yet) covered by mandatory basic health insurance. In all types of 
health systems there is an increasingly concerted effort to specify explicitly an ‘essential’ 
package of health care that is covered by mandatory health insurance [36].  Because of 
increasing offer and demand of health technology and growing budgetary constraints, 
the comprehensiveness of the mandatory package of care is coming under strain. Smith 
[37] has investigated the question how to choose the mandatory package to which all 
citizens are given free access when objectives include financial protection as well as 
health improvement. A key concern is the type of private markets available and the 
nature of patients’ responses when a treatment is not covered by such a package. Smith 
[37] has modelled three scenarios: no availability of private care, a spot market of private 
care paid for out-of-pocket and a market in prepaid complementary private insurance. 
His conclusion is that governments can secure an optimal system of mandatory health 
insurance coverage by specifying a benefits package in line with redistributional goals 
and nurturing a complementary voluntary insurance market [37]. He argues that under 
these circumstances, conventional cost-effectiveness analysis is the appropriate deci-
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sion rule for including treatments in the package. Certainly, more research is needed on 
the interaction between cost-effectiveness analysis and insurance design [38].
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5. Regulation of PHI markets
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abSTraCT
Recent European Court of Justice (ECJ) case law has highlighted apparent inconsisten-
cies in ECJ rulings on the regulation of voluntary additional health insurance. In 2013, the 
ECJ upheld Belgian regulations limiting the operation of the free market by restricting 
increases in premium rates of additional health insurance contracts. By contrast, in 2012, 
an ECJ ruling required Slovenia to repeal such restrictive legislation and not to hinder 
the operation of the free market. The objective of this paper is to feed the discussion on 
the question whether and under what conditions free-market-driven additional health 
insurance in the European Union might be acceptable. We conclude that, provided that 
basic health insurance effectively covers all essential health care (essential health care 
services being broadly defined), additional health insurance could be regulated in the 
same way as all other non-life insurance.
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5.1. InTrOduCTIOn
In the European Union (EU), voluntary additional health insurance is, in principle, sub-
ject to free market rules and competition. As an exception, governments may impose 
rules restricting free competition when private health insurance serves as a partial or 
complete alternative to health cover provided by the statutory social security system 
(‘substitutive health insurance’). In this paper, we will focus on ‘voluntary additional 
health insurance’, which we define as ‘all voluntary individual (not: group) additional 
private health insurance other than substitutive health insurance’ (e.g., complementary 
or supplementary health insurance).
In 2013, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that the European insurance directives 
do not preclude the Belgian government from adopting regulations limiting competi-
tion in the additional health insurance market in order to protect consumers against 
sharp and unexpected increases in premium rates.123 The ECJ did not concur with the 
opinion of the European Commission, which considered that the Belgian legislation at 
issue was contrary to the principle of freedom to set rates. As will be discussed below, 
this judgment differs from a 2012 ruling where the ECJ required Slovenia to repeal its 
restrictive legislation on increases in premium rates.124
In this article, we will analyse the impact of these two ECJ rulings on the application 
of free-market principles on voluntary additional health insurance markets in the EU. 
We will discuss the arguments made in favour and against restrictive price regulation. 
In addition to an analysis of the Belgian and Slovenian cases, we will also refer to the 
concept of services of general economic interest and to the ECJ ruling in the BUPA case125 
(Ireland). Starting from the Belgian and Slovenian ECJ cases on price regulation in the 
additional health insurance market, we will broaden the discussion to the question of 
the extent to which free market rules effectively apply to additional health insurance in 
the EU. The objective of this paper is to feed the discussion on the question whether and 
under what conditions free-market-driven additional health insurance in the EU might 
be acceptable.
123	 Case	C-577/11,	DKV Belgium SA	v.	Association belge des consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL	ECLI:EU:C:2013:146.	
124	 Case	C-185/11,	Commission	v.	Slovenia	ECLI:EU:C:2012:43.
125	 Case	T-289/03,	BUPA and others	v.	Commission	[2008]	ECR	II-81.
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5.2. addITIOnal PrIVaTE HEalTH InSuranCE and Eu rEGulaTIOn
In addition to the general treaty provisions on freedom of establishment (Article 49 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union(‘TFEU’)126) and freedom to provide 
services (Article 56 TFEU), the EU has adopted specific non-life insurance directives with 
the aim of increasing competition in the European insurance market.127 Recital 19 of the 
Third Non-Life Insurance Directive128 states that ‘within the framework of an internal 
market it is in the policyholder’s interest that he should have access to the widest pos-
sible range of insurance products available in the Community so that he can choose that 
which is best suited to his needs’.
When it comes to insurers’ freedom to set premium rates, Article 8(3) of the First Non-Life 
Insurance Directive129 and Articles 29 and 39(2) and (3) of the Third Non-Life Insurance 
Directive provide: ‘[…] Member States may not retain or introduce prior notification or 
approval of proposed increases in premium rates except as part of general price-control 
systems.’
Article 54 of the Third Non-Life Insurance Directive provides an exception to this rule. 
A Member State’s supervisory authority may impose specific measures in the form of 
restrictions on insurance contracts in the interest of the ‘general good’, where contracts 
covering health risks ‘may serve as a partial or complete alternative to health cover 
provided by the statutory social security system’. Where this is the case, a Member State 
can require private insurers to ‘comply with the specific legal provisions adopted by that 
Member State to protect the general good in that class of insurance’.130 A number of 
legal provisions may be introduced if private cover provides a partial or complete al-
ternative to statutory cover: open enrolment, community rating, lifetime cover, policies 
standardised in line with the cover provided by the statutory health insurance scheme 
at a premium rate at or below a prescribed maximum, participation in risk equalisation 
schemes (referred to as ‘loss compensation schemes’) and the operation of private health 
126	 Consolidated	version	of	the	Treaty	on	the	Functioning	of	the	European	Union,	OJ	C	202,	7	June	2016,	pp.	
47-200.
127	 For	an	analysis	of	the	relevant	EU	legal	framework,	see	F.	Paolucci,	A.	Den	Exter	and	W.P.M.M.	van	de	Ven,	
‘Solidarity	 in	competitive	health	 insurance	markets:	analysing	the	relevant	EC	 legal	 framework’,	Health 
Economics, Policy and Law	1(2)	(2006)	107-126.
128	 Council	Directive	92/49/EEC	of	18	June	1992	on	the	coordination	of	laws,	regulations	and	administrative	
provisions	relating	to	direct	insurance	other	than	life	assurance	and	amending	Directives	73/239/EEC	and	
88/357/EEC,	OJ	L	228,	11	August	1992,	pp.	1-23	(‘Third	Non-Life	Insurance	Directive’).	
129	 Council	Directive	73/239/EEC	of	24	July	1973	on	the	coordination	of	laws,	regulations	and	administrative	
provisions	relating	to	the	taking-up	and	pursuit	of	the	business	of	direct	insurance	other	than	life	assur-
ance,	OJ	L	228,	16	August	1973,	pp.	3-19	(First	Non-Life	Insurance	Directive).
130	 Article	54(1)	and	Recital	24	of	the	Third	Non-Life	Insurance	Directive.
131
Regulation of PHI markets
Ch
ap
te
r 5
insurance on a technical basis similar to life insurance.131 Measures taken to protect the 
general good must be shown to be necessary and proportional to this aim; not unduly 
restrict the right of establishment or the freedom to provide services; and apply in an 
identical manner to all insurers operating within a member state.
In his letter of 25 November 2008, European Commissioner Bolkestein, responding to 
a question from the Dutch government on the application of EU regulation to private 
health insurance, suggested that the Article 54 exception only applies to substitutive 
health insurance: ‘I do not think that it would be proportionate to apply the require-
ments to any complementary insurance cover offered by private insurers which goes be-
yond the basic social security package of cover laid down by the legislation’.132 Thomson 
and Mossialos (2010) disagree with the assumption that only substitutive private health 
insurance provides social protection. They argue that where the statutory benefits pack-
age is relatively narrow and/or subject to extensive co-payments, it could be considered 
that individuals do not have adequate protection from the financial risk associated 
with ill health unless they purchase additional health insurance covering excluded (and 
effective) services and/or statutory user charges.133 However, the credibility of this argu-
ment depends on the extent to which low-income groups and high-risk groups (e.g., the 
elderly and chronically ill) effectively have access to such additional cover. Regulation of 
voluntary additional health insurance that is not affordable for these groups cannot be 
considered to effectively protect the general good.
Under certain conditions, national governments can restrict the application of free 
market principles to private health insurance. A restriction on free competition may 
be justified where it serves overriding requirements relating to the public interest, is 
suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which it pursues and does not go 
beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.134
131	 Ibid.	Article	54(2)	and	Recital	24.
132	 F.	Bolkestein,	‘Letter	from	the	European	Commission	to	the	Dutch	Minister	of	Health,	Welfare	and	Sport’,	
European	Commission,	25	November	2003.
133	 S.	Thomson	and	E.	Mossialos,	‘Private	health	insurance	and	the	internal	market’,	 in:	E.	Mossialos,	G.	Per-
manand,	R.	Baeten	and	T.	Hervey	(eds.),	Health Systems Governance in Europe: the Role of EU Law and Policy	
(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2010)	pp.	419-460.	
134	 Case	C-518/06,	Commission	v.	Italy	[2009]	ECR	I-3491,	para.72.
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5.3.  Eu CaSE law On PrICE rEGulaTIOn Of addITIOnal HEalTH 
InSuranCE
In recent years, the ECJ has taken different views in two cases (Commission v. Slovenia 
(2012) and DKV Belgium SA v. Association belge des consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL 
(2013))135 on the question whether government intervention in setting the prices of addi-
tional health insurance contracts is consistent with EU regulation. On the one hand, in its 
ruling of 26 January 2012 in Commission v. Slovenia, the Court concluded that Slovenia’s 
rules on complementary health insurance did not comply with the EU non-life insurance 
Directives. The Court found that a number of provisions in the Slovenian Health Care 
and Health Insurance Act (‘Zakon o zdravstvenem varstvu in zdravstvenem zavarovanju’ 
(‘ZZVZZ’)) did not comply with some of the basic freedoms outlined in the EU’s non-life 
insurance Directives. By contrast, by its ruling of 7 March 2013 in DKV Belgium SA, the 
Court upheld the system of restrictive price regulation of existing private health insur-
ance contracts in Belgium. The Court accepted a requirement of prior notification and 
approval of proposed increases in premium rates in the Belgian context but not in the 
Slovenian context.
These two cases, which each concern price regulation, illustrate the need for discussion 
on the appropriate balance between regulation and the operation of the free market 
in the additional health insurance sector more broadly. This important issue of health 
policy will be discussed in more depth in section 5. Before that, in section 4, we will 
bring into the discussion two legal elements that are relevant to consideration of the 
appropriate balance to be drawn, the concept of services of general economic interest 
and the proportionality of national regulation aiming at restricting free market.
5.3.1. Slovenia
5.3.1.1.	 Health	insurance	system
In 2015, health expenditure per capita in Slovenia –expressed in purchasing power 
parity– was less than the EU28 average but above the average for the ten countries 
that joined the EU in May 2004.136 Private health expenditure, comprising voluntary ad-
ditional health insurance and out-of-pocket expenditure, is close to 30 per cent of total 
health expenditure.137 All Slovenians are covered by compulsory basic health insurance, 
135	 Supra	notes	123	and	124.
136	 OECD/EU,	Health at a glance: Europe 2016 – state of health in the EU cycle,	 Paris,	OECD	Publishing,	 2016.	
Retrieved	24	January	2017,	http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264265592-en.	
137	 In	2015,	Slovenia’s	public	spending	as	share	of	total	health	expenditure	was	72.2	per	cent.	Private	health	
expenditure	amounted	to	27.8	per	cent	of	total	health	expenditure.	Source:	OECD	Health	Statistics	2016,	
figures	for	2015.	Retrieved	22	January	2017,	http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=HEALTH_STAT.
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which is part of a Bismarckian system of social security. Voluntary additional health 
insurance is quite important in Slovenia, covering about half of private expenditure.138 
Voluntary additional health insurance was introduced in 1993 to cover co-payments for 
compulsory health insurance.139 Co-payments apply for visits to general practitioners, 
specialists and hospitals as well as for pharmaceuticals and vary from 5 per cent to 75 
per cent. Almost all Slovenians have taken out additional health insurance to cover co-
payments.140 Additional health insurance is provided by Vzajemna, a non-profit public 
insurance company, along with Adriatic-Slovenica, Triglav and Merkur, three for-profit 
insurance companies.141 Vzajemna and Adriatic-Slovenica have been active since 1993. 
In the period 2004-2005, two new commercial companies –Triglav and Merkur– entered 
into the Slovene market. They launched an overt cream-skimming campaign aimed at 
younger and healthier insured individuals by offering risk-related premiums. In 2005, a 
risk-equalisation scheme was adopted. In order to prevent cream-skimming, additional 
health insurance companies were obliged to participate in the risk-equalisation scheme 
to level out differences among insurance companies in terms of the costs of health 
care. Insurance companies had to apply a unified flat premium for all insured people, 
irrespective of sex, age or health status.142
5.3.1.2.	 Commission	v.	Slovenia143
According to the Slovenian Health Care and Health Insurance Act (ZZVZZ), increases in 
premium rates of additional health insurance contracts had to be notified to and ap-
proved by the relevant national supervisory authority.144 On 23 March 2007, the European 
Commission sent a letter of formal notice to Slovenia stating that certain articles of the 
ZZVZZ breached the non-life insurance Directives and Articles 56 and 63 TFEU.145 Article 
63 TFEU was invoked because the ZZVZZ obliged insurance companies to reinvest at 
least half of the profits from additional health insurance in the administration of this in-
138	 14.8	per	cent.	Source:	ibid.
139	 Reimbursement	 of	 co-payments	 amounted	 to	 EUR	 404	 million	 in	 2014,	 representing	 85	 per	 cent	 of	
total	 expenditure	 by	 additional	 health	 insurance	 (EUR	 474	 million).	 The	 remaining	 EUR	 70	 million	
was	 spent	on	care	not	 reimbursed	by	Slovenian	social	 security.	Source:	S.	Thomas,	S.	Thomson	and	T.	
Evetovits,	‘Making	sense	of	complementary	health	 insurance’,	final	 report,	Slovenian	Ministry	of	Public	
Health,	 2015.	 Retrieved	 26	 January	 2017,	 http://www.mz.gov.si/fileadmin/mz.gov.si/pageuploads/
Analiza/21012016/21012016Report_Making_sense_of_CHI_-_Slovenia.pdf.
140	 Children	under	18	years	and	students	under	26	years	are	excluded	from	co-payments.	Approximately	98	
per	cent	of	all	individuals	who	are	eligible	to	pay	co-payments	have	taken	out	additional	health	insur-
ance.	Source:	T.	Albreht,	E.	Turk,	M.	Toth,	J.	Ceglar,	S.	Marn,	R.	Pribaković	Brinovec,	M.	Schäfer,	O.	Avdeeva	
and	van	E.	Ginneken,	‘Slovenia:	Health	system	review’,	Health Systems in Transition	11(3)	(2009)	1-168.
141	 Ibid.
142	 Ibid.
143	 Supra	note	124.
144	 Article	62,	§	2,	6°	ZZVZZ.
145	 Supra	note	124,	paras.	10	and	12.
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surance.146 In response, Slovenia argued that, although additional health insurance was 
not compulsory, it was part of the Slovenian social security system since it represented 
a matter of public interest.147 In defence of the existing regulation, Slovenia referred to 
Article 54 of the Third Non-Life Insurance Directive.148 Later, in a letter of 26 August 2009, 
Slovenia proposed to remove the contested articles from the ZZVZZ. As Slovenia did not 
ultimately amend the ZZVZZ, the European Commission referred the case to the ECJ. On 
26 January 2012, the ECJ ruled that certain requirements of the ZZVZZ were in breach of 
Article 8(3) of the First Non-Life Insurance Directive and Articles 29 and 39 of the Third 
Non-Life Insurance Directive, more particularly the requirement of prior notification and 
approval of proposed increases in premium rates, the requirement of prior agreement of 
the Minister of Public Health before setting up an additional health insurance business 
in Slovenia (including notification of all terms and conditions) and the requirement of 
prior notification and approval of proposed changes of terms and conditions.
The European Commission also argued that Article 62, §2, 4° ZZVZZ (requirement that 
half of the profit resulting from additional health insurance be invested in its adminis-
tration) and Article 62f, §9 ZZVZZ (requirement that insurance companies from other 
Member States appoint a domiciliary agent in Slovenia) did not comply with Articles 56 
and 63 TFEU. However, since the Commission’s claim on these points was not correctly 
formulated, the Court dismissed it.
Subsequently, the Slovenian government adapted the ZZVZZ by removing the contested 
provisions. The amendments included repeal of Articles 62, §2, 4° and 62f, §9 ZZVZZ, 
even though the ECJ had not ruled on their compatibility with EU law.
5.3.2. belgium
5.3.2.1.	 Health	insurance	system
Belgium has a system of compulsory health insurance with a very broad benefits 
package. Health insurance is part of a Bismarckian social security system. Compulsory 
health insurance is administered by seven sickness funds. Every citizen is obliged to be 
a member of a sickness fund.
In 2015, Belgium had the 8th highest health care expenditure per capita measured in 
purchasing power parity among the EU28 countries.149 Private expenditure (i.e., out-of-
146	 Article	62,	§	2,	4°	ZZVZZ.
147	 Supra	note	124,	para.	11.	For	a	discussion	on	the	public	interest	argument	see	infra	section	5.4.2.
148	 Ibid.	For	further	explanation	of	Article	54,	see	supra	section	5.2.
149	 Supra	note	136.
135
Regulation of PHI markets
Ch
ap
te
r 5
pocket expenditure plus additional health insurance) represents more than 20 per cent 
of total health expenditure.150
Additional health insurance covers less than 5 per cent of total expenditure on health.151 
Half of this 5 per cent consists of services and benefits provided by the sickness funds 
to their members and for which the sickness funds request a membership fee. These 
services and benefits are very diverse, e.g., reimbursement of travel vaccines or reim-
bursement of the membership fees of sport clubs. In addition to these services and 
benefits, which are accessible for the entire population, about three-quarters of the 
population has taken out voluntary additional health insurance, known as ‘hospitalisa-
tion insurance’ (‘hospitalisatieverzekering’ (Dutch) / ‘assurance hospitalisation’ (French)).152 
This hospitalisation insurance covers supplements and co-payments.153 There are three 
types of supplements, which are not covered by compulsory health insurance: fee 
supplements, room supplements and material supplements.
A fee supplement is an extra fee charged by health care providers on top of the of-
ficial tariff set by the social security regime (‘ereloonsupplement’ (Dutch) / ‘supplément 
d’honoraires’ (French)).154 In a hospital setting, fee supplements may only be charged 
to patients staying in a private, one-bed room. In 2015, one out of every four patients 
stayed in a private room.155 In hospitals, fee supplements range between one and three 
times the official tariff, with significant variations between the supplements in different 
regions.156 In a similar way to a fee supplement, a room supplement is charged by the 
hospital for the use of a private, one-bed room. When a stay in a private room is necessary 
because of medical reasons, room supplements may not be charged. A ‘material’ supple-
ment is requested for medical material which is not (yet) reimbursed by social security, 
e.g., non-reimbursable pharmaceuticals or a new hip implant.157 The costs linked to the 
150	 Public	 funding	as	 share	of	 total	 expenditure	on	health	 amounts	 to	 77.6	per	 cent.	 Private	expenditure	
represents	22.4	per	cent	of	total	health	expenditure.	Source:	see	supra	note	137.
151	 In	 2014,	 voluntary	 additional	 health	 insurance	 represented	 4.4	 per	 cent	 of	 total	 health	 expenditure.	
Source:	OECD	Health	Statistics	2016,	see	supra	137.
152	 Other	types	of	additional	health	insurance,	such	as	dental	insurance	or	insurance	for	outpatient	costs,	are	
taken	out	by	less	than	5	per	cent	of	the	Belgian	population.
153	 The	term	‘statutory	user	charges’	can	also	be	used	instead	of	the	term	‘co-payments’.	Statutory	user	charg-
es	represent	on	average	38	per	cent	of	total	patient	bill.	Source:	Mutualité	Chrétienne,	‘12e	Baromètre	MC	
de	 la	 facture	hospitalière’,	 21	November	2016.	Retrieved	24	 January	2017,	https://www.mc.be/actualite/
communique-presse/2016/barometre_hospitalier_2016.jsp.	
154	 In	Anglo-American	contexts,	the	terms	‘extra	billing’	or	‘balance	billing’	are	used.	
155	 In	2015,	23	per	cent	of	all	Belgian	patients	stayed	in	a	private	room	for	a	regular	hospitalisation	(including	
at	least	one	night).	Source:	see	supra	note	153.
156	 Most	Flemish	hospitals	charge	100	per	cent	of	the	official	tariff,	most	Walloon	hospitals	200	per	cent	and	
most	Brussels	hospitals	300	per	cent.
157	 On	average,	material	supplements	account	 for	about	7	per	cent	of	total	patient	bill.	Source:	see	supra	
note	153.
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use of a private hospital room –i.e., fee and room supplements– account for about half 
of total reimbursements made by hospitalisation insurance programmes.158 Whereas the 
total patient bill has been decreasing over the past ten years, this is not the case for fee 
supplements which have been steadily increasing.159
In order to curb the –often high– premium rate increases under hospitalisation insur-
ance contracts, a ‘medical index’ has been created by law. Premium rates can only be 
increased in line with the consumer prices index or the medical index.160 Only when 
an additional health insurance product is (expected to be) loss-making may an insurer 
request the supervisory authority, the National Bank of Belgium, for permission to in-
crease premiums.161
5.3.2.2.	 DKV	Belgium	SA	v.	Association	belge	des	consommateurs	Test-Achats	ASBL
In 2010, the Belgian consumer organisation Test-Achats ASBL, and the Belgian profes-
sional association of insurance companies Assuralia, lodged an action for annulment 
of the aforementioned law of 17 June 2009 on private additional health insurance con-
tracts. In a judgment of 31 May 2011, the Belgian Constitutional Court upheld the legal 
restrictions on increases in premium rates.162 It stated that it was the goal of the legislator 
to protect consumers, particularly with a view to preventing them from being faced with 
sharp, unexpected increases in insurance premium rates.
In January 2010, DKV Belgium SA, a private insurance company offering additional health 
insurance products, increased insurance premium rates by 7.84 per cent, well before the 
publication of the official medical index later that year. On 22 February 2010, Test-Achats 
brought an action for an injunction before the President of the Commercial Court in 
Brussels seeking to have DKV ordered to reverse its decision to increase premiums. By 
judgment of 20 December 2010, the Court upheld Test-Achats’ complaint. DKV appealed 
against that judgment before the Brussels Court of Appeal. The Brussels Court of Appeal 
requested a preliminary ruling from the ECJ on the compatibility with EU law of Belgium’s 
158	 The	exact	figure	is	49	per	cent	(2015).	Source:	see	supra	note	153.
159	 After	 adjustment	 for	 inflation,	 supplementary	 fees	 have	 increased	by	 32	 per	 cent	 between	 2004	 and	
2015,	whereas	total	hospital	bill	for	the	patient	has	decreased	by	5	per	cent.	In	2015,	supplementary	fees	
represented	61	per	cent	of	the	average	patient	bill	for	a	private	hospital	room.	Source:	see	supra	note	153.
160	 A	law	introduced	on	17	June	2009	restricted	increases	in	premium	rates	for	existing	contracts	to	increases	
in	the	consumer	price	index	or	the	medical	index	if	and	in	so	far	as	the	evolution	of	the	medical	index	
exceeds	 that	of	 the	consumer	price	 index	 (Article	 204	 Insurance	Law).	The	medical	 index	 reflects	 the	
evolution	of	 the	patient	bill.	 Because	 the	medical	 index	did	not	 include	 a	provision	 to	 revalorise	 the	
ageing	reserves,	the	medical	index	was	annulled	by	the	administrative	court	on	29	December	2011.	By	
royal	decree	of	16	March	2016,	a	new	medical	 index	has	been	created,	 including	-on	top	of	the	claims	
evolution-	a	provision	of	maximum	2	per	cent	to	cover	the	revalorisation	of	the	ageing	reserves.
161	 Art.	204,	§4	Insurance	Law	(‘Loi	du	4	avril	2014	relative	aux	assurances,	Moniteur belge,	30	April	2014’).
162	 Arrêt	de	la	Cour	constitutionnel	90/2011	du	31	mai	2011,	Moniteur belge,	10	August	2011.
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legislation restricting premium rate increases of additional health insurance contracts.163 
The ECJ, in its judgment of 7 March 2013, held that ‘the non-life insurance directives do 
not preclude the Belgian legislation restricting increases in premium rates’. The ECJ ruled 
that the Belgian rules do not constitute a breach of Articles 49 and 56 TFEU, ‘provided 
that there are no less restrictive measures which might be used to achieve, under the 
same conditions, the objective of protecting consumers against sharp, unexpected 
increases in insurance premium rates, which is for the national court to ascertain’.164
Following the ECJ’s ruling, DKV argued before the national court that an ex post facto 
review of rate increases constituted a less restrictive alternative, compared to a prior 
review (as the non-life insurance Directives specifically prohibit retaining or introducing 
prior notification or approval of proposed increases in premium rates). However, on 22 
February 2016, the Brussels Court of Appeal ruled that an ex post facto review does not 
represent a less restrictive alternative but only a different ‘modus operandi’.
In its ruling, the ECJ stressed the fact that a system of premium rate increases such as that 
at issue does not prohibit insurance undertakings from freely setting the basic premium 
and from taking account of the higher costs that the insurance coverage will entail for 
them when the insured party becomes older.165 Previously, the Belgian Constitutional 
Court had also defended the contested regulation with the argument that the insurer 
can freely determine all elements of the contract –including the premium– at the mo-
ment the contract is concluded.166
5.4. unCErTaInTy abOuT THE aPPlICaTIOn Of Eu law
The apparent inconsistency in the ECJ’s recent case law has led to uncertainty as to the 
compatibility with EU law of restrictions on increases in premium rates. The question is 
to what extent free market rules effectively apply to additional health insurance in the 
EU. An important element in the discussion is how the appropriateness of the restrictive 
measures taken by Member States can be assessed. In this section, we will discuss a set 
of criteria developed by the European Commission to test the proportionality of na-
tional regulation of private additional health insurance. We will also discuss the concept 
of services of general economic interest (SGEIs). When an additional health insurance 
163	 DKV Belgium SA	v.	Association belge des consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL,	see	supra	note	123,	para.	17.
164	 Ibid.,	paras.	48	and	49.
165	 Ibid.,	para.	45.
166	 Supra	note	162,	para.	B.13.7.3.
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scheme can be defined as an SGEI, the application of free market rules to that scheme 
can be restricted.
As discussed in section 3, while the ECJ held that Slovenian requirements of prior 
notification and approval of increases in premium rates of additional health insurance 
contracts were not compliant with the European non-life insurance Directives, the ECJ 
found the Belgian regime compliant.
In the Belgian case, the European Commission considered that the restrictions on in-
creases in premium rates were contrary to the principle of freedom to set rates.167 In 
its ruling, the ECJ agreed that such a regulatory regime for premium rate increases in 
one Member State was liable to dissuade insurance undertakings established in other 
Member States from opening a branch in that first Member State or to offer their ser-
vices there. The Court reasoned that those undertakings would have to determine their 
premium positioning and, therefore, their commercial strategy when they first set their 
premiums, with the risk that future premium rate increases would be insufficient to cover 
the costs with which they will be faced. However, the Court recalled that a restriction on 
the freedom of establishment or the freedom to provide services may be justified where 
it serves overriding requirements relating to the public interest, is suitable for securing 
the attainment of the objective which it pursues and does not go beyond what is neces-
sary in order to attain it.168 In past cases, the ECJ has accepted the objective of consumer 
protection, which was advanced by the Belgian government to defend the contested 
regulations, as an ‘overriding requirement relating to the public interest’.169
As for the suitability of the restrictive Belgian regulation for the attainment of the objec-
tive it pursues, the European Commission expressed serious doubts.170 The Commission 
considered that it might prove difficult for the regulator to reject proposed increases 
in premium rates for loss-making additional health insurance products. If this were 
the case, premium increases would not be prevented and the consumer would not be 
protected against sharp, unforeseen increases in premium rates. In other words, the 
Commission had serious doubts about the effectiveness of the regulation.
167	 Cf.	Commission	v.	Italy,	see	supra	note	134,	para.	101.
168	 Cf.	ibid.	para.	72.
169	 Cf.	Case	205/84,	Commission	v.	Germany	[1986]	ECR	3755,	paras.	32-33.
170	 Commission	 Européenne,	 Observations	 écrites	 dans	 l’affaire	 C-577/11,	 Brussels,	 28	 February	 2012	
(JUR(2012)250478	CV/tm).
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5.4.1. Proportionality of the contested regulation
In the DKV case, the European Commission proposed five criteria to assess the propor-
tionality of national regulation relating to additional health insurance:171 (1) the nature of 
the additional health insurance at issue (i.e., whether substitutive, duplicative, supple-
mentary or complementary), with national measures being more proportionate in case 
of substitutive health insurance; (2) the expenditure by additional health insurance as a 
share of total national health expenditure, with national measures being more propor-
tionate in case this share is increasing; (3) the objective of the public interest rationale 
invoked: granting access to additional health insurance irrespective of age and health 
status (and thus protecting the weakest in society) or protecting consumers who freely 
concluded their contract in a competitive market, with national measures being more 
proportionate in case the first objective is aimed at; (4) the existence of a competitive 
insurance market, which succeeds in creating a wider choice for the consumer and a 
decrease in premium rates, with national measures being more proportionate in case 
there is no really competitive insurance market; (5) the existence of other, less restrictive 
measures.
What would be the consequences of applying these five criteria to the Slovenian and 
the Belgian cases?
(1) Nature of additional health insurance: Both in Belgium and Slovenia, additional health 
insurance is not substitutive but complementary and supplementary. In Belgium, 
about half of total expenditure by additional health insurance is spent on providing 
access to a private hospital room. There are no studies available proving that the 
quality of care in a private room in a Belgian hospital is better than in a double or 
common room. In Slovenia, co-payments represent 85% of total reimbursement by 
additional health insurance. Therefore, as to this criterion, the Slovenian regulation 
may be considered more proportionate than the Belgian regulation.
(2) Expenditure by additional health insurance as a share of total expenditure on health 
care: While additional health insurance covers 14.8 per cent of total expenditure 
on health care in Slovenia, the figure reaches only 4.4 per cent in Belgium (2014). In 
fact, the share of total health expenditure covered by additional health insurance in 
Belgium has dropped from 5.1 per cent in 2003 to 4.4 per cent in 2014. Over the same 
period, in Slovenia, there has been an increase from 13.9 per cent to 14.8 per cent.172 
So far as this criterion is concerned, the Slovenian regulation may be considered 
more proportionate than the Belgian regulation.
171	 Ibid.
172	 Supra	note	137.
140
Chapter 5
(3) Objective of public interest: Due to the existence of community rating in Slovenia, 
protecting consumers against sharp, unexpected increases in insurance premium 
rates equally serves the objective of granting access to additional health insur-
ance, irrespective of age and health status (by keeping premium rates affordable) 
and the objective of protecting consumers who freely conclude their contract in a 
competitive market. This is not the case for the Belgian market. In Belgium, insurers 
are completely free to set premium rates for new clients. New clients who suffer from 
a pre-existing condition may have to pay an extra premium. Once a contract is con-
cluded, given their higher initial premium, high risk clients will be more impacted by 
subsequent premium increases (in absolute terms). New clients are not protected 
by the restrictive regulation on increases in premium rates since this regulation is 
limited to existing contracts. Since the Slovenian regulation also affects access to 
additional health insurance, it appears to be more proportionate than the Belgian 
regulation.
(4) Existence of a competitive insurance market: The Belgian health insurance market is 
more competitive than the Slovenian market. There is both a larger number of insur-
ers and a bigger variety in premium levels in Belgium. In Slovenia there are only 4 
insurers, whose premium levels are close to each other,173 whereas in Belgium there 
are over 20 insurers.174 For these reasons, the Slovenian regulation may be more 
proportionate than the Belgian regulation as far as this criterion is concerned.
(5) Alternative measure possible: In its reasoned opinion on the Belgian case, the Euro-
pean Commission put forward a number of alternative measures: better information 
for consumers underwriting additional health insurance; a framework for contested 
contractual clauses; an obligation to offer a standard contract with limited premiums 
to vulnerable groups (cf. the ‘Basistarif’ offered by private basic health insurance in 
Germany); a limitation of the technical part of the premium (i.e., pure premium and 
security loadings) in combination with a more flexible framework for the commercial 
part of the premium (i.e., administrative and commercial costs); a risk equalisation 
system.175 However, some of these supposedly less restrictive measures may well be 
more restrictive than linking premium increases to a price index (e.g., an obligation 
to offer a standard contract with limited premiums to vulnerable groups).
Given that additional health insurance expenditure as a share of total health care expen-
diture is much larger in Slovenia and the Slovenian additional health insurance market 
173	 Supra	note	139	(source).
174	 Five	Belgian	sickness	funds	offer	voluntary	additional	health	insurance	products	and	so	are	more	than	
15	private	insurance	companies.	Retrieved	25	January	2017,	http://www.assuralia.be/images/docs/stats/
NL/04_marktsamenstelling/04_11_top15-ziekte.htm.	
175	 Supra	note	170.
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is less competitive than the Belgian market, it is remarkable that the ECJ upheld the 
Belgian regulatory regime but found the Slovenian regime incompatible with EU law. 
Article 54 of the Third Non-Life Insurance Directive explicitly allows EU Member States 
to restrictively regulate private health insurance that serves as a partial or complete al-
ternative to health cover provided by the statutory social security system. According to 
this criterion, since additional health care in Slovenia mainly covers co-payments (85%) 
and makes health care more accessible, the proportionality test rather points towards 
allowing restrictive regulation to be introduced in Slovenia.
Since the ECJ apparently accepted regulation of premium rate increases in Belgium but 
not in Slovenia, it is not clear whether this kind of regulation could be adopted by other 
EU Member States.
5.4.2.  Can additional health insurance be considered as a service of general 
economic interest?
The qualification of an additional health insurance scheme as a service of general 
economic interest (SGEI) can serve as a justification for national regulation restricting 
the operation of the free market. SGEIs are commonly defined as economic activities 
that would not be generated by market forces alone or at least not in the form of an 
affordable service available to all on a non-discriminatory basis.176 SGEIs are carried out 
in the public interest under conditions defined by the State, which imposes a public 
service obligation on one or more providers.177 The concept ‘service of general economic 
interest’ (SGEI) is mentioned in article 106(2) Treaty of the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU).
A key value of EU Member States’ health care systems, which applies to welfare services 
more generally, is universal access or coverage.178 To guarantee universal coverage, the 
national government plays a vital role in regulating market-oriented systems. After 
all, the health care market is characterised by several instances of market failure, for 
instance information asymmetry and risk selection.179
176	 J.	Almunia	(2011)	Reform	of	the	state	aid	rules	for	services	of	general	economic	interest	(SGEI)	and	de-
cisions	on	WestLB,	Bank	of	 Ireland	and	France	Telecom.	Press	conference,	Brussels,	 20	December	2011.	
SPEECH/11/901.
177	 European	Commission,	 2011,	State aid: Commission adopts new package on state aid rules for services of 
general economic interest (SGEI) – frequently asked questions.	Retrieved	25	January	2017,	http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-929_en.htm.		
178	 U.	Neergaard,	‘Services	of	general	economic	interest:	the	nature	of	the	beast’,	 in:	M.	Krajewski,	U.	Neer-
gaard	and	J.W.	van	de	Gronden	(eds.),	The changing legal framework for services of general interest in Europe 
– between competition and solidarity	(The	Hague:	Asser	Press,	2009)	pp.	17-50.
179	 S.	 Lavrijssen	 and	 S.	 de	Vries,	‘Chapter	 19,	 Netherlands’,	 in:	M.	 Krajewski,	 U.	 Neergaard	 and	 J.W.	 van	 de	
Gronden		(eds.)	The changing legal framework for services of general economic interest – between competi-
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When a service is determined to be an SGEI, Member States may enact measures which 
would otherwise be contrary to the rules of the Treaties, notably the competition rules. 
Member States retain a wide discretion to define SGEIs, i.e., to use the concept of an SGEI 
as a tool to intervene in the market. This discretion is subject only to a test for manifest 
error of assessment.180
The closest attempt at clarifying the ‘manifest error of assessment’ test was made in 
BUPA where the European Court of Justice (ECJ) noted that the minimum criteria all 
SGEIs must fulfil are the presence of an act of the public authority entrusting the opera-
tors in question with an SGEI mission and the universal and compulsory nature of that 
mission.181
In BUPA, the ECJ deferred to the principal prerogative of the Member States to define 
their services of general economic interest. The case concerned an Irish law that estab-
lished a risk equalisation scheme for private medical insurance. Private insurers whose 
clients were below the average risk profile –like BUPA– would have to pay a fee, while 
insurance companies that provided insurance coverage for clients above the average 
risk profile were entitled to receive a payment. Claiming that the equalisation scheme 
constituted a breach of EU competition law, BUPA brought proceedings before the EU 
courts in the course of which the question arose whether private medical insurance was 
a public service that could fall under article 106(2) TFEU.
In Ireland a private medical insurance system operates alongside a tax based system. 
According to the facts of the case, approximately 50 per cent of the Irish population 
had taken out private insurance with one of the three private insurers. BUPA was one 
of the three insurance companies, but withdrew from the market in 2007 after its ap-
peal against the introduction of a risk equalisation scheme was rejected. The idea of 
setting up a risk equalisation scheme was that it should contribute to the attainment 
of the public interest objectives served by private insurance, which are open enrolment 
(anyone under the age of 65 must be accepted), lifetime cover, community rating and 
minimum benefits policy.182
tion and solidarity	(The	Hague:	Asser	Press,	2009)	pp.	383-422.	
180	 G.S.	Ølykke	and	P.	Møllgaard,	‘What	is	a	service	of	general	economic	interest?’,	European Journal of Law and 
Economics		41(1)	(2016)	205–241.
181	 BUPA,	see	supra	note	125,	para.	172.
182	 S.	de	Vries,	‘BUPA:	a	healthy	case,	in	the	light	of	a	changing	constitutional	setting	in	Europe?’,	in:	J.W.	van	
de	Gronden,	M.	Krajewski,	U.	Neergaard	and	E.	Szyszczak	(eds.)	Health care and EU law	(The	Hague:	Asser	
Press,	2009)	pp.	295-318.
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One aspect of the case which is important to be discussed for the purposes of this paper 
is that the ECJ classified private medical insurance as an SGEI, even though only about 
50 per cent of the Irish population was covered by this additional insurance when the 
case was filed.183 The ECJ addressed this fact, and the requirement of universality which 
it itself had specified as a mandatory characteristic of an SGEI, by stating that: ‘The 
compulsory nature of the service and, accordingly, the existence of an SGEI mission [is] 
established if the service-provider is obliged to contract, on consistent conditions, with-
out being able to reject the other contracting party. That element makes it possible to 
distinguish a service forming part of an SGEI mission from any other service provided on 
the market and, accordingly, from any other activity carried out in complete freedom.’184 
In other words, as long as the service is available to all of the population, the condition of 
universality is satisfied.185 The essential core of the definition of an SGEI thus lies in their 
potentially universal nature.
In the BUPA case, the ECJ concluded Irish additional health insurance to be an SGEI.
When the minimum criteria of an SGEI are fulfilled, a violation of the competition rules 
can potentially be justified under article 106(2) TFEU.
Coming back to the two cases at issue, the question arises whether Slovenian additional 
health insurance could be defined as an SGEI. Nikolič lists several arguments to defend 
this position.186 First, additional health insurance is an economic activity. Health insur-
ance companies offer voluntary health insurance coverage and take on the financial 
risk of engaging in this line of business. Second, the Slovenian legislator has stated that 
additional health insurance is a part of the social security system.187 Additional health 
insurance is an important and indispensable source of financing for the Slovenian 
health care system.188 The majority of the Slovenian population has taken out additional 
health insurance. Statutory user charges (co-payments) make up 85 per cent of total re-
imbursements by the Slovenian additional health insurance scheme. Third, the specific 
obligations, i.e., community rating, open enrolment and lifetime cover, which insurance 
companies offering additional health coverage have to respect, have been decreed by 
183	 BUPA,	see	supra	note	125,	para.	17.
184	 BUPA,	see	supra	note	125,	para.	190.
185	 Supra	note	179.
186	 B.	Nikolič,	‘Slovenian	complementary	health	insurance	as	a	service	of	general	economic	interest’,	Interna-
tional Public Administration Review,	13(1)	(2015)	49-67.	
187	 Art.	62	ZZVZZ.
188	 Additional	health	insurance	covers	over	half	of	private	health	expenditure	with	private	health	expendi-
ture	representing	close	to	30	per	cent	of	total	health	expenditure.
144
Chapter 5
the legislator.189 Fourth, Slovenian additional health insurance can be ascribed a univer-
sal and compulsory nature since insurance companies are obliged to contract without 
being able to reject the other contracting party (cf. open enrolment).
Unlike the Belgian public interest argument –consumer protection– Slovenia’s public 
interest argument that Slovenian additional health insurance ought to be considered as 
a part of the social security system was rejected by the ECJ.
5.5. frEE markET Or rEGulaTIOn?
A clear indication of how the organisation of additional health insurance within the EU 
should evolve cannot be derived from the recent ECJ case law. Should competition be 
fostered or should more regulation be imposed? Starting from the Belgian and Slovenian 
ECJ cases on price regulation in the additional health insurance market, the discussion 
is broadened to the question of the extent to which free market rules effectively apply 
to additional health insurance in the EU. The case law discussed above can serve as a 
starting point for an evaluation of where we stand today and what we should be head-
ing for. What is the future role of additional health insurance within the framework of 
social health insurance systems in the EU? This article aims at stimulating the discussion 
on how additional health insurance ought to be organised in order to generate added 
value for the health care system without jeopardising equity concerns such as equal 
access to essential health care.
According to the European Commission, consumers’ interests are best protected by 
promoting free market principles: ‘competition encourages enterprise and efficiency, 
creates a wider choice for consumers and helps reduce prices and improve quality’.190 
However, according to Thomson and Mossialos, there is no evidence to suggest that the 
expected benefits of competition have, as yet, materialised in the private health insur-
ance sector.191 Private health insurance premiums have risen rather than fallen, often 
faster than inflation in the health sector as a whole, while insurers’ expansion across 
189	 Art.	62-62c	ZZVZZ.
190	 European	Commission,	‘Why	is	competition	policy	important	for	consumers?’,	16	April	2012.	Retrieved	26	
January	2017,	http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consumers/why_en.html.
191	 Supra	note	133.
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national borders has been limited to cross-border mergers and acquisitions, rather than 
genuinely new entrants to the market.192 193
Equal access to health care is at the core of equity in health which implies that ideally 
everyone should have a fair opportunity to attain their full health potential and, more 
pragmatically, that no one should be disadvantaged from achieving this potential, if 
it can be avoided.194 The Constitution of the World Health Organisation sets out the 
following principle as ‘basic to the happiness, harmonious relations and security of 
all peoples’: ‘The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the 
fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political 
belief, economic or social condition.’195
Equity of access to health care services can be improved by defining essential health 
care services.196 Essential health care services should be made accessible to everyone 
within the health care system. The Committee on Choices in Health Care, the so-called 
Dunning Committee, established in 1990 in the Netherlands, has developed a set of four 
principles, to be applied successively, in order to delineate essential from non-essential 
health care services: necessity, effectiveness, efficiency, and individual responsibility. 
The principle of necessity is defined very broadly, basically meaning any treatment that 
is necessary to maintain or restore health, or to relieve suffering.197 With regard to the 
principle of effectiveness, only interventions where there is evidence for an effect are 
covered. The services to be covered are further narrowed down by those that give value 
for money, by only funding efficient services. Finally, services that are best dealt with by 
the individuals themselves are excluded (i.e., services that can easily be paid for by the 
individuals themselves).198
192	 E.	Mossialos	and	S.	Thomson,	Voluntary health insurance in the European Union	(Copenhagen:	World	Health	
Organization,	 2004).	 Retrieved	 26	 January	 2017,	www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/98448/
E84885.pdf.	
193	 A.	 Sagan	and	S.	Thomson,	Voluntary health insurance in Europe, role and regulation	 (Brussels:	 European	
Observatory	on	Health	Systems	and	Policies,	2016).	Retrieved	26	January	2017,	http://www.euro.who.int/
en/about-us/partners/observatory/publications/studies/voluntary-health-insurance-in-europe-role-
and-regulation.	
194	 M.	Whitehead,	‘The	concepts	and	principles	of	equity	and	health’,	International Journal of Health Services,	
22(3)	(1992)	429-445.
195	 World	Health	Organisation,	Basic Documents,	Forty-fifth	edition,	Supplement,	October	2006.	Retrieved	26	
January	2017,	http://www.who.int/about/mission/en/.	
196	 N.	Söderlund,	‘Possible	objectives	and	resulting	entitlements	of	essential	health	care	packages’,	Health 
Policy,	45(3)	(1998)	195-208.
197	 W.P.M.M.	van	de	Ven,	‘Choices	in	health	care:	a	contribution	from	The	Netherlands.’	British Medical Bulletin,	
51(4)	(1995)	781-790.
198	 L.M.	Sabik	and	R.K.	 Lie,	‘Priority	 setting	 in	health	care:	 lessons	 from	 the	experience	of	eight	countries’,	
International Journal for Equity in Health,	7(4)	(2008)	1-13.
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If additional health insurance really is so important that restrictive regulation is needed, 
would it not be better to integrate additional health insurance within the social security 
system? The poor, the sick and the old who cannot afford voluntary additional health 
insurance are not protected by government designed consumer protection rules regard-
ing the additional health insurance market. As a consequence, regulation of additional 
health insurance protects only the well-off (or better-off) customers who can afford 
to buy additional health insurance. When additional health insurance covers essential 
health care, a more equitable result might be reached by integrating that care into the 
social security system rather than by developing restrictive regulation protecting only 
the well-off part of the population who can afford additional health insurance.
In Slovenia, where additional health insurance primarily covers co-payments, lower 
income groups might be better served by a decrease in co-payments or by direct sub-
sidies rather than by introducing restrictive regulation for voluntary additional health 
insurance.
In Belgium, additional health insurance mainly covers hospital care. About half of the 
money reimbursed by additional health insurance relates to the price of a stay in a pri-
vate hospital room. Since quality of care in a private room is no better than in a double 
or common room, it might be difficult to uphold the view that special protection from 
government is needed to secure access to private hospital rooms.
New health technology is often reimbursed by additional health insurance. From an 
equity point of view –if essential health care services are concerned– new health tech-
nology should be integrated in basic health insurance rather than protecting only those 
customers who can afford additional cover.
Additional health insurance also provides financial protection from co-payments. Tra-
ditionally, co-payments were introduced to reduce moral hazard.199 Co-payments are 
meant to prevent people from seeking medical care that may not be necessary. Apart 
from their traditional role, co-payments also allow the public sector to shift costs on 
to households.200 In countries where private additional health insurance covers co-pay-
ments, the scope of statutory coverage might erode over time and there are concerns 
199	 M.	Chalkley	and	R.	Robinson,	Theory and evidence on cost sharing in health care: an economic perspective	
(London:	 Office	 of	 Health	 Economics,	 1997).	 Retrieved	 26	 January	 2017,	 https://www.ohe.org/publica-
tions/theory-and-evidence-cost-sharing-health-care-economic-perspective.	
200	S.	Thomas,	S.	Thomson	and	T.	Evetovits,	‘Making	sense	of	complementary	health	insurance’,	final	report,	
Slovenian	Ministry	 of	 Public	 Health,	 2015.	 Retrieved	 26	 January	 2017,	 http://www.mz.gov.si/fileadmin/
mz.gov.si/pageuploads/Analiza/21012016/21012016Report_Making_sense_of_CHI_-_Slovenia.pdf.	
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about the fact that those who do not have additional health insurance may face financial 
and other barriers to accessing health care.201
If there is insufficient public funding to reduce co-payments and to integrate (new) 
health technology within the mandatory basic health insurance system, basic health 
insurance could be extended with private funding.  Low income groups, who cannot 
afford private funding, could be subsidised. The French government has chosen this 
option. In 2014, 7.4 per cent of those covered by additional health insurance benefited 
from a public programme providing free coverage to the poorest (‘complementary 
universal health coverage’, ‘couverture maladie universelle complémentaire’ (CMU-C)).202 
Individuals with an income above the CMU-C ceiling can get a voucher to partially fund 
the premium for an additional health insurance contract (‘aide complémentaire santé’).
If all essential health care would be covered by an affordable basic health insurance 
scheme, there is no need to develop restrictive regulation for the voluntary additional 
health insurance market (covering non-essential health care).203 With all essential care 
being covered by the social security system, customers taking out voluntary health 
insurance would no more need special government protection than customers taking 
out home or car insurance.
In the Netherlands, the situation is clear-cut. According to the Dutch government all 
essential health care is covered by mandatory basic health insurance. Voluntary addi-
tional health insurance, providing top-up cover for alternative medicine, dental care and 
physiotherapy, is not regulated by the government.204
However, as long as essential health care is not always reimbursed by mandatory basic 
health insurance and as long as statutory user charges (co-payments) remain quite sub-
stantial or fee supplements –extra billing– continue to exist, additional health insurance 
schemes may well be important for securing access to health care. In two EU countries, 
201	 S.	Thomson	and	E.	Mossialos,	‘Private	health	insurance	in	the	European	Union.	Final	report	prepared	for	
the	European	Commission,	Directorate	General	for	Employment,	Social	Affairs	and	Equal	Opportunities’,	
London	School	of	Economics,	24	June	2009.	Retrieved	26	January	2017,	http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobS
ervlet?docId=4216&langId=en.
202	 C.	 Franc	 and	A.	 Pierre,	‘Compulsory	private	 complementary	health	 insurance	offered	by	employers	 in	
France:	implications	and	current	debate’,	Health Policy,	199(2)	(2015)	111-116.
203	 M.V.	Pauly,	‘A	plan	for	a	responsible	national	health	insurance’,	Health Affairs	10(1)	(1991)	5-25.
204	See	e.g.,	the	letter	of	the	Dutch	government	to	the	Parliament	(Tweede	Kamer)	‘Beantwoording	kamervra-
gen	over	bericht	dat	vrouwen	die	zwanger	zijn	worden	verwezen	naar	een	andere	zorgverzekeraar’,	19	
January	 2016.	 Retrieved	26	 January	 2017,	https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/ministerie-van-volks-
gezondheid-welzijn-en-sport/documenten/kamerstukken/2016/01/19/beantwoording-kamervragen-
over-bericht-dat-vrouwen-die-zwanger-zijn-of-willen-worden-worden-verwezen-naar-een-andere-
zorgverzekeraar.
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France and Slovenia, private additional health insurance accounts for more than ten per 
cent of total health expenditure.205 Markets with substantial statutory user charges have 
the highest levels of additional health insurance coverage.206 Over half of the Irish popu-
lation is covered by additional health insurance which covers statutory user charges and 
reimbursement of treatment in private hospital beds.207 In countries where additional 
health insurance plays an important role, a regulatory framework has been developed 
to facilitate access and to protect consumers.
Free market and regulation need not be opposites. Competition does not exclude regu-
lation. On the contrary, regulation can improve competition and help create a level play-
ing field. Regulation can empower consumers, e.g., by creating more transparency (for 
instance, by obliging the use of standard clauses or even the use of standard contracts 
in additional health insurance). In the second half of the 1990s, the Office for Fair Trade 
(OFT), at the time the United Kingdom’s regulatory agency for consumer protection,208 
launched an investigation following concerns that customers lacked adequate informa-
tion when buying private medical insurance. Regarding the ability of consumers to 
compare different products, the OFT reported: ‘different plans are presented in different 
ways, and it is difficult –if not impossible for those outside the industry– to compare 
them in terms of value for money’. The OFT also found problematic ‘the absence of 
information regarding past and likely future increases in the premium’.209
A main obstacle for efficient and effective regulation is the information asymmetry 
between insurers and government. In Belgium, for instance, government regulation 
states that the medical index –used to adjust additional health insurance premiums to 
the evolution of health care costs– cannot be negative, even when cost evolution is 
negative. Such regulation may not be in the best interest of consumers. Another issue 
is that a medical index of this sort could act as a disincentive for insurance companies 
to reduce costs, because they know that in the end cost increases will be covered by 
the medical index. In this way, the application of medical indices could even have an 
inflationary effect.
205	 France:	14.4	per	cent	(2014);	Slovenia:	14.8	per	cent	(2015).	Source:	OECD	Health	Statistics	2016,	see	supra	
note	137.
206	France:	95.5	per	cent	(2014);	Slovenia:	72.8	per	cent	(2013).	Source:	OECD	Health	Statistics	2016,	see	supra	
note	137.
207	 D.	McDaid,	M.	Wiley,	A.	Maresso	and	E.	Mossialos,	‘Ireland:	Health	system	review’.	Health Systems in Transi-
tion	11(4)	(2009)	1-268.
208	The	OFT	has	since	been	replaced	by	the	Competition	and	Markets	Authority	(CMA).
209	T.	 Foubister,	 S.	Thomson,	 E.	Mossialos	 and	A.	McGuire,	Private medical insurance in the United Kingdom	
(Brussels:	European	Observatory	on	Health	Systems	and	Policies,	2006).	
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When all essential care is included in the social security system and barriers to care 
(e.g., high co-payments) have been removed, the market for voluntary additional health 
insurance could be opened to private –for profit or not for profit– companies with real 
competition actively being fostered.
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6. Optimal design of PHI products
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6.1. InTrOduCTIOn
In Europe, on average 70% of total expenditure on dental care is private expenditure and 
16% of this private expenditure is covered by complementary dental insurance (CDI) [1]. 
However, most CDI products currently on the market in Belgium, France, Germany and the 
Netherlands are not optimal because (i) they provide little protection against financial risk 
and do not improve access to otherwise unaffordable dental treatment (e.g., implants and 
crowns) and (ii) moral hazard and adverse selection are not sufficiently counteracted. The 
suboptimal character of CDI can be explained by supply-side aspects (the limits of insur-
ability) and demand-side aspects (behavioural economics). On the basis of these potential 
explanations, strategies will be drawn to optimise dental insurance.
We begin by presenting a framework for optimal insurance design, as well as the current 
situation of CDI in Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands.
6.2. OPTImal HEalTH InSuranCE dESIGn
Health insurance has two important advantages for the consumer, but also two disad-
vantages (see table 1 below). On the one hand, health insurance reduces the financial 
risk for the insured and provides access to health care that would otherwise be unaf-
fordable [2]. On the other hand, insurance increases costs due to loading costs – the 
administrative and other expenses of the insurer – and moral hazard. In relation to 
dental care, perhaps more so than in relation to other types of care, a choice is possible 
between cheaper basic treatments and more expensive ‘luxury’ treatments (e.g., placing 
a metal crown versus a porcelain crown), which may result in substantial moral hazard 
(both consumer- and supplier-induced moral hazard).
Table 1. Advantages and disadvantages of health insurance
advantages disadvantages
Reduction of financial risk for the insured Loading costs
Access to health care that would otherwise be unaffordable Moral hazard
Optimal health insurance should maintain the advantages and reduce the disadvan-
tages as much as possible. First, it should reduce the insured’s financial risk as far as 
possible. Because trivial risks lead to losses that can be borne by the insured without any 
noticeable burden, optimal insurance should not provide coverage for trivial risks. This 
avoids relatively high administrative expenses and loss settlement costs (loading costs) 
that are very high for these risks compared with the pure risk premium.
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Secondly, optimal insurance should provide ‘access to health care that would otherwise 
be unaffordable’. This implies that cover limits should be avoided and expensive care 
should be covered as much as possible.
Third, the optimality of CDI can be increased by restricting the loading costs of dental 
insurance by increasing insurers’ efficiency.
Fourth, to reduce moral hazard optimal insurance should involve cost-sharing arrange-
ments such as deductibles and co-insurance, and apply managed care. A deductible 
makes the enrolee responsible for all costs up to a defined threshold. A co-insurance rate 
makes the enrolee responsible for a percentage of costs. Optimal insurance contracts 
should also have a stop-loss, a limit on out-of-pocket expenses [3].
Fifth, optimal insurance should also counteract adverse selection as much as possible. 
Adverse selection occurs when the insured knows more information about his expected 
losses than the insurer knows or uses in his premium setting and underwriting process. 
Adverse selection can be counteracted by selective underwriting (using medical ques-
tionnaires), risk rating (setting higher premiums for groups presenting high risk, e.g., 
age-related) and product differentiation (designing benefits so to attract lower risks).
The features of optimal health insurance are summarised in the first column of table 4 
below.
6.3.  COmPlEmEnTary dEnTal InSuranCE In bElGIum, franCE, 
GErmany and THE nETHErlandS
Complementary dental insurance (CDI) provides coverage for care that is either not cov-
ered or not fully covered by the mandatory basic insurance (MBI). In the four countries 
studied, private expenditure on dental care (i.e., not covered by MBI) expressed as a 
percentage of total expenditure on dental care ranges between 30% in Germany and 
74% in the Netherlands (Table 2). CDI represents 3% (Belgium) to 55% (Netherlands) of 
total expenditure on dental care. Out-of-pocket expenditure on dental care is the high-
est in Belgium (42%) and the lowest in the Netherlands (19%).
The coverage provided by CDI is complementary to that provided by MBI, which covers 
26% (the Netherlands) to 70% (Germany) of total expenditure on dental care. Table 3 
provides an overview of the dental care covered by MBI in the four countries.
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6.3.1. no optimal dental insurance
Currently, CDI offered in Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands cannot be de-
scribed as ‘optimal’ (Table 4). German CDI responds best to the criteria of optimal health 
insurance.
Table 2. Dental care: expenditure and insurance
belgium france Germany netherlands
Average expenditure per person on dental care €150 €160 €314 €179
Private expenditure (i.e., not covered by MBI)a 45% 65% 30% 74%
Complementary dental insurance (CDI)a 3%b 43% 5.4% 55%
Percentage of population with CDI 5% 95% 18% 62%
a As share of total expenditure on dental care
b Authors’ estimate
Source: [1].
Table 3. Dental care covered by mandatory basic health insurance
belgium france Germany netherlands
Conservative care (e.g., fillings) +++a +++a +++ +b
Orthodontics (e.g., braces) + + ++ -
Prosthetics (e.g., implants, bridges, crowns) - + + -
Periodontics (gum disease treatment) + + ++ -
+++: good coverage
++: medium coverage
+: low coverage
-: no coverage
a: extra billing is possible
b: conservative dental care is covered for children only (under age 18)
Table 4. Complementary dental insurance: presence of features of optimal health insurance design
belgium france Germany netherlands
No upper limit on coverage - - + -
No coverage of trivial risks - - - -
Deductible - - - -
Co-insurance + - + +
Cap on out-of-pocket expenses - - - -
Selective underwriting -a -a + -a
Risk rating + + + +
Product differentiation + + + +
Managed care - + + +
-: The feature is not present in CDI products offered.
+: The feature is present in CDI products offered.
a Selective underwriting is applied only for a limited number of contracts, i.e., those with the highest upper limits on 
coverage.
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Only in Germany are there no upper limits on coverage for dental care (after an initial pe-
riod). CDI in the other three countries does not provide access to otherwise unaffordable 
health services and protection against unpredictable high financial risks. For example, 
replacing four teeth by implants and crowns can cost about €10000. Upper limits of 
only €250 (the Netherlands) or €1000 (Belgium) do not provide protection against high 
financial risks nor do they make this kind of dental care more accessible. In France, even 
the most extensive complementary covers provide a maximum amount of only €750 per 
year for implants. With total costs for an implant easily amounting to about €2500, €1750 
still needs to be paid for out-of-pocket after complementary insurance has kicked in. In 
all four countries CDI provides coverage of trivial risks.
In all four countries, cost sharing is applied, but only in the form of co-insurance. Co-
insurance rates vary between 0% and 50% in Belgium, 0% and 55% in Germany and 0% 
and 25% in the Netherlands. In France, co-insurance is generally not used. In Germany 
and the Netherlands, many products are offered with 0% co-insurance. Deductibles are 
not used. Caps on out-of-pocket expenses, which protect the consumer against high 
financial risk, are not applied in any of the four countries studied.
Selective underwriting is primarily used in Germany, and to a lesser extent in the other 
three countries.  In Belgium, selective underwriting is used by only one insurer offering 
CDI. In France, where a 7% tax has to be paid for contracts that apply selective under-
writing, most CDI contracts abstain from selective underwriting. In Germany, a medical 
questionnaire needs to be filled out for most CDI products. The insurer can decline to 
cover the candidate or charge an additional premium or exclude missing teeth or the use 
of certain techniques from the scope of coverage. Insurance products without selective 
underwriting usually have contractual clauses excluding reimbursement for problems 
that existed well before the start of the contract and for treatments running at the mo-
ment of the conclusion of the contract (‘pre-existing conditions’). In the Netherlands, 
selective underwriting is rarely applied (only for the high-end dental coverage).
In all four countries, risk rating and product differentiation are used to a certain extent 
(e.g. age-related premiums). Products are designed and marketed to attract certain 
market segments.
In all countries except Belgium, preferred provider networks are used as an element of 
managed care for CDI. In all countries, waiting times are used as a means to contain costs 
and to counteract adverse selection.
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6.4. wHy IS dEnTal InSuranCE SubOPTImal?
Both supply-side aspects (the limits of insurability) and demand-side aspects (behav-
ioural economics) may explain why dental insurance is not optimal.
6.4.1. limits of insurability
A potential explanation of why insurers offer suboptimal CDI is that optimal CDI exceeds 
the limits of insurability. According to Berliner [4], risks properly belong in the area of 
insurability where: (1) losses occur with a high degree of randomness; (2) the maximum 
possible loss for the insurer is limited; (3) the average loss amount upon loss occurrence 
is small; (4) the average time interval between two loss occurrences is small (i.e., losses 
occur frequently); (5) the insurance premium is sufficiently high; (6) there is virtually no 
possibility of moral hazard; (7) coverage of the risk is consistent with public policy; and 
(8) the law permits the cover.
Public policy (7), moral hazard (6), the degree of randomness of losses (1) and the maxi-
mum possible loss (2) are important issues as far as the suboptimality of CDI is concerned.
Public policy plays an important role in Belgium, France and the Netherlands, where 
the ‘solidarity’ principle is paramount in health care financing. Equal access to health 
insurance is at the heart of the values of the mutual insurers (‘mutuelles’) established in 
those countries. Their goal is to organise solidarity between their members for the reim-
bursement of health care costs. According to the French ‘Code de la mutualité’, medical 
questionnaires may not be used by mutuals and thus selective underwriting cannot be 
applied. The solidarity idea is not restricted to mutuals. In France, for instance, a 7% tax 
is due when selective underwriting is applied. So, commercial insurance companies are 
encouraged by the French government not to apply selective underwriting. In Belgium 
as well, the government intervenes in the organisation of CDI. Premium increases for 
existing clients are strictly regulated. Premiums can only be adjusted in line with the 
consumer price index or a specific ‘medical index’ for dental care, which is calculated 
annually by the Ministry of Economic Affairs.
Fear of reputational damage and the wish to avoid (further) restrictive regulation be-
ing adopted may help to explain why (commercial) insurance companies in Belgium, 
France and the Netherlands refrain from applying ‘hard insurance logic’ such as selective 
underwriting. By offering limited coverage which is equally accessible for all citizens, 
insurers willingly refrain from applying private insurance logic. Rather, they apply ‘social 
security mechanisms’ (open enrolment, no selective underwriting, community rating). 
Insurance companies may be concerned that the unfettered application of insurance 
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logic could provoke a reaction from the regulator. In a market where it is impossible 
or very difficult for mutuals to engage in selective underwriting, commercial insurance 
companies applying selective underwriting could easily be accused of ‘cherry-picking’. 
By sticking to social security-type mechanisms, insurance companies err on the safe 
side. However, insurers’ reluctance to apply private insurance logic (such as selective 
underwriting) and reliance on other methods (such as setting upper limits on coverage) 
lead to the development of suboptimal CDI products.
Moral hazard is an important problem due to the very nature of dental care. Choices 
among different treatment options are strongly influenced by individual consumer pref-
erences, where aesthetic aspects often play a role. Dentists also have their preferences, 
which can be influenced by the consumer’s and insurer’s ‘willingness to pay’. Dental in-
surance can thus provide fertile ground for both consumer- and provider-induced moral 
hazard. Therefore, in an optimally designed scheme, insurers ought to fully invest in 
countermeasures. However, classic private insurance measures such as deductibles and 
co-insurance are not or are not fully implemented due to public policy concerns. Rather, 
insurers prefer to use other measures such as offering restricted coverage, setting upper 
limits on coverage and not applying a cap on out-of-pocket expenditure. However, this 
contributes to the development of suboptimal CDI products.
The degree of randomness of losses varies between total randomness and absolute 
predictability. Pre-existing conditions come close to being absolutely predictable. In 
Belgium, France and the Netherlands, CDI covers pre-existing conditions. Consequently, 
adverse selection is inadequately counteracted and a  vicious circle arises whereby the 
insurer needs to repeatedly increase premiums to be able to continue coverage for the 
high risks that have subscribed the insurance policy. This leads to the development of 
suboptimal CDI products [5]. By comparison, in Germany, CDI is effectively limited to 
future, unforeseen events. It may not be a coincidence that CDI in Germany generally 
provides unlimited coverage, in contrast to the situation in Belgium, France and the 
Netherlands.
The ‘maximum possible loss’ is also a potential explanation for the sub-optimality of 
CDI. Certain dental treatments, i.e., prosthetic treatments such as the replacement of 
multiple teeth, constitute a risk with a relatively large loss amount (more than €10,000) 
and a low loss frequency. Such risks can only be made insurable if the insurer is given the 
opportunity to build up long-term loss reserves from its premium income. However, CDI 
contracts can be cancelled by the insured every year. Uncertainty about the duration of 
the contract together with moral hazard and adverse selection may lead insurers to limit 
coverage, resulting in suboptimal dental insurance.
159
Optimal design of PHI products
Ch
ap
te
r 6
6.4.2. behavioural economics
Van Winssen et al. [6] explored potential explanations of why individuals choose 
suboptimal complementary health insurance. Based on key insights from behavioural 
economics they discuss several factors that can have an impact on the high uptake of 
suboptimal insurance by consumers. For CDI the following factors are relevant.
Factors such as liquidity constraints and debt aversion may help to explain why people 
buy dental insurance products that provide only limited coverage. Liquidity constraints 
imply that individuals do not have the means to free up (substantial) funds at a given 
point in time. Debt aversion stems from mental accounting theory [7] and is illustrated 
by individuals’ preference to prepay for consumption and to get paid for work after 
completion.
Ignorance and social comparison may also affect individuals’ willingness to purchase 
suboptimal insurance. People often do not know exactly what they are insuring them-
selves against by taking out complementary dental insurance (see, e.g., [8]) and they 
often do not know the costs of dental care that is (not) covered by their insurance. They 
often rely on what their peers decide [9].
6.5. STraTEGIES fOr OPTImISInG COmPlEmEnTary dEnTal InSuranCE
In many countries, MBI does not cover certain types of dental care such as prosthetic 
treatments (e.g., crowns, implants and bridges) or provides only limited coverage (see, 
e.g., Table 3). With 70% of total expenditure on dental care being privately financed in 
Europe, CDI can play an essential role in the affordability and accessibility of dental 
care. Therefore, it is important for CDI products to respond as closely as possible to the 
features of optimal insurance design. However, currently many CDI products on the 
market are suboptimal. The gap with optimal insurance design can be explained by both 
supply-side aspects and demand-side aspects. From these potential explanations, the 
following strategies to optimise CDI can be drawn.
First, public policy would like voluntary CDI products to provide both optimal insurance 
coverage and equal access to insurance. However, this is not possible because optimal 
insurance requires selective underwriting and risk rating (to counteract adverse selec-
tion to protect existing clients against free riders who abuse the insurance system), 
which is inconsistent with the principle of equal access. Therefore policymakers should 
carefully decide which types of dental care are essential and ought to be covered by MBI. 
Dental care which is considered non-essential by policymakers and which is therefore 
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not covered by MBI should be subject to private insurance logic. If, because of budget-
ary constraints, essential dental care cannot be covered by MBI, subsidisation of private 
insurance for persons with low incomes might be an alternative to full public provision.
Second, moral hazard could be counteracted by the systematic use of deductibles and 
co-insurance. Standard lists of usual market prices could be compiled (as, e.g., in the 
Netherlands and France) and provider networks adhering to a price list could be cre-
ated. Insurers should not shy away from legal action in case of excessive amounts being 
claimed (i.e., excessive extra billing).
Third, selective underwriting and risk rating could be used to counteract adverse selec-
tion and to protect existing clients against free riders who abuse the insurance system. 
Providing insurance for pre-existing conditions is incompatible with the insurance 
principle that only future, unforeseen risks can be covered: a burning house cannot be 
insured.
Fourth, applying waiting times for expensive treatments such as prosthetics and provid-
ing only limited coverage during the initial years of the contract constitute alternatives 
to a general limitation of coverage. For instance, in Germany, limited coverage typically 
applies during the first four years of the insurance contract.
Fifth, behavioural economics aspects such as liquidity constraints and debt aversion 
could be dealt with by offering a combination of optimal dental insurance in combina-
tion with a health (dental) savings account. The dental savings account could be used 
to finance trivial costs. In this way, CDI could be optimised and would not be tainted by 
attempts to also cover trivial risks. Ignorance and social comparison can be taken care 
of by improving the transparency of CDI products. Consumer organisations can play an 
important role in clarifying the market offer for the consumer.
acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Richard Burton and Seraf Van Den Bosch for their corrections 
and suggestions.
161
Optimal design of PHI products
Ch
ap
te
r 6
rEfErEnCES
[1] OECD Health Statistics 2017. Figures for 2015. http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=HEALTH_
STAT (2017). Accessed 29 September 2017
[2] Nyman, J.A.: The value of health insurance: the access motive. J Health Econ. 18(2), 141–52 (1999). doi: 
10.1016/S0167-6296(98)00049-6
[3] Arrow, K.J.: Essays in the theory of risk bearing. Markham, Chicago (1971)
[4] Berliner, B.: Limits of insurability of risks. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs (1982)
[5] Rothschild, M., Stiglitz, J.: Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: an essay on the economics 
of imperfect information. Q J Econ. 90(4), 629–649 (1976). doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-
015-7957-5_18
[6] Van Winssen, K.P.M., van Kleef, R.C., van de Ven, W.P.M.M.: The demand for health insurance and behav-
ioural economics. Eur J Health Econ. 17(6), 653–657 (2016)
[7] Thaler, R.: Mental accounting and consumer choice. Mark Sci. 4(3), 199–214 (1985).
[8] Autoriteit Financiële Markten (AFM).: Uitkomsten onderzoek Aanvullende Zorgverzekeringen. AFM, 
Amsterdam. https://www.afm.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2015/nov/rapport-aanvullende-zorgverzekerin-
gen (2015). Accessed 29 September 2017
[9] Richter, A., Schiller, J., Schlesinger, H.: Behavioral insurance: theory and experiments. J Risk Uncertain 
48(7), 85–96 (2014)
Ch
ap
te
r 7
7. Conclusion and discussion
165
Conclusion and discussion
Ch
ap
te
r 7
7.1. COnCluSIOn
In this section, we will answer the research questions (see Chapter 1). The answers are 
based on the papers included in the previous chapters.
7.1.1. reliability of OECd Health Statistics
Research	question	1:
In how far are OECD Health Statistics on private expenditure on health for Belgium reliable?
We have compared -for the year 2010- the official estimates of private health expendi-
ture for Belgium (as published in the OECD Health Statistics210) with estimates based on 
alternative sources and calculations. As alternative sources, we have used both publicly 
available information and billing data from professional associations and private com-
panies. We have applied the methodology of the International Classification of Health 
Accounts: sources of funding (HF)211 and providers of health care services and goods 
(HP)212 giving an insight in where the money comes from (HF) and where the money 
goes to (HP).
Table 1 shows the results of this comparison. The most significant differences between 
the official estimates and alternative calculations can be found in the following sectors: 
(1) general hospitals, (2) nursing care facilities (homes for the elderly), (3) community 
care facilities for the elderly, (4) all other residential care facilities (residential care for 
the disabled), (5) offices of other health practitioners (such as physiotherapists and 
psychologists) and (6) vision products.
Our conclusion is that official estimates of private expenditure on health for Belgium 
are not reliable. For instance, according to OECD Health Statistics, private expenditure 
on hospitals in Belgium amounts to 3.1 billion EUR, while according to our alternative 
calculations these expenses represent only 1.1 billion EUR. Total private expenditure on 
health differs only slightly (9.4 billion EUR [alternative calculations] versus 9.3 billion EUR 
[OECD]), but this is a mere coincidence.
Dirk Moens, who is responsible with the Belgian Federal Service Social Security for 
producing the official estimates of health expenditure for Belgium, co-authored the 
210	 Formerly	‘OECD	Health	Data’.	Official	estimates	on	health	expenditure	are	produced	by	the	Belgian	Fed-
eral	Public	Service	Social	Security.	The	estimates	are	collected,	validated	and	published	in	a	joint	effort	by	
OECD,	WHO	and	Eurostat.
211	 HF:	‘health	financing’,	expenditure	on	health	by	source	of	funding.
212	 HP:	‘health	provider’,	expenditure	on	health	by	provider.
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paper on this subject. The publication of the paper has led to a revision of some of the 
official estimates. For instance, for 2010, private expenditure on inpatient long-term 
nursing care (homes for the elderly) has been revised from 420 million EUR (OECD Health 
Statistics 2011) to 950 million EUR (OECD Health Statistics 2017). Private expenditure on 
therapeutic appliances (i.e., glasses and other vision products and hearing aids) has also 
been revised: from a mere 22 million EUR (OECD Health Statistics 2011) to 395 million EUR 
(OECD Health Statistics 2017).
Research	question	2:
What are the major obstacles to a correct estimation of private expenditure on health?
We distinguish four potential sources of problems: (1) the interpretation of definitions, 
(2) the formulation of assumptions, (3) missing or incomplete data and (4) incorrect data.
(1) Interpretation of definitions
A narrow or broad interpretation of the definitions listed in the OECD Manual ‘A System 
of Health Accounts’ (SHA) can give totally different results for private expenditure on 
health. The definitions used in relation to private expenditure on homes for the elderly 
can illustrate this problem. In Belgium, there are two types of homes for the elderly: 
homes for individuals requiring extended nursing care (‘nursing homes’)213 and homes 
for individuals requiring limited care (‘rest homes’).214 For the calculation of the Belgian 
official estimates, the choice has been made to include private expenditure for the first 
type of homes but not for the second type. There are two problems with this approach. 
First, although the scope of the SHA category ‘nursing care facilities’ is indeed limited to 
‘individuals requiring nursing care’, private expenditure on rest homes could be allocated 
to the SHA category ‘community care facilities for the elderly’. This category addresses 
‘persons unable to fully care for themselves and/or unwilling to live independently’. 
Second, in the OECD Health Statistics for Belgium, public expenditure on both types 
of homes for the elderly has been taken into account. However, as far as private expen-
diture is concerned, only nursing homes have been taken into account. The question 
can be raised whether including only public expenditure on rest homes and not private 
expenditure does not result in an inconsistency between public and private expenditure 
on health.
213	 ‘Maisons	de	repos	et	de	soins’	(MRS)/‘Rust-	en	verzorgingstehuizen’(RVT).
214	 ‘Maisons	de	repos	pour	personnes	âgées’	(MRPA)/‘Rustoorden	voor	bejaarden’	(ROB).
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Table 1. Expenditure on health by provider and source of funding: OECD Health Data versus alternative 
calculations (Belgium 2010) (million €).
General
government
expenditure
(OECd)
Private
sector
expenditure
(OECd)
Private sector
expenditure
(alternative
calculations)
Hospitals  8612  3139  1073
General hospitals  7332  2436  966
Mental health and substance abuse hospitals  1188  451  95
Specialty (other than mental health and substance abuse 
hospitals)
 92  252  12
nursing and residential care facilities  4238  397  1991
Nursing care facilities (homes for the elderly)  2344  378  1136
Residential mental retardation, mental health and substance 
abuse facilities
 109  18  18*
Community care facilities for the elderly  0***  0  610
All other residential care facilities  1784  0  227
Providers of ambulatory health care  8766  2991  3420
Offices of physicians  3240  1537  1243
Offices of dentists  770  584  592
Offices of other health practitioners  987  182  717
Out-patient care centres  278  1  1*
Medical and diagnostic laboratories  1471  184  293
Providers of home health care  1242  10  82
Other providers of ambulatory health care  778  492  492*
retail Sale and other providers of medical goods  3764  2459  2627
Dispensing chemists (pharmacies)  3731  2434  2248
(Pharmaceutical and other medical non-durables - HC.5.1) ( 3735)** ( 2317)** ( 2248)**
Retail sale and other suppliers of optical glasses and other 
vision products
 23  3  357
Retail sale and other suppliers of hearing aids  0  20  20*
(Hearing aids - HC.5.2.3) ( 45)** ( 56)** ( 60)**
Retail sale and other suppliers of medical appliances (other 
than optical goods and hearing aids)
All other miscellaneous sale and other suppliers of 
pharmaceuticals and medical goods
 10  2  2*
Provision and administration of public health programs  874    
General health administration and insurance  1501  331  331
Other industries (occupational health care / private 
households)
 333  0  0
Total general government expenditure / Total private sector 
expenditure
 28088  9316  9442
Total expenditure  37404  37530
Total private sector expenditure (% of total expenditure) 24.9% 25.2%
* When no alternative data are available, OECD figures for private expenditure are being used.
** Figures for HC.5.1 and HC.5.2.3 have not been used to calculate total expenditure.
*** General government expenditure on community care facilities for the elderly is comprised in general 
government expenditure on nursing care facilities (homes for the elderly).
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(2) Formulation of assumptions
Certain assumptions are being made for the allocation of total private expenditure on 
health to the different (sub)sectors of health care providers. Transparency in relation 
to these assumptions is crucial to allow for data on private expenditure to be criticised 
and improved. In this respect, we have had an excellent working relationship with the 
Belgian Federal Public Service Social Security which is responsible for producing the 
Belgian figures for the OECD Health Statistics. A critical assumption, for instance, is that 
statutory user charges can be used as a distribution key to allocate private expenditure 
to the different (sub)sectors of health care providers. Criticism of this assumption can be 
illustrated by supplementary fees, since there is not always a proportional relationship 
between user charges and supplementary fees. Certain (sub)sectors have substantial 
user charges and low supplementary fees while other (sub)sectors are characterised by 
significant supplementary fees and (almost) no user charges.
(3) Missing or incomplete data
Examples of missing data in the Belgian market are the figures on private expenditure 
for psychologists and dietitians. No aggregate data are available. The professional asso-
ciations have made an estimate based on the number of providers, the average number 
of sessions and the average fee charged. According to this methodology, we arrive at a 
total of 230 million EUR private expenditure on self-employed, registered clinical psy-
chologists and 60 million EUR on self-employed dietitians in Belgium. Incomplete data 
can also be a source of error. An example from the Belgian market are vision products. 
OECD Health Statistics list 3 million EUR for private expenditure on vision products (see 
Table 1). This figure pertains solely to co-payments for vision products that are reim-
bursed by mandatory basic health insurance.215 Figures on total turnover in the market 
of vision products are not publicly available. Information from the industry shows that 
total turnover amounts to 475 million EUR. This example shows how lack of information 
can result in completely distorted results.
(4) Incorrect data
Incorrect data can be the result of the use of outdated information. For instance, for 
the production of the Belgian data on private expenditure on homes for the elderly, a 
ratio of 40 per cent nursing home beds and 60 per cent rest home beds has been used. 
However, in 2010, nursing home beds represented 49.4 per cent of total beds. Since only 
private expenditure on nursing homes has been included in the official Belgian figures, 
the 40:60 ratio applied results in an underestimation of private expenditure on homes 
for the elderly.
215	 Reimbursement	of	vision	products	by	mandatory	basic	health	insurance	totals	23	million	EUR.
169
Conclusion and discussion
Ch
ap
te
r 7
7.1.2. Supplementary physicians’ fees
Research	question	3:
What is the cost (evolution) of supplementary physicians’ fees in Belgium and France?
In Belgium, more supplementary fees are charged per inhabitant than in France (see 
Table 2). For outpatient care, the difference between the two neighbouring countries is 
limited. However, for inpatient care, supplementary fees per inhabitant are almost three 
times higher in Belgium than in France.
In 2012, supplementary physicians’ fees represented 8.9 per cent and 6.3 per cent of total 
private expenditure on health in Belgium and France respectively.
Table 2. Supplementary physicians’ fees in Belgium and France (2012)216
belgium france
Total Average per
inhabitant
Total Average per
inhabitant
Supplementary fees charged for outpatient care €400 million €36 €1851 million €28
Supplementary fees charged in hospitals216 €381 million €34 €793 million €12
Total supplementary fees €781 million €70 €2644 million €40
Sources: authors’ calculations; DREES; Eurostat
In Belgian hospitals, both ‘conventioned’ and ‘non-conventioned’ physicians can charge 
supplementary fees for private rooms,. For outpatient care, only ‘non-conventioned’ 
physicians are allowed to do so.217 Between 2011 and 2017, the percentage of ‘non-
conventioned’ general practitioners and medical specialists has dropped from 12.3 to 
10.6 per cent and from 20.0 to 16.7 per cent respectively (INAMI, 2016a).
In France, the percentage of liberal physicians working in sector 2, who are authorised 
to charge supplementary fees, has slightly increased from 24.7 per cent in 2000 to 25.3 
per cent in 2014. While the percentage of general practitioners working in sector 2 has 
decreased from 13.9 to 9.0 per cent, the percentage of specialists working in sector 2 
has increased from 37.1 to 43.4 per cent (Sécurité sociale, 2016b). 59 per cent of all new 
medical specialists chooses to work in sector 2 (Barlet and Marbot, 2016).
216	 For	2015,	figures	are	531	million	EUR	and	937	million	EUR	for	Belgium	and	France	respectively	(sources:	
INAMI,	DOC	CNMM	2017/34.	Available	at	http://ima-aim.be/IMG/pdf/ima-rapport_ereloonsupplementen.
pdf;	Fierla	A.:	Toujours	plus	de	dépassements	d’honoraires	dans	 les	cliniques	privées.	Le	Figaro,	27	De-
cember	 2016.	 Available	 at	 http://www.lefigaro.fr/conjoncture/2016/12/27/20002-20161227ARTFIG00087-
les-depassements-d-honoraires-des-cliniques-privees-ont-augmente-de-30.php	(2016)).
217	 ‘Conventioned’	physicians	can	only	charge	supplementary	fees	in	case	of	‘special	demands’	made	by	the	
patient	(e.g.,	a	late-night	consultation).
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The total amount of supplementary fees charged for classic hospital stays in Belgian 
hospitals (including minimum one-night) has increased by 7.1 per cent per year between 
1998 and 2010. Over the same period, the total hospital bill for patients has increased by 
3.0 per cent (Mutualité Chrétienne, 2011).218 After adjustment for inflation, supplementary 
fees have increased by 32 per cent between 2004 and 2015, whereas the total patient bill 
has decreased by 5 per cent (Mutualité Chrétienne, 2016).
Unfortunately, data on supplementary fees for outpatient care in Belgium are scarce and 
do not allow for an evaluation of changes over time.
In France, average supplementary fees in sector 2 have risen from 25 per cent of official 
tariffs in 1990 to 54 per cent in 2010 (Léchenet, 2012). Between 2011 and 2015, the total 
amount of supplementary fees in private hospitals has risen from 676 million EUR to 
867 million EUR (+ 28 per cent). In 2014, total supplementary fees charged by physicians 
amounted to 2.8 billion EUR (Sécurité sociale, 2016b), while in 2011 the figure was 2.4 
billion EUR (Auguste, 2012).
While about three-quarters of the Belgian population has taken out complemen-
tary health insurance covering inpatient supplementary fees, less than five per cent 
is covered for outpatient supplementary fees. This may be explained by both supply 
and demand factors. Isolated outpatient bills tend to be relatively small while hospital 
stays may result in catastrophic medical expenses. Taking out health insurance to cover 
catastrophic expenses is more appealing. However, patients suffering from (multiple) 
chronic diseases can be confronted with significant outpatient bills. Processing small 
outpatient bills entails disproportionally large administrative costs for health insurers. 
As long as the majority of outpatient bills are on paper, health insurers will not be likely 
to promote complementary health insurance covering outpatient costs.
Research	question	4:
How can cost inflation of supplementary physicians’ fees be contained?
Several measures to curb cost inflation of supplementary fees can be implemented both 
by authorities and insurers. Supplementary fees can be prohibited for certain categories 
of patients (e.g., persons with low incomes) and in certain situations (e.g., emergency 
care). Reference tariffs can be set and supplementary fees can be capped. Supply-side 
218	 The	figures	mentioned	(7.1	per	cent	and	3.0	per	cent)	are	compound	annual	growth	rates.	The	figures	are	
based	on	an	analysis	of	all	hospital	bills	of	the	members	of	the	Christian	Mutualities.	On	31	December	
2015,	the	Christian	Mutualities	covered	4,574,738	people	or	41.2	per	cent	of	the	Belgian	population	(INAMI,	
2016b).		
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restrictions can be introduced and differences in quality of care can be limited. Insurers 
providing coverage for supplementary fees also have an important role to play. Coverage 
of supplementary fees can lead to both patient-induced and physician-induced moral 
hazard. Therefore, insurers ought to effectively counteract moral hazard by implement-
ing measures such as co-insurance, deductibles and managed care. Insurers should not 
shy away from legal action against excessive supplementary fees.
Both in Belgium and France, several measures have not yet been implemented or only to 
a limited extent (see Table 3). So far, the measures that have been implemented in these 
countries have not yet resulted in a stabilisation or a reduction of supplementary fees.
Table 3. Measures to curb cost inflation of supplementary fees
Initiated by the authorities belgium france
Prohibiting supplementary fees a a
Setting indicative/reference tariffs for supplementary fees - 
Introducing supply-side restrictions - 
Capping supplementary fees - -
Capping reimbursement of supplementary fees by additional health insurance - 
Restricting differences in quality of care b -
Initiated by insurers belgium france
Capping reimbursement of supplementary fees  
Negotiating supplementary fees - -
Applying deductibles  -
Applying co-insurance - -
Taking legal action against excessive supplementary fees -c -c
a Both in Belgium and in France, supplementary fees have only been prohibited for limited groups (e.g., people who get 
subsidies to buy additional health insurance) or in certain circumstances (e.g., emergency care)
b Since January 2017, physicians may no longer discriminate between patients who pay supplementary fees and those 
who do not. This legislation applies to inpatient care alone. The new rules are not well known by the public. So far, they 
have not been enforced.
c Legal action has only been taken by individuals in isolated cases. There are only judgments from lower courts.
Research	question	5:
What is the added value of supplementary physicians’ fees?
Historically, both in Belgium and in France, the system of supplementary fees was 
introduced to allow physicians to increase their revenue. Hence, the added value of 
supplementary fees for the physician is clear: a source of (extra) income. However, the 
added value for the patient is not clear.
In the 1990s, the Belgian courts already dealt with the issue of whether the system of 
supplementary fees linked to the use of a private hospital room could be justified from 
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a legal standpoint. Two courts –in 1993 and in 1997 respectively– ruled that supple-
mentary fees are not acceptable unless additional health services are provided by the 
physician (‘qu’il existe un “supplément” de prestations en contrepartie du “suppléments 
d’honoraires”’).219 The judges stated that extra services needed to be provided for the 
extra money paid in order for the supplementary fees to be justified (‘quid pro quo’). 
Since the two courts ruled at first instance, the judgments had only a limited impact.
For certain categories of self-employed medical specialists, supplementary fees consti-
tute a substantial part of their income. Supplementary fees represent 35 per cent and 32 
per cent of the total income of Belgian and French surgeons respectively.
Both in Belgium and France, hospitals also benefit from supplementary fees. In most 
hospitals, physicians need to cede a certain percentage of their supplementary fees to 
the hospital to help finance overhead costs.
Patients willing to pay supplementary fees may be offered convenient consultation 
hours late at night or comfortable private rooms in hospitals. However, while it is under-
standable that a patient might have to pay extra to the hospital for the use of a luxurious 
private room, it is difficult to understand why he/she should pay extra to the physician 
for staying in a private room.
A physician can refuse to treat a patient if the patient is not willing to pay the supple-
mentary fees charged by the physician. Dormont and Péron (2016) found that French 
patients might choose to consult sector 2 specialists, who can charge supplementary 
fees, because they have difficulties in gaining access to other physicians, i.e., sector 1 
specialists who do not charge supplementary fees. If, in a certain region, there are fewer 
sector 1 specialists, patients face search costs, waiting time and transportation costs in 
order to consult a specialist who does not charge more than the regulated fee.
In Belgian hospitals, supplementary fees are linked to the use of a private room. A review 
of the literature found that private rooms have a moderate effect on patient satisfaction 
with care, noise and quality of sleep, and the experience of privacy and dignity (van de 
Glind et al., 2007). Conflicting results were found for hospital infection rates. In addition, 
there was no evidence on recovery rates and patient safety.
219	 Court	of	First	 Instance	Antwerp	27	May	 1993	 (Rechtbank van eerste aanleg Antwerpen),	DCCR	 1994,	 762.	
Court	of	First	Instance	Liège	12	November	1997	(Tribunal de première instance Liège),	JLMB,	1999,	277.
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The thriving in France of sector 2 medical specialists, who can charge supplementary 
fees, may be due to patients believing that these physicians provide better quality of 
care (Dormont and Péron, 2016). The idea that an expensive physician must be an excel-
lent physician might play a role. Value might also be attributed to supplementary fees 
by patients believing that extra payments for physicians motivate them to go the extra 
mile.
In short, the added value of supplementary fees for the physician is clear: extra revenue. 
Hospitals may also benefit from supplementary fees for they may receive part of the 
supplementary fees charged. Patients who are able and willing to pay supplementary 
fees can buy comfort such as convenient consultation hours late at night or private 
rooms in hospitals. Since physicians can refuse to treat patients who do not pay supple-
mentary fees, willingness to pay supplementary physicians’ fees guarantees a patient’s 
free choice of physician.
Research	question	6:
Is a system of supplementary physicians’ fees charged on top of social security tariffs sustain-
able?
In the past, patients had little objective data at their disposal on the quality of health 
care services provided by an individual physician. Today, such data are being made 
available. Processing such data can provide objective information on the quality of care 
provided by an individual physician. As long as there is no transparency on the quality 
of care provided by physicians, physicians can charge supplementary fees even if the 
quality of care they provide is substandard. With more transparency being created on 
the quality of care provided, it is likely that the value of supplementary fees will increas-
ingly be questioned in the future. It can be expected that patients will only be willing to 
pay supplementary fees for physicians who effectively provide above standard quality 
of care. But then another problem will arise. If supplementary fees are to be linked to 
objectively and transparently demonstrated high quality, a problem of equal access 
to care will arise. Limiting access to top quality care to patients who are able to pay 
supplementary fees is in contradiction with the principle of equal access to care. Equal 
access to health care is at the core of equity in health which implies that ideally everyone 
should have a fair opportunity to attain their full health potential and, more pragmati-
cally, that no one should be at a disadvantage in achieving this potential, if it can be 
avoided (Whitehead, 1992).
A two-tiered system, with better quality care only available to those who are able and 
willing to pay extra, is considered to be socially unacceptable in many countries. In these 
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countries, it is unlikely that governments will choose for supplementary fees to be used 
as an incentive for physicians to provide better quality of care. 
Since supplementary fees constitute an important source of revenue for certain medi-
cal specialists and physicians are a strong lobby group, a policy gradually restricting 
supplementary fees might be preferable. Today, both in Belgium and in France, the first 
steps in limiting supplementary fees have already been set. With the lack of added value 
for the patient becoming more apparent, this process is likely to continue over the next 
few years.
A short answer to the research question is: no, the current system of supplementary 
physicians’ fees in Belgium and France is not sustainable. In the short run, cost inflation 
is putting serious pressure on the viability of the system. In the long run, lack of evidence 
that physicians charging supplementary fees provide better quality of care is likely to 
undermine patients’ willingness to pay supplementary fees. Patients, like all consum-
ers, want ‘quid pro quo’. Moreover, if supplementary fees were to effectively depend on 
the quality of care provided, a problem of equal access to care would arise since only 
patients able to pay supplementary fees would have access to top quality physicians.
7.1.3. access to new health technologies
Research	question	7:
Are new health technologies equally accessible for patients in Belgium and the Netherlands?
Contrary to the Netherlands, out-of-pocket payments for new health technology are 
widely accepted and practiced in Belgium. This difference is largely the result of different 
regulatory environments. A major difference is the way in which entitlements to care 
are described: closed and explicit in Belgium versus open and non-explicit in the Neth-
erlands. In Belgium, there is a closed, enumerative list of medical goods and services 
covered by mandatory basic health insurance. As a consequence, there is transparency 
about which treatments are not covered. In the Netherlands, there is no such list. Dutch 
law stipulates that care that meets the criteria of ‘current scientific knowledge and 
practice’ is to be covered by mandatory health insurance. However, unless the National 
Health Care Institute has assessed a certain treatment, insurers and hospitals do not 
necessarily all have the same approach towards that treatment. This may cause a less 
transparent situation for the patient in the Netherlands. The existence of in-kind health 
insurance policies in the Netherlands, as opposed to Belgium, may also help explain 
differences in access to new health technologies. With in-kind policies, patients’ choice 
is limited to the care contracted by the health insurer.
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It is not always clear for the Dutch patient which insurers and which hospitals offer a 
specific new health technology. In principle, the patient can check the website of the 
insurer or enquire with the insurer by telephone. Insurers are obliged to give a detailed 
answer to such questions. However, in practice this possibility is not often used. Recently, 
concerns have been raised in the press about Dutch hospitals -for financial reasons- not 
always or not immediately providing the patient with the best treatment available. For 
example, bevacizumab (Avastin) might not be given to all patients with colon carcinoma 
because some hospitals prefer not to pay for this expensive treatment.220
In Belgian hospitals lists are available for the patient containing well-defined health 
technologies which need to be paid for out-of-pocket (e.g., certain types of hip implants 
and intraocular lenses and materials for fracture fixation) (Christian Mutuality, 2017).
Whereas the Belgian approach may do better in terms of ‘access to new health tech-
nologies’ for those who are able and willing to pay, the Dutch approach has a better 
score for ‘equal access to care’. In Belgium, patients have more choice, if they can pay. Of 
course, the condition is that they are informed about the existence of other treatment 
options. Based on the Patient Rights Act of 2002, their doctor should inform them about 
all treatment options, including those that are not covered by mandatory basic health 
insurance. More research is needed to know to what extent doctors effectively perform 
this task. For instance, doctors might be inclined to only inform well-off patients who 
can afford to pay out-of-pocket for an expensive new health technology.
Within the Dutch health system, there is less transparency on the availability of new 
health technologies. Out-of-pocket payments for new health technologies do not ex-
ist in the Netherlands. The comprehensiveness of the statutory benefits package may 
be part of the explanation. However, since it is impossible for the benefits package to 
cover all new health technologies, Dutch patients may not have access to certain new 
technologies. Another element of the Dutch health care system may also negatively af-
fect transparency. Since health insurers and hospitals are free to contract, including on 
the use of new health technologies, the patient may not know about new technologies 
being used in one hospital but not in the other.
Contrary to the Netherlands, Belgium has a two-tiered system so far as access to new 
health technologies is concerned. Access to new health technologies depends on the 
220	 See	Dutch	newspaper	article	(2015):	‘Ziekenhuis	verbiedt	kankerkuur’	(translation:	Hospital	forbids	cancer	
Treatment).	De Telegraaf,	16	June	2015.	Available	at	http://www.telegraaf.nl/gezondheid/24164283/_Ziek-
enhuis_verbiedt_kankerkuur_.html.	
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patient being informed about the new technology and the ability and willingness to pay 
out-of-pocket. Covering new health technologies that are not (yet) reimbursed by man-
datory basic health insurance is one of the reasons for the existence of PHI in Belgium.
In sum, there seems to be a trade-off between equal access to care on the one hand and 
choice and transparency on the other. In a two-tier health care system, there is no equal 
access to new health technology. In an egalitarian system, transparency on where and 
what technology is being used, as well as choice are limited.
Research	question	8:
What can be the role of voluntary private health insurance in providing access to new health 
technology?
Eighty-two per cent of the Belgian population and 84 per cent of the Dutch population 
has subscribed to PHI (figures for 2015) (Assuralia, 2016; CDZ, 2015; Vektis, 2015). While 
Belgian PHI mainly offers coverage for inpatient costs, Dutch PHI focuses on outpatient 
costs such as dental care and physiotherapy. As opposed to Belgium, PHI in the Nether-
lands does not offer coverage for new health technology which is not (yet) covered by 
mandatory basic health insurance. In Belgium, the role of PHI in covering new health 
technology is recognised by the government. The Belgian ‘Special Solidarity Fund’, 
which is an integral part of mandatory basic health insurance, explicitly stipulates that 
patients first have to seek reimbursement for a new technique from PHI before they can 
file a request with the Fund.221
In the Netherlands, expenditure on general hospitals is almost completely covered by 
mandatory basic health insurance. Out-of-pocket expenditure represents only 0.4 per 
cent of total expenditure on hospitals. The situation is very different in Belgium, where 
private expenditure on general hospitals amounts to 20.1 per cent of total expenditure 
on hospitals. Additional health insurance covers 8.6 per cent of total expenditure on 
hospitals.222
While in the Netherlands it is theoretically possible to charge a supplement for new 
health technology to patients who have a reimbursement policy, the general perception 
is that this is not happening in practice. Although the Dutch government is promoting 
221	 Article	25	septies.	§1,	4°	Wet	betreffende	de	verplichte	verzekering	voor	geneeskundige	verzorging	en	
uitkeringen	gecoördineerd	op	14	juli	1994	(Health	Insurance	Act).
222	 Source:	OECD	Health	Statistics	(figures	for	2015).	As	discussed	in	chapter	2	of	this	thesis,	the	real	figure	
for	 private	 expenditure	 on	 general	 hospitals	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 substantially	 lower	 than	 the	OECD	 figure	
mentioned	here.
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competition on price and quality among health insurers and health insurance policies 
and although legislation allows them to do so, health insurers are not offering two 
benefits-in-kind policies A and B whereby for policy A treatment X has been contracted 
and for -the more expensive- policy B treatment Y, using new health technology, has 
been contracted.
An analysis of the Belgian and the Dutch approach reveals that a closed explicit system 
of entitlements to care may create an environment in which patients (and their doc-
tors) are encouraged to look for and to use new health technologies which are not (yet) 
reimbursed by mandatory basic health insurance. Reimbursement by PHI can facilitate 
the use of new health technologies, e.g., by providing reimbursement for technologies 
that are not yet reimbursed by mandatory basic health insurance but that are under 
review for reimbursement (= ‘waiting room function’). Risk-averse individuals may want 
to protect both their health and their wealth by assuring access to expensive health 
technology not (yet) covered by mandatory basic health insurance. In all types of health 
systems, there is an increasingly concerted effort to define an ‘essential’ package of 
health care that is covered by mandatory basic health insurance (Jost, 2005). Because 
of the increasing offer and demand of health technologies and growing budgetary 
constraints, the comprehensiveness of the statutory benefits package is coming under 
strain. Smith (2013) has investigated the question of how to choose the benefits package 
to which all citizens are given free access when objectives include financial protection 
as well as health improvement. A key concern is the type of private markets available 
and the nature of patients’ responses when a treatment is not covered by such a pack-
age. Smith (2013) has modelled three scenarios: no availability of private care; a spot 
market of private care paid for out-of-pocket; and a market in prepaid complementary 
private insurance. His conclusion is that governments can secure an optimal system 
of mandatory health insurance coverage by specifying a benefits package in line with 
redistributional goals and nurturing a complementary voluntary insurance market.
In short, by covering technologies that are not (yet) reimbursed by mandatory basic 
health insurance, PHI can play a significant role in providing access to new health tech-
nologies. However, due to equity reasons, the statutory benefits package should include 
essential (new) health technologies.
7.1.4. regulation of PHI markets
Research	question	9:
To what extent do free market rules effectively apply to voluntary private health insurance?
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In addition to the general treaty provisions on freedom of establishment (Article 49 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’)223) and freedom to provide 
services (Article 56 TFEU), the EU has adopted specific non-life insurance Directives with 
the aim of increasing competition in the European insurance market.224 Recital 19 of the 
Third Non-Life Insurance Directive225 states that ‘within the framework of an internal 
market it is in the policyholder’s interest that he should have access to the widest pos-
sible range of insurance products available in the Community so that he can choose that 
which is best suited to his needs’.
Article 54 of the Third Non-Life Insurance Directive provides an exception to this rule. 
A Member State’s supervisory authority may impose specific measures in the form of 
restrictions on insurance contracts in the interest of the ‘general good’, where contracts 
covering health risks ‘may serve as a partial or complete alternative to health cover 
provided by the statutory social security system’. Where this is the case, a Member State 
can require private insurers to ‘comply with the specific legal provisions adopted by that 
Member State to protect the general good in that class of insurance’.226 A number of 
legal provisions may be introduced if private cover provides a partial or complete al-
ternative to statutory cover: open enrolment, community rating, lifetime cover, policies 
standardised in line with the cover provided by the statutory health insurance scheme 
at a premium rate at or below a prescribed maximum, participation in risk equalisation 
schemes (referred to as ‘loss compensation schemes’) and the operation of PHI on a 
technical basis similar to life insurance.227 Measures taken to protect the general good 
must be shown to be necessary and proportional to this aim; not unduly restrict the 
right of establishment or the freedom to provide services; and apply in an identical man-
ner to all insurers operating within a Member State.
In his letter of 25 November 2008, European Commissioner Bolkestein, responding to 
a question from the Dutch government on the application of EU regulation to private 
health insurance, suggested that the Article 54 exception only applies to substitutive 
health insurance: ‘I do not think that it would be proportionate to apply the requirements 
to any complementary insurance cover offered by private insurers which goes beyond 
223	 Consolidated	version	of	the	Treaty	on	the	Functioning	of	the	European	Union,	OJ	C	202,	7	June	2016,	pp.	
47-200.
224	 For	an	analysis	of	the	relevant	EU	legal	framework,	see	F.	Paolucci,	A.	Den	Exter	and	W.P.M.M.	van	de	Ven,	
‘Solidarity	 in	competitive	health	 insurance	markets:	analysing	the	relevant	EC	 legal	 framework’,	Health 
Economics, Policy and Law	1(2)	(2006)	107-126.
225	 Council	Directive	92/49/EEC	of	18	June	1992	on	the	coordination	of	laws,	regulations	and	administrative	
provisions	relating	to	direct	insurance	other	than	life	assurance	and	amending	Directives	73/239/EEC	and	
88/357/EEC,	OJ	L	228,	11	August	1992,	pp.	1-23	(‘Third	Non-Life	Insurance	Directive’).
226	 Article	54(1)	and	Recital	24	of	the	Third	Non-Life	Insurance	Directive.
227	 Ibid.	Article	54(2)	and	Recital	24.
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the basic social security package of cover laid down by the legislation’.228 Thomson and 
Mossialos disagree with the assumption that only substitutive private health insurance 
provides social protection. They argue that where the statutory benefits package is 
relatively narrow and/or subject to extensive co-payments, it could be considered that 
individuals do not have adequate protection from the financial risk associated with ill 
health unless they purchase PHI covering excluded (and effective) services and/or statu-
tory user charges (Thomson and Mossialos, 2010).229 However, the credibility of this argu-
ment depends on the extent to which low-income groups and high-risk groups (e.g., the 
elderly and chronically ill) effectively have access to such additional cover. Regulation of 
PHI that is not affordable for these groups cannot be considered to effectively protect 
the general good.
Under certain conditions, national governments can restrict the application of free 
market principles to PHI. A restriction on free competition may be justified where it 
serves overriding requirements relating to the public interest, is suitable for securing the 
attainment of the objective which it pursues and does not go beyond what is necessary 
in order to attain it.230
Recent European Court of Justice (ECJ) case law has revealed apparent inconsistencies 
in its approach to the regulation of PHI. In 2013, the ECJ upheld Belgian regulations limit-
ing the operation of the free market by restricting increases in premium rates of PHI 
contracts.231 By contrast, in 2012, an ECJ ruling required Slovenia to repeal such restrictive 
legislation and not to hinder the operation of the free market.232
The question is to what extent free market rules effectively apply to PHI in the EU. An 
important element in the discussion is how the appropriateness of the restrictive mea-
sures taken by Member States can be assessed. We discuss a set of criteria developed by 
the European Commission to test the proportionality of national regulation of PHI. We 
also discuss the concept of services of general economic interest (SGEIs). When a PHI 
scheme can be defined as an SGEI, the application of free market rules to that scheme 
can be restricted.
228	 F.	Bolkestein,	‘Letter	from	the	European	Commission	to	the	Dutch	Minister	of	Health,	Welfare	and	Sport’,	
European	Commission,	25	November	2003.
229	 S.	Thomson	and	E.	Mossialos,	‘Private	health	insurance	and	the	internal	market’,	 in:	E.	Mossialos,	G.	Per-
manand,	R.	Baeten	and	T.	Hervey	(eds.),	Health Systems Governance in Europe: The Role of EU Law and Policy	
(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2010)	pp.	419-460.
230	 Case	C-518/06,	Commission	v.	Italy	[2009]	ECR	I-3491,	para.	72.
231	 Case	C-577/11,	DKV Belgium SA	v.	Association belge des consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL	ECLI:EU:C:2013:146.
232	 Case	C-185/11,	Commission	v.	Slovenia	ECLI:EU:C:2012:43.
180
Chapter 7
In the DKV case, the European Commission proposed five criteria to assess the propor-
tionality of national regulation relating to PHI:233 (1) the nature of the PHI at issue (i.e., 
whether substitutive, duplicative, supplementary or complementary), with national 
measures being more proportionate in case of substitutive health insurance; (2) the 
expenditure by PHI as a share of total national health expenditure, with national mea-
sures being more proportionate where this share is increasing; (3) the objective of the 
public interest rationale invoked: granting access to PHI irrespective of age and health 
status (and thus protecting the weakest in society) or protecting consumers who freely 
concluded their contract in a competitive market, with national measures being more 
proportionate where the first objective is aimed at; (4) the existence of a competitive 
insurance market, which succeeds in creating a wider choice for the consumer and a 
decrease in premium rates, with national measures being more proportionate in case 
there is no really competitive insurance market; (5) the existence of other, less restrictive 
measures.
Given that expenditure financed by PHI as a share of total health expenditure is much 
larger in Slovenia and the Slovenian PHI market is less competitive than the Belgian 
market, it is remarkable that the ECJ upheld the Belgian regulatory regime but found the 
Slovenian regime incompatible with EU law. Article 54 of the Third Non-Life Insurance 
Directive explicitly allows EU Member States to restrictively regulate PHI that serves as a 
partial or complete alternative to health cover provided by the statutory social security 
system. According to this criterion, since PHI in Slovenia mainly covers co-payments 
(85%) and makes health care more accessible, the proportionality test rather points 
towards allowing restrictive regulation to be introduced in Slovenia. Since the ECJ ap-
parently accepted regulation of premium rate increases in Belgium but not in Slovenia, 
it is not clear whether this kind of regulation could be adopted by other EU Member 
States.
The qualification of a PHI scheme as a service of general economic interest (SGEI) can 
serve as a justification for national regulation restricting the operation of the free mar-
ket. SGEIs are commonly defined as economic activities that would not be generated 
by market forces alone or at least not in the form of an affordable service available to 
all on a non-discriminatory basis.234 SGEIs are carried out in the public interest under 
conditions defined by the State, which imposes a public service obligation on one or 
233	 Commission	 Européenne,	 Observations	 écrites	 dans	 l’affaire	 C-577/11,	 Brussels,	 28	 February	 2012	
(JUR(2012)250478	CV/tm).
234	 J.	Almunia,	‘Reform	of	the	state	aid	rules	for	services	of	general	economic	interest	(SGEI)	and	decisions	on	
WestLB,	Bank	of	Ireland	and	France	Telecom’,	Press	conference,	Brussels,	20	December	2011.	SPEECH/11/901.
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more providers.235 The concept ‘service of general economic interest’ (SGEI) is mentioned 
in Article 106(2) TFEU.
A key value of EU Member States’ health care systems, which applies to welfare services 
more generally, is universal access or coverage.236 To guarantee universal coverage, the 
national government plays a vital role in regulating market-oriented systems. After 
all, the health care market is characterised by several instances of market failure, for 
instance, information asymmetry and risk selection.237
When a service is determined to be an SGEI, Member States may enact measures which 
would otherwise be contrary to the rules of the Treaties, notably the competition rules. 
Member States retain a wide discretion to define SGEIs, i.e., to use the concept of an SGEI 
as a tool to intervene in the market. This discretion is subject only to a test for manifest 
error of assessment.238
The closest attempt at clarifying the ‘manifest error of assessment’ test was made in BUPA 
where the ECJ noted that the minimum criteria all SGEIs must fulfil are the presence of 
an act of the public authority entrusting the operators in question with an SGEI mission 
and the universal and compulsory nature of that mission.239
In the BUPA case, the ECJ concluded Irish PHI to be an SGEI.
Unlike the Belgian public interest argument -consumer protection- Slovenia’s public 
interest argument that Slovenian PHI ought to be considered as a part of the social 
security system was rejected by the ECJ.
A short answer to the research question is that recent ECJ case law has revealed appar-
ent inconsistencies its approach to the regulation of PHI. Therefore, it is not clear to what 
extent EU free market rules apply to complementary PHI.
235	 European	Commission,	 2011,	State aid: Commission adopts new package on state aid rules for services of 
general economic interest (SGEI) — frequently asked questions,	 available	at	http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-11-929_en.htm.	
236	 U.	Neergaard,	‘Services	of	general	economic	interest:	the	nature	of	the	beast’,	 in:	M.	Krajewski,	U.	Neer-
gaard	 and	 J.W.	 van	de	Gronden	 (eds.),	 The Changing Legal Framework for Services of General Interest in 
Europe — between Competition and Solidarity	(The	Hague:	Asser	Press,	2009)	pp.	17-50.
237	 S.	Lavrijssen	and	S.	de	Vries,	‘Chapter	19,	Netherlands’,	in:	Krajewski	et	al.	(eds.),	ibid.,	pp.	383-422.
238	 G.S.	Ølykke	and	P.	Møllgaard,	‘What	is	a	service	of	general	economic	interest?’,	European Journal of Law and 
Economics	41(1)	(2016)	205-241.
239	 Case	T-289/03,	BUPA and others	v.	Commission	ECLI:EU:T:2008:29,	para.	172.
182
Chapter 7
Research	question	10:
What is the future role of voluntary private health insurance within the framework of social 
health insurance systems in the European Union?
Equal access to health care is at the core of equity in health which implies that ideally 
everyone should have a fair opportunity to attain their full health potential and, more 
pragmatically, that no one should be disadvantaged from achieving this potential, if it 
can be avoided (Whitehead, 1992).
Equity of access to health care services can be improved by defining essential health care 
services (Söderlund, 1998). Essential health care services should be made accessible to 
everyone within the health care system. The Committee on Choices in Health Care, the 
so-called Dunning Committee, established in 1990 in the Netherlands, has developed 
a set of four principles, to be applied successively, in order to delineate essential from 
non-essential health care services: necessity, effectiveness, efficiency, and individual 
responsibility. The principle of necessity is defined very broadly, basically meaning any 
treatment that is necessary to maintain or restore health, or to relieve suffering (van de 
Ven, 1995). With regard to the principle of effectiveness, only interventions where there 
is evidence for an effect are covered. The services to be covered are further narrowed 
down by those that give value for money, by only funding efficient services. Finally, 
services that are best dealt with by the individuals themselves are excluded (i.e., services 
that can easily be paid for by the individuals themselves) (Sabik and Lie, 2008).
More recently, the 2010 U.S. Affordable Care Act (ACA) stipulates that a broad package 
of ‘essential health benefits’ (EHBs) equivalent to that of a ‘typical employer plan’ be 
offered by qualified health plans participating in newly created state-based insurance 
exchanges, as well as by new plans offered to individuals and small employers outside 
these exchanges. U.S. Congress directed the Department of Health and Human Services 
(DHHS) to flesh out the details. The DHHS, in turn, asked the Institute of Medicine (IOM) 
to recommend a process for defining and updating the EHB package (Iglehart, 2011). 
The ACA states that EHB packages must include at least 10 broad benefit categories: 
ambulatory patient services; emergency services; hospitalisation; maternity and new-
born care; mental health and substance abuse disorder services, including behavioural 
health treatment; prescription drugs; rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices; 
laboratory services; preventive and wellness services and chronic disease management; 
and pediatric services, including oral and vision care. The IOM advanced the following 
criteria to define medically necessary services: ‘medical services that are (1) clinically 
appropriate for the individual patient, (2) based on the best scientific evidence, tak-
ing into account the available hierarchy of medical evidence, and (3) likely to produce 
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incremental health benefits relative to the next best alternative that justify any added 
cost’ (Institute of Medicine, 2011). DHHS regulation stipulates that the mandatory EHB 
package needs to be defined at a state level. As a result, there are quite significant 
differences in EHB packages between states. For instance, essential health benefits in 
Alabama are quite different from those in New Hampshire.240 Reproductive health and 
obesity surgery may be included in the EHB package in one state but not in another. The 
issue of reproductive health illustrates political discussions playing an important role in 
determining EHBs. Obesity surgery is a good example of the normative discussion on 
what constitutes a disease and what does not.
A 2008 WHO report enumerates five goals for defining EHB packages: priority setting on 
the grounds of effectiveness and relative costs, poverty reduction, equity, political em-
powerment and accountability, and improving service delivery (World Health Organisa-
tion, 2008). The report stresses that implementing an EHB package is not just a technical 
exercise. Political and institutional processes need to be engaged, because successful 
implementation involves dialogue on purpose and design; decisions on financing and 
delivery arrangements, and adaptation over time.
Coming back to the discussion on the regulation of PHI, the following question can be 
asked: If PHI really is so important that restrictive regulation is needed, would it not be 
better to integrate PHI within the social security system? The poor, the sick and the old 
who cannot afford PHI are not protected by government-designed consumer protec-
tion rules regarding the PHI market. As a consequence, regulation of PHI protects only 
well-off (or better-off) customers who can afford to buy PHI. When PHI covers essential 
health care, a more equitable result might be reached by integrating that care into the 
social security system rather than by developing restrictive regulation protecting only 
the well-off part of the population who can afford PHI.
New health technologies are often reimbursed by PHI. From an equity point of view 
-if essential health care services are concerned- new health technologies should be 
integrated in basic health insurance rather than protecting only those customers who 
can afford additional cover.
PHI also provides financial protection from co-payments. Traditionally, co-payments 
were introduced to reduce moral hazard. Co-payments are meant to prevent people 
from seeking medical care that may not be necessary. Apart from their traditional role, 
240	The	EHB	packages	per	state	are	available	at:	https://www.cms.gov/cciio/resources/data-resources/ehb.
html
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co-payments also allow the public sector to shift costs on to households. In countries 
where PHI covers co-payments, the scope of statutory coverage might erode over time 
and there are concerns about the fact that those who do not have PHI may face financial 
and other barriers to accessing health care (Thomson and Mossialos, 2009).
If there is insufficient public funding to reduce co-payments and to integrate (new) 
health technologies within the mandatory basic health insurance system, basic health 
insurance could be extended with private funding.  Low income groups, who cannot 
afford private funding, could be subsidised. The French government has chosen this 
option. In 2014, 7.4 per cent of those covered by PHI benefited from a public programme 
providing free coverage to the poorest (‘complementary universal health coverage’, 
‘couverture maladie universelle complémentaire’ (CMU-C)) (Franc and Pierre, 2015). Indi-
viduals with an income above the CMU-C ceiling can get a voucher to partially fund the 
premium for a PHI contract (‘aide complémentaire santé’).
In summary, if all essential health care were to be covered by an affordable mandatory 
basic health insurance scheme, there would be no need to develop restrictive regulation 
for the PHI market (see also Pauly, 1991). Customers taking out PHI would no more need 
special government protection than customers taking out home or car insurance.
7.1.5. Optimal design of PHI products
Research	question	11:
How can the gap between the current offer of dental insurance products and an optimal 
design for complementary dental insurance be explained?
In Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands, the current offer of complementary 
dental insurance (CDI) is not optimal. After reimbursement of dental costs by MBI and 
CDI, out-of-pocket expenditure on dental care remains at a fairly high level (e.g., 45% 
in Belgium). The design of CDI products does not respond to the criteria of optimal 
insurance because the majority of products on the market do not protect against high 
financial risk, nor do they give access to otherwise unaffordable dental care. Moreover, 
moral hazard and adverse selection are insufficiently counteracted. The gap with opti-
mal insurance design can be explained by both supply-side aspects and demand-side 
aspects. For reasons of public policy, insurers are reluctant to offer optimal CDI and be-
havioural economic aspects such as liquidity constraints, debt aversion and ignorance 
can explain why consumers are willing to buy suboptimal CDI. Public policy would like 
voluntary CDI products to provide both optimal insurance coverage and equal access 
to insurance. However, this is not possible because optimal insurance requires selective 
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underwriting and risk rating (to counteract adverse selection241), which is inconsistent 
with equal access. In Belgium, France and the Netherlands, guaranteeing equal access 
seems to be more important than providing optimal coverage.
Research	question	12:
How can current complementary dental insurance design be improved?
The following strategies to optimise CDI can be derived from the potential explanations 
for the current existence of suboptimal CDI. First, policymakers should carefully decide 
which dental care is essential and ought to be covered by MBI. Dental care which is 
considered non-essential by policymakers and which is therefore not covered by MBI 
should be subject to private insurance logic. If, because of budgetary constraints, es-
sential dental care cannot be covered by MBI, subsidisation of private insurance for 
low-income people might be an alternative to full public provision.
Second, moral hazard could be counteracted by the systematic use of deductibles and 
co-insurance. Standard lists of usual market prices could be compiled and provider 
networks adhering to a price list could be created. Insurers should not shy away from 
legal action in case of excessive amounts being claimed.
Third, selective underwriting and risk rating could be used to counteract adverse selec-
tion and to protect existing clients against free riders who abuse the insurance system. 
Providing insurance for pre-existing conditions is incompatible with the insurance 
principle that only future, unforeseen risks can be covered. A burning house cannot be 
insured.
Fourth, applying waiting times for expensive treatments such as prosthetics and provid-
ing only limited coverage during the initial years of the contract constitute alternatives 
for a general limitation of coverage.
Fifth, behavioural economics aspects such as liquidity constraints and debt aversion 
could be dealt with by offering a combination of optimal dental insurance in combina-
tion with a health (dental) savings account. Ignorance and social comparison can be 
241	 Unlike	mandatory	health	insurance,	voluntary	CDI	is	prone	to	adverse	selection.	Individuals	who	expect	
high	health	 care	 costs	differentially	prefer	more	generous	 and	expensive	 insurance	plans;	 those	who	
expect	low	costs	choose	more	moderate	plans.	This	phenomenon,	called	adverse	selection,	is	a	major	
concern	in	health	insurance	markets.	Adverse	selection	can	lead	to	three	classes	of	inefficiencies:	prices	
to	participants	do	not	reflect	marginal	costs,	hence	on	a	benefit-cost	basis	individuals	select	the	wrong	
health	plans;	desirable	risk	spreading	is	lost;	and	health	plans	manipulate	their	offerings	to	deter	the	sick	
and	attract	the	healthy	(Cutler	and	Zeckhauser,	1998).
186
Chapter 7
taken care of by improving the transparency of CDI products. Consumer organisations 
can play an important role in clarifying the market offer for the consumer.
7.2. dISCuSSIOn
In this thesis, we have discussed several issues relating to private expenditure on health 
and voluntary private health insurance (PHI). The two themes are closely related since 
expenditure covered by PHI is a part of private expenditure on health. The other part is 
out-of-pocket expenditure on health.
In the European Union (EU), private expenditure represents 21 per cent of total expen-
diture on health (2015). PHI covers only one-quarter of private expenditure on health. 
With 15 per cent of total health spending, out-of-pocket expenditure is quite substantial 
in the EU. In the United States, for instance, out-of-pocket represents 12 per cent of total 
health spending.
PHI converts out-of-pocket health spending into spending covered by insurance. In this 
discussion, we will focus on this conversion.
Health insurance has two important advantages for the consumer, but also two disad-
vantages (see Table 4 below). On the one hand, health insurance reduces the financial 
risk for the insured and provides access to health care that would otherwise be unaf-
fordable (Nyman, 1999). People wish to reduce the impact of unexpected shocks to their 
levels of overall consumption (Pauly, 2007). On the other hand, insurance increases costs. 
This is due to loading -the administrative and other expenses of the insurer- and moral 
hazard.  Moral hazard refers to adverse behaviours encouraged by the guarantee of 
financial protection against losses caused by the occurrence of adverse events (Gruber, 
2005). Insurance reduces the marginal cost of health care services borne by the indi-
vidual which may result in excessive consumption of these services (‘consumer-initiated 
moral hazard’). Providers may also be inclined to induce additional demand for services 
for which they know that the costs are covered by insurance (‘supplier-induced moral 
hazard’) (Pauly, 1968; Feldstein, 1970; Feldman and Dowd, 1991; Paolucci, 2011).
Table 4. Advantages and disadvantages of health insurance
advantages disadvantages
Reduction of financial risk for the insured Loading costs
Access to health care that would otherwise be unaffordable Moral hazard
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Consumption of health goods and services that are not covered by mandatory basic 
health insurance or for which substantial cost-sharing arrangements apply may increase 
financial risk. Access to these goods and services may prove difficult or impossible be-
cause of financial reasons. PHI can reduce financial risk and guarantee access to health 
care.
However, loading costs of PHI are significant. In France, loading costs of PHI are 15 per 
cent for non-profit provident associations, 19 per cent for non-profit mutual associa-
tions and 23 per cent for commercial for-profit insurance companies.242 Loading costs of 
mandatory basic health insurance are lower because of economies of scale and because 
there are no acquisition costs.
Moral hazard is a particularly important issue as far as health insurance is concerned. 
Because insurance reduces the user price of health care and because the premium a 
person pays is usually independent of that person’s use, the person responds to the 
lower out-of-pocket price by demanding more medical care and possibly more expen-
sive types of medical care. Insurance that makes all care free of out-of-pocket payment 
leads to nearly 50 percent greater spending than wealth-related catastrophic coverage 
with deductibles, with very modest improvements in health outcomes (Pauly, 2007).
PHI can be worthwhile if the advantages outweigh the disadvantages.
Loading costs can be reduced by automating administrative and sales processes. Thanks 
to digitalisation and artificial intelligence, the loading costs of Sygeforsikringen, a non-
profit Danish private health insurer with two million clients, are under 8 per cent.
Viability of PHI can be improved by effectively counteracting moral hazard and adverse 
selection. Cost-sharing arrangements, such as deductibles, co-payments (fixed sum) and 
co-insurance (percentage), can be used and costs can be reduced through negotiations 
with health care providers. In countries such as Belgium, France and the Netherlands, 
most private dental insurance products offer only limited benefits because insurers have 
insufficiently invested in measures to counteract moral hazard and adverse selection.
The crucial question is: which private health costs should PHI cover?
242	 Acquisition	costs,	which	represent	a	significant	part	of	loading	costs,	are	5,	6	and	13	per	cent	for	provident	
associations,	mutual	associations	and	insurance	companies	respectively	(DREES,	2015).	Loading	costs	of	
mandatory	basic	health	insurance	are	only	5	per	cent.
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Trivial risks lead to losses that can be borne by the insured without any noticeable 
burden. Coverage of trivial risks does not contribute to ‘the reduction of financial risk for 
the insured’. However, insurance against trivial risks has proven successful, e.g., a dental 
insurance product on offer in the Netherlands, with a coverage limit of 250 EUR per year 
only. This success can be explained by behavioural economics (e.g., debt aversion).
Reimbursement by PHI of cost-sharing arrangements included in mandatory basic 
health insurance schemes is a tricky issue. The question is: what role does cost-sharing 
play? To counteract moral hazard or to shift health costs from public to private sources 
of funding? PHI providing coverage for cost-sharing arrangements imposed by 
mandatory basic health insurance can have an inflationary effect on public health 
spending by eroding the ‘slowing down’ effect of deductibles, co-payments and co-
insurance on the use of health goods and services. Until 2002, Belgian law243 forbade 
coverage of cost-sharing arrangements by PHI. However, this legal provision was never 
enforced and in 2002 it was removed from the law altogether.
The relationship between PHI and the supplementary fee system in Belgium and France 
can also be called into question. People subscribing PHI may be less price-sensitive. 
Knowing that a patient is additionally insured may lead health care providers to charge 
higher fees. As a result, PHI can have an inflationary effect on supplementary fees. 
This inflationary effect could be counteracted by engineering effective cost-sharing ar-
rangements for the reimbursement of supplementary fees.
In Belgian hospitals, supplementary fees are allowed in single rooms only. The link be-
tween supplementary fees and single rooms has a negative effect on the level of comfort 
in Belgian hospitals. In the rest of the economy, single rooms have long since become 
the standard. We cannot imagine a hotel receptionist telling us we will need to spend 
the night sharing our room with X, Y or Z in the bed next to us. In current times, with 
privacy being increasingly prized, it would be better to cut the link between single 
rooms and supplementary fees and offer a single room to every patient.
Providing access to (new) health technologies, not (yet) reimbursed by mandatory 
basic health insurance is an important role to be played by PHI. According to Thom-
son and Mossialos (2009), this role is more significant than giving subscribers greater 
choice of provider and enabling them to bypass waiting lists for publicly-financed treat-
ment. PHI covering new health technologies is a good thing, provided governments do 
243	 Art.	 37,	§18	Wet	betreffende	de	verplichte	verzekering	voor	geneeskundige	verzorging	en	uitkeringen	
gecoördineerd	op	14	juli	1994	(Belgian	Health	Insurance	Law).
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not use the existence of PHI to shift costs from public to private sources of funding. PHI 
creates solidarity amongst subscribers. This is better than a situation without PHI, where 
access to expensive new health technologies is limited to ‘the happy few’ (= the rich). If 
the whole population ought to have access, any new health technology should be read-
ily reimbursed by mandatory basic health insurance. However, this may not be feasible, 
because of budgetary constraints. an alternative and less costly solution could be 
for governments to subsidise PHI in order to provide access to new health tech-
nologies for people with low-income. In France, for instance, government subsidises 
people with low-income to buy PHI.
Reimbursement of new health technologies by PHI often is followed by reimbursement 
by mandatory basic health insurance. Reimbursement by PHI is used as an argument 
by health technology companies and health care providers, when lobbying for reim-
bursement by mandatory basic health insurance. Therefore, coverage of new health 
technologies by PHI should be the result of careful consideration. Evidence-based 
medicine should be the guiding principle. reimbursement by PHI can give an aura of 
respectability to therapies that are not evidence-based. This is for instance the case 
for alternative medicine (e.g., homeopathy), which is sometimes reimbursed by PHI.
Creating transparency on the availability of new health technology is an important is-
sue. Patients have the right to know that new technology is on the market, even 
when their physicians assume that their patients cannot afford to pay for the new 
technology out-of-pocket. The decision whether or not to pay for new health tech-
nology ought to lie with the patient. After all, the patient may have access to funding 
sources (e.g., through friends, family or crowdfunding) that the physician is not aware of. 
The patient can also decide to forgo other consumption, in order to be able to finance 
new health technology.
Weisbrod (1991) has shown how the expansion of health insurance has contributed to 
financing the development of new health technologies, and how new technologies 
have expanded demand for insurance. In times when budgets of mandatory basic 
health insurance tend to be tight, PHI could provide additional funding for new 
health technologies. In this way, PHI could contribute to the further evolution of health 
technology.
In 2006, the Dutch government decided to exclude dental care and physiotherapy from 
the basic package. Only elective treatments are covered by mandatory basic health insur-
ance (e.g., dental care for children under age 18 and physiotherapy for critical illnesses). 
Dutch patients can buy voluntary private health insurance products for dental care and 
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physiotherapy. In many countries, reimbursement of dental care and physiotherapy 
by mandatory basic health insurance is quite limited. Excluding them from the basic 
package can free up money; money that could be used, for instance, for more extensive 
reimbursement by mandatory basic health insurance of new, expensive cancer treat-
ments. by providing coverage for so-called less essential health care services, PHI 
could help governments to free up money for new, expensive, health technologies.
Giving a greater choice of provider and providing access to a preferred provider are also 
roles which can be played by PHI. Supplementary fees can buy access to a preferred 
physician (e.g., a physician working in a private hospital -‘clinique privée’- in France and a 
senior resident -‘Chefarzt’- in Germany). However, as discussed in chapter 3, the current 
supplementary fee system is not sustainable. There is cost inflation of supplementary 
fees and -most importantly- the added value for the patient is not clear. Patients should 
get extra value for the extra money paid. Today, there is little transparency as to the 
quality of care provided by a physician charging supplementary fees. If such transpar-
ency were to be created, the current supplementary fee system might no longer be 
acceptable since everyone -not only those able to pay supplementary fees- would want 
to have access to physicians providing -objectively proven- better quality of care. a 
system could be conceived where -instead of charging supplementary fees on top 
of social security tariffs- physicians are free to set their fees but without reimburse-
ment by mandatory basic health insurance. Such a system exists in France, where 
about 1,000 physicians -sector 3 physicians- are not reimbursed by mandatory basic 
health insurance. They need to prove that they are worth the (extra) money. If such a 
system exists, it is important -for equity reasons- for basic mandatory health insurance 
to provide comprehensive coverage and a good quality of care. The advantage of such 
system is that physicians would need to make a clear choice: either they choose to work 
within the social security system (and fully respect social security tariffs), or they choose 
to work outside of the social security system (and are at liberty to set their fees). The 
disadvantage is that physicians choosing to opt out of the social security system would 
no longer be accessible for people with low incomes. Eventually, this might lead to top 
physicians only being accessible for the wealthy. However, this risk is also inherent in the 
current systems of supplementary fees.
Currently, PHI represents only 5 per cent of total health spending and one quarter of 
private health spending in the EU. High out-of-pocket spending is at odds with equal 
access to health care. Therefore, in the absence of coverage by mandatory basic health 
insurance, converting out-of-pocket spending into spending covered by PHI is a step 
forward. However, PHI is a step forward only then when the advantages of insur-
ance outweigh the disadvantages. Insurance coverage is not needed for every euro 
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of out-of-pocket spending. Providing insurance for trivial risks and for cost-sharing ar-
rangements may prove counterproductive. Coverage of non-evidence-based medicine 
can even be dangerous. Fostering competition and applying private insurance logic 
could lead to a decrease in loading costs and a reduction of moral hazard, which -in the 
end- might prove beneficial to the consumer.
In the ideal world, all essential health care should be covered by mandatory basic health 
insurance. In the real world, mandatory basic health insurance can be supplemented by 
voluntary private health insurance.
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Private expenditure on health and voluntary private health insurance
In this thesis, several issues relating to private expenditure on health and voluntary 
private health insurance (PHI) are being discussed. The two themes are closely linked 
since expenditure covered by PHI is a part of private expenditure on health. The other 
part is out-of-pocket expenditure on health.
In the European Union (EU), private expenditure represents -on average- 21 per cent of 
total expenditure on health. Three quarters of private expenditure on health is financed 
out-of-pocket.244 PHI finances only 5 per cent of total health spending in the EU.
We have examined the reliability of OECD Health Statistics as far as private expenditure 
on health is concerned. OECD Health Statistics are a well-known source for detailed in-
formation on health expenditure for policymakers. Official estimates of private expendi-
ture for Belgium for the year 2010 (as published in the OECD Health Statistics) have been 
shown not to be reliable. We have distinguished four major obstacles for estimating pri-
vate health spending: interpretation of definitions, formulation of assumptions, missing 
or incomplete data and incorrect data. Using alternative sources of billing information, 
we have reached more accurate estimates of private and out-of-pocket expenditure. For 
Belgium, we have found differences of more than 100% between our estimates and the 
official Belgian estimates of private health expenditure. For instance, according to OECD 
Health Statistics private expenditure on hospitals in Belgium amounts to 3.1 billion EUR, 
while according to our alternative calculations these expenses represent only 1.1 billion 
EUR. Total private expenditure differs only 1 per cent, but this is a mere coincidence.
Out-of-pocket expenditure on health may negatively affect access to health care. Es-
pecially people on low incomes and in poor health are at risk. They may postpone or 
forgo necessary treatment because they are not able to pay the bill. In this study, we 
have focused on two issues relating to out-of-pocket expenditure on health: (1) extra 
payments guaranteeing free choice of provider (supplementary fees) and (2) extra pay-
ments guaranteeing access to new health technology.
A supplementary fee is a fee charged on top of the tariff set by the mandatory basic 
health insurance scheme.
244	 Surprisingly,	out-of-pocket	expenditure	in	the	EU	is	higher	than	in	the	United	States,	where	out-of-pocket	
represents	12	per	cent	of	total	expenditure	on	health.
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In Belgium and France, access to certain physicians is only possible for patients able 
and willing to pay supplementary fees. In 2012, total supplementary physicians’ fees 
amounted to 781 million EUR and 2644 million EUR in Belgium and France respectively.
In both countries, the supplementary fee system is under pressure because of financial 
sustainability concerns and a lack of added value for the patient. Expenditure on supple-
mentary fees is increasing much faster than total health expenditure. So far, measures 
taken to curb this trend have not been successful. For certain categories of physicians, 
supplementary fees represent one third of total income. For patients, however, the 
added value of supplementary fees is not that clear. Supplementary fees can buy com-
fort (e.g., convenient consultation hours) and access to physicians who refuse to treat 
patients who are not willing to pay supplementary fees. Perceived quality of care plays 
an important role in patients’ willingness to pay supplementary fees. Today, there is no 
evidence that physicians who charge supplementary fees provide better quality of care 
than physicians who do not. However, linking supplementary fees to objectively proven 
quality of care and limiting access to top quality care to patients able and willing to pay 
supplementary fees might not be socially acceptable in many countries.
(New) health technology -health goods and services- which is not (yet) reimbursed by 
health insurance is accessible only for patients able and willing to pay out-of-pocket.
New health technology comes on the market at a rapid pace and -sometimes- at a 
huge cost. Providing access to new health technology is a serious challenge for many 
countries with mandatory basic health insurance. Access to new health technology in 
Belgium and the Netherlands is analysed, using eight concrete examples as a starting 
point for comparing the two -neighbouring- countries. Contrary to the Netherlands, 
out-of-pocket payments for new health technology are widely accepted and practiced 
in Belgium. This difference is largely the result of different regulatory environments. A 
major difference is the way that entitlements to care are described: closed and explicit in 
Belgium versus open and non-explicit in the Netherlands. The characteristics of in-kind 
policies versus reimbursement policies also play a role. Allowing out-of-pocket pay-
ments for new health technology has consequences for the patients. It leads to greater 
access to new health technology for those who are able and willing to pay, but has a 
negative effect on equal access to care. Choice and transparency are enhanced by al-
lowing out-of-pocket payments for new health technology. It can be argued that lack of 
coverage by mandatory health insurance should not render private access to new health 
technology impossible.
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In the EU, households are confronted with substantial private expenditure, representing 
-on average- 21 per cent of total expenditure on health. Voluntary private health insur-
ance (PHI) can reduce the financial risk related to private health spending. In this thesis, 
two issues relating to PHI have been addressed: regulation of PHI markets and optimal 
design of PHI products.
Unlike mandatory basic health insurance, PHI is applying risk-based premiums. In some 
EU countries (i.e., Belgium and Slovenia) government has taken initiative to regulate PHI 
premiums, which is contrary to free market principles.
Recent European Court of Justice (ECJ) case law has highlighted apparent inconsisten-
cies in ECJ rulings on the regulation of PHI. In 2013, the ECJ upheld Belgian regulations 
limiting the operation of the free market by restricting increases in premium rates of 
PHI contracts. By contrast, in 2012, an ECJ ruling required Slovenia to repeal such restric-
tive legislation and not to hinder the operation of the free market. The objective of this 
thesis is to feed the discussion on the question whether and under what conditions 
free-market-driven PHI in the European Union might be acceptable. We conclude that, 
provided that basic health insurance effectively covers all essential healthcare (essential 
healthcare services being broadly defined), PHI could be regulated in the same way as 
all other non-life insurance.
Since private expenditure on dental care is quite substantial in most EU countries, we 
have chosen to focus on complementary dental insurance (CDI) for examining in how 
far the current offer of PHI products responds to the features of optimal health insurance 
design.
In Europe, private expenditure represents, on average, 70% of total expenditure on 
dental care. Complementary dental insurance (CDI) provides coverage for a part of these 
private dental costs. However, most CDI products currently on the market in Belgium, 
France, Germany and the Netherlands do not meet the criteria for optimal insurance. An 
optimal dental insurance policy involves a deductible, a co-insurance of losses above 
the deductible, protects the consumer against large financial risks and gives access 
to otherwise unavailable dental treatment (e.g., implants and crowns). The gap with 
optimal insurance design can be explained by supply-side aspects (the limits of insur-
ability) and demand-side aspects (behavioural economics). Policymakers should care-
fully decide which dental care is essential and ought to be covered by mandatory basic 
health insurance. Dental care which is not essential and not covered by mandatory basic 
health insurance should be subject to private insurance logic. If, because of budgetary 
constraints, essential dental care cannot be covered by mandatory basic health insur-
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ance, subsidisation of private insurance for individuals with low incomes might be an 
alternative to full public provision. We conclude with a discussion on possible strategies 
to improve the design of dental insurance.
In the EU, PHI represents only 5 per cent of total health spending and one quarter of 
private health spending. High out-of-pocket spending is at odds with equal access to 
health care. Therefore, in the absence of coverage by mandatory basic health insurance, 
converting out-of-pocket spending into spending covered by PHI, is a step forward. 
However, PHI is a step forward only then when the advantages of insurance outweigh 
the disadvantages. Insurance coverage is not needed for every euro of out-of-pocket 
spending. Providing insurance for trivial risks and for cost-sharing arrangements may 
prove counterproductive. Coverage of non-evidence-based medicine can even be 
dangerous. Fostering competition and applying private insurance logic could lead to 
a decrease in loading costs and a reduction of moral hazard, which -in the end- might 
prove beneficial to the consumer.
In the ideal world, all essential health care should be covered by mandatory basic health 
insurance. In the real world, mandatory basic health insurance can be supplemented by 
voluntary private health insurance.
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Private uitgaven voor gezondheidszorg en vrijwillige private 
ziektekostenverzekering
In deze thesis worden verschillende onderwerpen besproken met betrekking tot de 
private uitgaven voor gezondheidszorg en de vrijwillige private ziektekostenverzeke-
ring. Deze twee thema’s zijn nauw met elkaar verbonden aangezien de uitgaven die zijn 
gedekt door de private ziektekostenverzekering een onderdeel vormen van de private 
uitgaven voor gezondheidszorg.
In de Europese Unie (EU) vormen private uitgaven gemiddeld 21 procent van de totale 
uitgaven voor gezondheidszorg. Drie kwart van de private uitgaven voor gezondheids-
zorg wordt ‘out-of-pocket’ gefinancierd.245 De private ziektekostenverzekering staat in 
voor slechts 5 procent van alle gezondheidsuitgaven in de EU.
We hebben de betrouwbaarheid van de ‘OECD Health Statistics’ onderzocht wat betreft 
de private uitgaven voor gezondheidszorg. De ‘OECD Health Statistics’ verschaffen be-
leidsmakers gedetailleerde informatie over de gezondheidsuitgaven. We hebben aan-
getoond dat de officiële cijfers voor de private uitgaven voor België voor het jaar 2010, 
gepubliceerd in de ‘OECD Health Statistics’, niet betrouwbaar zijn. Er zijn vier hinderpalen 
voor het correct inschatten van de private gezondheidsuitgaven: de interpretatie van 
definities, de formulering van hypothesen, ontbrekende of onvolledige informatie en 
onjuiste informatie. Door gebruik te maken van alternatieve informatiebronnen zijn we 
gekomen tot meer accurate schattingen van de private en ‘out-of-pocket’ uitgaven. We 
hebben verschillen van meer dan 100 procent vastgesteld tussen onze schattingen en 
de officiële Belgische schattingen van de private gezondheidsuitgaven. Bijvoorbeeld, 
volgens de ‘OECD Health Statistics’ bedragen de private uitgaven voor ziekenhuizen in 
België 3,1 miljard EUR, terwijl deze uitgaven volgens onze alternatieve berekeningen 
slechts 1,1 miljard EUR bedragen. De totale private uitgaven verschillen slechts 1 procent, 
maar dit is louter toeval.
‘Out-of-pocket’ uitgaven kunnen een negatief effect hebben op de toegankelijkheid 
van de gezondheidszorg. Vooral mensen met een laag inkomen en een slechte gezond-
heid lopen een risico. Zij kunnen noodzakelijke zorg uitstellen of ervan afzien omdat 
ze niet in staat zijn om de factuur te betalen. In het kader van deze thesis hebben we 
ons geconcentreerd op twee onderwerpen met betrekking tot ‘out-of-pocket’ uitgaven 
voor gezondheidszorg: (1) extra betalingen die de vrije keuze van zorgverstrekker 
245	 Verrassende	vaststelling	 is	dat	de	‘out-of-pocket’	uitgaven	 in	de	EU	hoger	 liggen	dan	 in	de	Verenigde	
Staten,	waar	de	‘out-of-pocket’	uitgaven	 12	procent	van	de	 totale	uitgaven	voor	gezondheidszorg	uit-
maken.
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waarborgen (ereloonsupplementen) en (2) extra betalingen die de toegang tot nieuwe 
gezondheidstechnologie waarborgen.
Een ereloonsupplement is een extra ereloon dat wordt aangerekend bovenop het ere-
loon dat is vastgesteld door de verplichte ziektekostenverzekering.
In België en Frankrijk is de toegang tot bepaalde artsen alleen mogelijk voor patiënten 
die in staat zijn en bereid zijn om ereloonsupplementen te betalen. In 2012 bedroegen 
de ereloonsupplementen in totaal 781 miljoen EUR in België en 2.644 miljoen EUR in 
Frankrijk.
In beide landen staat het systeem van ereloonsupplementen onder druk wegens be-
zorgdheid over de financiële houdbaarheid en een gebrek aan toegevoegde waarde 
voor de patiënt. De uitgaven voor ereloonsupplementen stijgen veel sneller dan de 
totale gezondheidsuitgaven. Tot dusver zijn maatregelen om deze trend om te buigen 
niet succesvol gebleken. Voor bepaalde categorieën van artsen vertegenwoordigen de 
ereloonsupplementen één derde van hun totale inkomen. Voor patiënten echter, is de 
toegevoegde waarde van ereloonsupplementen niet zo duidelijk. Door ereloonsupple-
menten te betalen, kan de patiënt zijn comfort verhogen (bijvoorbeeld, raadplegingen 
’s avonds laat) en heeft hij toegang tot artsen die weigeren om patiënten te behandelen 
die geen ereloonsupplementen betalen. De gepercipieerde kwaliteit van zorg speelt 
een belangrijke rol in de bereidheid van patiënten om ereloonsupplementen te betalen. 
Maar het is niet duidelijk of artsen die ereloonsupplementen aanrekenen ook betere 
kwaliteit van zorg leveren dan artsen die dit niet doen. Het koppelen van ereloonsup-
plementen aan objectief bewezen kwaliteit van zorg en het beperken van toegang tot 
topzorg tot patiënten die ereloonsupplementen kunnen en willen betalen, zou weleens 
op een grote weerstand kunnen stuiten in veel landen.
(Nieuwe) gezondheidstechnologie -goederen en diensten- die (nog) niet wordt terug-
betaald door de ziektekostenverzekering is alleen toegankelijk voor patiënten die in 
staat en bereid zijn om ‘out-of-pocket’ te betalen.
Nieuwe gezondheidstechnologie komt in hoog tempo op de markt en -soms- tegen 
hoge kosten. Toegang verschaffen tot nieuwe gezondheidstechnologie is een grote 
uitdaging voor veel landen met een verplichte ziektekostenverzekering. We hebben 
de toegang tot nieuwe gezondheidstechnologie in België en Nederland onderzocht, 
waarbij we zijn uitgegaan van acht concrete voorbeelden om beide landen met elkaar 
te vergelijken. In tegenstelling tot Nederland zijn ‘out-of-pocket’ betalingen voor 
nieuwe gezondheidstechnologie een wijdverspreide en aanvaarde praktijk in België. 
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Het verschil is hoofdzakelijk te wijten aan uiteenlopende regelgevingen. Een belang-
rijk onderscheid is de manier waarop aanspraken op zorg zijn gedefinieerd: gesloten 
en expliciet in België versus open en niet expliciet in Nederland.  Het verschil tussen 
naturapolissen en restitutiepolissen speelt ook een rol. Het toelaten van ‘out-of-pocket’ 
betalingen voor nieuwe gezondheidstechnologie heeft gevolgen voor de patiënt. Het 
leidt tot een grotere toegankelijkheid van nieuwe technologie voor hen die het kun-
nen en willen betalen, maar heeft een negatief effect op gelijke toegang tot zorg. Vrije 
keuze en transparantie worden bevorderd door ‘out-of-pocket’ betalingen voor nieuwe 
technologie toe te laten. De stelling kan worden verdedigd dat een gebrek aan dekking 
door de verplichte ziektekostenverzekering private toegang tot nieuwe gezondheids-
technologie niet onmogelijk mag maken.
In de EU worden huishoudens geconfronteerd met belangrijke private uitgaven die 
-gemiddeld- 21 procent van de totale uitgaven voor gezondheidszorg vertegenwoor-
digen. Vrijwillige private ziektekostenverzekeringen (PZKV) kunnen het financieel risico 
verbonden aan private gezondheidsuitgaven verminderen. In het kader van deze thesis 
worden twee onderwerpen met betrekking tot PZKV behandeld: de regulering van 
PZKV markten en het optimale design van PZKV producten.
In tegenstelling tot de verplichte ziektekostenverzekering, hanteert de PZKV op risico 
gebaseerde premies. In bepaalde EU-lidstaten (bijvoorbeeld in België en Slovenië) heeft 
de overheid het initiatief genomen om de premies van PZKV te reguleren, wat in tegen-
spraak is met de vrije markt principes.
Recente rechtspraak van het Europese Hof van Justitie (HvJ) heeft klaarblijkelijke tegen-
strijdigheden in de uitspraken van het HvJ over de regulering van PZKV aan het licht 
gebracht. In 2013 handhaafde het HvJ Belgische regelgeving die premieverhogingen 
voor PZKV-contracten inperkt en daardoor de werking van de vrije markt beperkt. In 
2012 daarentegen, werd Slovenië door een uitspraak van het HvJ verplicht gelijkaardige 
regelgeving in te trekken en de werking van de vrije markt niet te belemmeren. Deze 
thesis beoogt om de discussie aan te zwengelen over de vraag of en onder welke voor-
waarden vrije markt gedreven PZKV in de EU aanvaardbaar zijn. We concluderen dat -op 
voorwaarde dat de basisverzekering alle essentiële zorg dekt (waarbij essentiële zorg 
breed wordt gedefinieerd)- PZKV op dezelfde manier kan worden gereguleerd als alle 
andere ‘non-life’ verzekeringstakken.
Aangezien de private uitgaven voor tandzorg significant zijn in de meeste EU-lidstaten, 
hebben we ervoor gekozen om ons te concentreren op aanvullende tandzorgverzekerin-
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gen om na te gaan in welke mate het huidig aanbod van PZKV-producten beantwoordt 
aan de kenmerken van een optimaal design van ziektekostenverzekering.
In Europa vormen de private uitgaven -gemiddeld- 70 procent van de totale uitgaven 
voor tandzorg. Aanvullende tandzorgverzekeringen bieden dekking voor een deel van 
die private tandzorgkosten. Echter, de meeste aanvullende tandzorgverzekeringen die 
momenteel op de markt zijn in België, Frankrijk, Duitsland en Nederland voldoen niet 
aan de criteria van een optimale verzekering. Een optimale verzekeringspolis omvat 
een eigen risico (‘franchise’; ‘remgeld’), beschermt de consument tegen grote financiële 
risico’s en geeft toegang tot anderszins onbereikbare tandzorg (bijvoorbeeld, tandim-
plantaten en kronen). De kloof met het optimaal design van ziektekostenverzekering 
kan worden verklaard door factoren van vraag (gedragseconomie) en aanbod (de limie-
ten van verzekerbaarheid). Beleidsmakers zouden zorgvuldig moeten overwegen welke 
tandzorg essentieel is en gedekt zou moeten zijn door de verplichte ziektekostenverze-
kering. Tandzorg die niet essentieel is en niet gedekt is door de verplichte ziektekosten-
verzekering zou onderworpen moeten zijn aan de private verzekeringslogica. Wanneer 
omwille van budgettaire beperkingen essentiële tandzorg niet kan worden gedekt 
door de verplichte ziektekostenverzekering, kan subsidiëring van private verzekeringen 
voor mensen met een laag inkomen een alternatief vormen voor een volledig publiek 
aanbod. We besluiten dit onderwerp met een discussie over mogelijke strategieën om 
het design van aanvullende tandzorgverzekeringen te verbeteren.
PZKV vertegenwoordigt slechts 5 procent van de totale gezondheidsuitgaven en een 
kwart van de private gezondheidsuitgaven in de EU. Hoge ‘out-of-pocket’ uitgaven staan 
haaks op een gelijke toegang tot de gezondheidszorg. Wanneer er geen dekking is door 
de verplichte ziektekostenverzekering, betekent het omzetten van ‘out-of-pocket’ uitga-
ven in uitgaven die gedekt zijn door PZKV een stap voorwaarts. Echter, PZKV betekenen 
slechts een stap voorwaarts wanneer de voordelen van verzekering opwegen tegen de 
nadelen ervan. Verzekeringsdekking is niet nodig voor iedere euro die ‘out-of-pocket’ 
wordt betaald. Dekking voorzien voor onbeduidende risico’s en voor het eigen risico 
kan contraproductief zijn. Dekking voor niet wetenschappelijk onderbouwde behande-
lingen kan zelfs gevaarlijk zijn. Het stimuleren van concurrentie en het toepassen van 
private verzekeringslogica kan leiden tot een vermindering van de ‘loading’ kosten en 
een reductie van de ‘moral hazard’, wat -uiteindelijk- gunstig is voor de consument.
In de ideale wereld is alle essentiële zorg gedekt door de verplichte ziektekostenverze-
kering. In de reële wereld kan de verplichte ziektekostenverzekering worden aangevuld 
met vrijwillige private ziektekostenverzekeringen.
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Private expenditure on health and voluntary private
 health insurance  
piet calco
en
In this thesis, several issues relating to private expenditure on 
health and voluntary private health insurance (PHI) are being dis-
cussed. The two themes are closely linked since expenditure cov-
ered by PHI is a part of private expenditure on health. The other 
part is out-of-pocket expenditure on health.
In the European Union (EU), private expenditure represents -on 
average- 21 per cent of total expenditure on health. Three quar-
ters of private expenditure on health is financed out-of-pocket. 
PHI finances only 5 per cent of total health spending in the EU. 
Out-of-pocket expenditure on health may negatively affect ac-
cess to health care. Especially people on low incomes and in 
poor health are at risk. They may postpone or forgo necessary 
treatment because they are not able to pay the bill. In this study, 
we have focused on two issues relating to out-of-pocket expend-
iture on health: (i) extra payments guaranteeing free choice of 
provider (supplementary fees) and (ii) extra payments guarantee-
ing access to new health technology. 
Voluntary private health insurance (PHI) can reduce the financial 
risk related to private health spending. In this thesis, two issues 
relating to PHI have been addressed: (i) regulation of PHI markets 
and (ii) optimal design of PHI products.
